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FIFTH ANNUAL SURVEY OF
NORTH CAROLINA CASE LAW*
The Fifth Annual Survey of North Carolina Case Law is designed
to review cases decided by the North Carolina Supreme Court during
the past three termst of court and to supplement past and future Surveys
in presenting developments in North Carolina case law over a period of
time.
It is not the purpose of the Survey to discuss all the cases that
were decided during the period of its coverage. It is intended to dis-
cuss only those decisions which are of particular importance-cases re-
garded as being of significance and interest to those concerned with the
work of the Court, and decisions which reflect substantial changes and
matters of first impression in the law of North Carolina. Where a case
embraced within the period covered by the Survey has been the subject
of a note in this Law Review, the holding is briefly stated and the note
is cited.
Most of the research for and writing of this Survey was accom-
plished by selected members of the Student Board of Editors of the
Law Review, working under the supervision of the Faculty of the
School of Law of the University of North Carolina. Some sections,
however, represent the individual work of a faculty member.
Student members of the Law Review and the sections for which they
are responsible are:
John T. Allred (Criminal Law and Procedure); David E. Buckner,
Jr. (Domestic Relations, Municipal Corporations, and Trusts); James
N. Golding (Future Interests, Personal Property, Real Property, and
Wills and Administration); Robert L. Grubb, Jr. (Constitutional
Law, Damages, and Evidence); Jimmy W. Kiser (Torts); Henry C.
Lomax (Civil Procedure (Pleading and Parties) (in part) and Taxa-
tion); Frederick C. Meekins (Agency and Workmen's Compensation,
Contracts, and Insurance); Phillip C. Ransdell (Administrative Law,
Business Associations, Credit Transactions, and Sales).
Throughout this Survey the North Carolina Supreme Court will be
referred to as the "Court" unless it appears by its full title. The United
States Supreme Court will be designated only by its full name. North
Carolina General Statutes will be signified in the text by "G.S."
* The period covered embraces the decisions of the North Carolina Supreme
Court reported in 244 N.C. 399 through 247 N.C. 523.
t With the exception of the decisions reported in 247 N.C. 528 through 247 N.C.
669 of the Fall Term 1957.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
JURISDICTION
In Deal v. Enon Sanitary Dist.1 there was a petition filed with the
Board of County Commissioners of Burke County to have a certain area
established as a sanitary district. Fifty-one per cent of the freeholders
of the area signed the petition as required by G.S. § 130-34. After
passing on the petition, the Commissioners sent it to the State Board
of Health, which established the sanitary district but excluded there-
from part of the area described in the petition. The Court construed
G.S. § 130-34 and § 130-36 together and concluded that the two statutes
did not give the State Board of Health discretionary authority to change
the area described in the petition.2  The Court found that a petition
signed by fifty-one per cent of the freeholders of the specific proposed
district was a prerequisite to the State Board of Health's jurisdiction
to establish that proposed district as a sanitary district. Such petition
was here lacking for the smaller district the Board had established.
This seems to be in accord with a prior holding of the Court that the
petition is a prerequisite for jurisdiction. 3 This also seems to be the
general view where administrative action is set in motion by the filing
of a petition.
4
In another case,5 plaintiff city brought suit in the superior court to
restrain defendant, a utilities company, from curtailing services on cer-
tain bus routes within the city. No hearing before the Utilities Com-
mission was held. The Supreme Court dissolved the injunction because
G.S. § 62-121.47(1) vests jurisdiction over disputes involving ex-
tensions and services of such common carriers as a city bus company
in the Utilities Commission; this jurisdiction is exclusive and does not
depend on a provision in the franchise contract granting jurisdiction.
The Court also reminded the defendant that it could not change its
schedules and services until authorized to do so by the Utilities Com-
mission, since the defendant and the city were unable to agree. Thus
the Court seems to be applying the "primary jurisdiction doctrine"
which requires the Utilities Commission to pass on matters within its
'245 N.C. 74, 95 S.E.2d 362 (1956).
2 However, chapter 130 of the General Statutes was rewritten by the Legislature
in 1957 to become effective January 1, 1958. Under the new statutes, it seems the
State Board of Health may make minor changes in the boundaries as described in
the petition because of the following clause found in G.S. § 130-125 (Supp. 1957) :
"[P]rovided that the State Board of Health may make minor deviation, in de-
fining the boundaries, from those prescribed in the petition when the Board de-
termines that it is advisable in the interest of the public health .. .
' Idol v. Hanes, 219 N.C. 723, 14 S.E.2d 801 (1941).
'See 17A Am. JuR., Drains and Sewers § 29 (1957).
'Winston-Salem v. Winston-Salem City Coach Lines, Inc., 245 N.C. 179, 95
S.E.2d 510 (1956).
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jurisdiction concerning public utilities before any court acts in the
matter.6
LICENSES
In Boyd v. Allen 7 petitioner's retail beer permit was suspended for
twelve months by the State Board of Alcoholic Control because his em-
ployees sold beer on the premises after hours and also sold whiskey
on the premises, both without the knowledge or consent of the licensee.
The Court pointed out that the business of dealing in intoxicating
liquors is not a vested or constitutional right but is a privilege held
subject to the police power of the state. Thus the licensee can be
held strictly liable in an administrative proceeding for the actions of
his employees. The Court cited authority to the effect that the sale of
intoxicating liquors could be prohibited altogether or the privilege could
be granted to one class and denied to another." The holding is in ac-
cord with the generally accepted view.9
In another case10 a dispensing optician's license was revoked for
material fraud and misrepresentation in the procurement of the license.
The grounds for revocation of a license issued by'the Board of Opticians
are set out in G.S. § 90-249,11 and fraud or misrepresentation is not one
of the grounds listed. However, the Court held that the Board had
inherent power, without statutory authority, to revoke a license im-
properly issued by reason of material fraud or misrepresentation in its
procurement.
12
In Roller v. Allen,13 G.S. §§ 87-28 to -38, requiring that tile con-
tractors be licensed, was declared unconstitutional on the ground that it
was an unwarranted interference with the fundamental right to engage
in an ordinary and innocuous occupation; it could not be upheld as an
'DAVIS, ADMINiSTRA=IE LAW § 197 (1951). However, it has been held that
the superior court could exercise original jurisdiction and grant equitable relief
to duly licensed franchise carriers when their routes were being invaded by un-
licensed carriers. City Coach Co. v. Gastonia Transit Co., 227 N.C. 391, 42
S.E.2d 398 (1947).
7246 N.C. 150, 97 S.E.2d 864 (1957).
' 11 Amd. Ju, Constitutional Law § 29 (1937).
'DAVIs, ADnINIsTrnvE LAW § 69 (1951). Also, licenses for such purposes
as selling liquor may be suspended or revoked under the police power of the state
without observing such requirements as giving notice and an opportunity to be
heard. Ibid.
"In re Berman, 245 N.C. 612, 96 S.E.2d 836 (1957).
"' This statute also provides that the procedure for revocation and suspension of
licenses of dispensing opticians shall be in accordance with chapter 150 of the
General Statutes entitled "Uniform Revocation of Licenses." See Note, 31 N.C.L.
REv. 378 (1953), for a discussion of the latter statute.
" In Attorney-General v. Gorson, 209 N.C. 320, 183 S.E. 392 (1935), the
Court held that it had inherent power to revoke the license of an attorney if
procured by fraud and misrepresentation.
12245 N.C. 516, 96 S.E.2d 851 (1957). See Note, 35 N.C.L. REv. 473 (1957),
for a discussion of this case.
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exercise of the police power, since its provisions have no substantial
relation to the public health, safety, morals or welfare, but tend to create
a monopoly.
ADmINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
In Penland v. Bird Coal Co.14 the Supreme Court affirmed an award
by the Industrial Commission even though incompetent evidence was
admitted at the hearing. The Court found that the essential findings
of the Commission were supported by competent evidence and therefore
were conclusive on appeal. The Court also held that it would review
only the record that was before the superior court. Thus a point the
defendant raised in his appeal to the full Commission but which was
not included in the certified record sent up to the superior court could
not be passed on by the Supreme Court.
In Burleson v. Francis15 the Supreme Court was entertaining an
appeal from the superior court pursuant to a judicial review provision
of the Agricultural Adjustment Act,16 which provided: "The review by
the court shall be limited to questions of law, and the findings of fact
by the review committee, if supported by evidence shall be conclusive."
The Court said: "In the light of this provision the finding of fact by
[sic] Judge of Superior Court that the determination by the Review
Committee is supported by substantial evidence is binding on this Court
if there be evidence to support it."' Thus the Court seems to be saying
that a decision as to whether a determination by an administrative agency
is supported by substantial evidence is a finding of fact. Other courts
interpreting this provision of the Agricultural Adjustment Act indicate
that whether the findings of the Review Committee are supported by
substantial evidence is a question of law.18 The North Carolina Supreme
-"246 N.C. 26, 97 S.E.2d 432 (1957).
2-246 N.C. 619, 99 S.E.2d 767 (1957).6 52 STAT. 63 (1938), 7 U.S.C. § 1366 (1952).
17Burleson v. Francis, 246 N.C. 619, 620, 99 S.E.2d 767, 768 (1957). The
Court cited Lee v. DeBerry, 219 S.C. 382, 65 S.E.2d 775 (1951), as authority for
this proposition. This case involved an appeal pursuant to the same section of the
Agricultural Adjustment Act as that involved in the North Carolina case. The
South Carolina court merely recited the fact that judicial review was limited to
questions of law, reviewed the evidence, and reversed the court of common pleas
which had reversed the review committee. The court did not say that the court of
common pleas made a finding of fact when it determined that the Review Com-
mittee's findings were not supported by evidence. Indeed, the court treated it as
a question of law because it reviewed the evidence and reached its own conclusion
as to whether there was evidence to support the Review Committee's findings of
fact.
16 Mace v. Berry, 225 S.C. 160, 81 S.E.2d 276 (1954) ; Lyerly v. Lawrimore,
144 F. Supp. 345 (1956). The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly said
that whether there is any evidence to support findings of fact made by the ad-
ministrative agency is a question of law and not of fact. Florida East Coast
Line v. United States, 234 U.S. 167 (1913) ; Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Louis-
ville and N.R.R., 227 U.S. 88 (1912).
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Court has repeatedly stated while reviewing the decisions of other
administrative agencies that whether findings of fact are supported by
evidence is a question of law to be considered on judicial review.19
Thus, the language of this case seems to be contrary to previous North
Carolina cases and to cases in other jurisdictions.
In another case 2° involving a proceeding under the Tort Claims Act,
the Court held that since it was unable to determine whether the In-
dustrial Commission had limited its consideration of negligence to that
of the employee named in the claim, or whether it had also considered
the negligence of the employee named in a stipulation between the
parties as being the one in charge of maintenance of the particular high-
way involved, it was proper for the superior court to remand the case
to the Commission for, the answer and for any modification of the award
made necessary by such finding. Another point in the case involved
a statement in the superior court's order remanding the case to the
Commission. The order stated that stipulated facts and certain findings
of the Commission compelled the conclusion that a dangerous condi-
tion existed on the highway for at least ten days, and that the Court was
of the opinion that whether the supervisor was negligent would depend
on whether he had notice or should have known of the condition. The
Court struck out this statement, since negligence is a mixed question of
law and fact, on which the Commission must be free to make its own
findings.
21
PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY
In North Carolina ex rel. Util. Comm'ne v. Casey,22 the Court affirmed
a decision supporting a finding by the Utilities Commission that public
convenience and necessity no longer required and were no longer served
by the operation and ownership of an electrical distribution system in
the city of Kinston by the utility company, that the system should be
discontinued, and that the sale of the equipment would be in accord
with public convenience and necessity. Thus, a contract between the
utility company and the city of Kinston for the sale of the electrical
'" Thomason v. Red Bird Cab Co., 235 N.C. 602, 70 S.E.2d 706 (1952) ; Smith
v. Southern Waste Paper Co., 226 N.C. 47, 36 S.E.2d 730 (1945) ; Logan v. John-
son, 218 N.C. 200, 10 S.E.2d 653 (1940).
-'Tucker v. State Highway & Public Works Comm'n, 247 N.C. 171, 100 S.E.2d
514 (1957).
"The Court has stated on numerous occasions that the Commission's findings
on a mixed question of law and fact are conclusive on appeal if there is sufficient
evidence to sustain the facts found. Lewter v. Abercrombie Enterprises, Inc., 240
N.C. 399, 82 S.E.2d 410 (1954); Beach v. McLean, 219 N.C. 521, 14 S.E.2d 515
(1941). However, in actually applying that rule, the Court seems to separate the
questions of law from the questions of fact and review the questions of law but
accept the questions of fact if supported by evidence. See Lewter v. Abercrombie
Enterprises, Inc., .rpra.
22 245 N.C. 297, 96 S.E.2d 8 (1956).
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distribution system to the city was approved. The Court held the Util-
ities Commission has both the authority and the duty to pass upon such
contracts and to determine whether or not it is in the public interest
to permit their consummation. 23
LIABmTY or MEMBERS OF AN ADmINISTRATIVE BODY
In Langley v. Taylor2 4 the Court held that individual members of the
Alcoholic Beverages Control Board of Beaufort County were not liable
for injuries inflicted by an employee enforcement officer even though the
Board had not required the officer to post bond. One basis for the de-
cision was that, conceding the Board had the duty to require the officer
to post bond, in the absence of statute expressly imposing such liability,
a public officer who is a member of a corporate or governmental body
on which a duty rests cannot be held liable for the neglect of duty of that
body if he acts in good faith. While this may be the general view25
there is authority to the contrary, at least for ministerial acts required
of the governmental body.28
AGENCY AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
AGENCY
Distinction Between Liability of Absentee-Owner and Owner-Occupant
The only significant case in agency is Litaker v. Bost,' an action for
wrongful death in which plaintiff alleged negligence against both A-the
owner-occupant-and B-the party named in the complaint as the driver
of the vehicle at the time of the accident. The evidence was conflicting
as to whether B or another passenger in the vehicle was driving. A
verdict was returned against A but not B. The Court upheld the de-
cision of the lower court allowing plaintiff to amend the complaint after
verdict so as to allege (1) that the car was being driven by either one
of the passengers referred to in the evidence, and (2) that in either
event, A was responsible for the negligence of the driver. 2
In a deliberate dictum the Court distinguishes between the basis of
liability on the part of an absentee-owner and that of an owner-occupant,
"' N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 62-27, -29, -96 (1950) seem to place this duty on the
Utilities Commission before a utility company can abandon part or all of its service
to the public. This appears to be the general rule both as to abandonment of
services and selling facilities. 73 C.J.S., Public Utilities § 43 (1951).
24245 N.C. 59, 95 S.E.2d 115 (1956).22DAvIs, ADmINISTRAlVE LAW § 231 (1951).
26First Nat'l Bank v. Filer, 107 Fla. 526, 145 So: 204 (1933).
1247 N.C. 298, 101 S.E.2d 31 (1957).
2 See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-163 to -168 (1953).
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stating that the former depends upon the application of the doctrine of
respondeat superior while the latter, provided the driver is not the
agent of the owner, depends solely upon the owner's own acts or omis-
sions as related to his right to control and to direct the operation of
his car.3
The Court states that "to establish the liability of an absentee-owner,
it must be shown that the driver was the owner's agent and then acting
in furtherance of the owner's business. Ordinarily, in such case, the
identity of the driver would be a vital factor in the determination of the
alleged agency.' 4 This would appear to be applicable only in those
situations where the plaintiff seeks to hold the owner liable without the
aid of G.S. § 20.71.1(b), which provides that "proof of the registration
of a motor vehicle in the name of any person . . . shall . . .be prima
facie evidence . . .that such motor vehicle was then being operated by
and under the control of a person for whose conduct the owner was
legally responsible . . . ." It would seem that proof of the driver's
identity would not be essential if the statute is applicable.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Attack by Fellow-Employee
In order for compensation to be recovered for the death of an em-
ployee caused by the assault of a fellow-employee, it is required that
the injury causing the death result from an accident arising out of and
in the course of the employment. Where the killing results from per-
sonal enmity alone5 and the attack does not arise as an incident of the
employment," recovery will be denied. But where the assault arises
from a dispute over work7 and a causal relation exists between the em-
ployment and the dispute, recovery will be allowed when the evidence
shows that the employees had no personal contacts outside of the
employment.8
Zimmerman v. Elizabeth City Freezer Locker9 represents a liberal
application of these rules to an interesting fact situation. A had a feeling
of hatred toward people in general and, because of arguments and
bickering in connection with his employment, toward certain fellow-
employees in particular. He was suffering from a mental disturbance
"triggered" by an incident at a local draft board which caused him
8 See, e.g., Harper v. Harper, 225 N.C. 260, 34 S.E.2d 185 (1945).
'1247 N.C. at 309-10, 101 S.E.2d at 39.
'Harden v. Thomasville Furniture Co., 199 N.C. 733, 155 S.E. 728 (1930).
'Ashley v. F-W Chevrolet Co.,'222 N.C. 25, 21 S.E.2d 834 (1942).THegler v. Cannon Mills Co., 224 N.C. 669, 31 S.E.2d 918 (1944).
'Withers v. Black, 230 N.C. 428, 53 S.E.2d 668 (1949). But see Holmes v.
M. G. Brown Co., Docket No. 4277 (May 31, 1944) (compensation denied where
deceased was murdered by an insane employee).
p244 N.C. 628, 94 S.E.2d 813 (1956).
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to become exceedingly angry. He went to his room, loaded a rifle,
walked several blocks back to the place of his employment, and shot
three fellow-employees, killing two of them. The evidence established
that A had made a statement to a police officer that he did not attempt
to kill anyone else because he preferred to kill someone he knew at
the plant and that he had no personal contact with the fellow-employees
outside of the employment. The Court held that the injuries resulted
from an "accident arising out of and in the course of the employment"
within the meaning of G.S. § 97-2(f) and affirmed the awards made by
the Industrial Commission to the three claimants.
The decision apparently extends the previous rule regarding acci-
dents of this character in that the Court allowed compensation for in-
juries resulting from an assault triggered by an event unrelated to the
employment, but having its root in a psychic condition aggravated by a
series of disputes related to the employment.
Average Weekly Wages
In Liles v. Faulkner Neon & Elec. Co.10 the deceased was employed
part-time during vacation and after school for a period of eleven weeks
preceding his death. During the period he received an average weekly
wage of $26.88. There was evidence that a full-tine employee doing
similar work would have earned $34.88 per week. However, there was
no evidence as to the average weekly amount a part-time worker had
earned during the fifty-two weeks previous to decedent's injury while
working for this employer or any other in the same locality or com-
munity, and there was no evidence that any part-time worker earned
a higher average weekly wage than $26.88.
The Court, interpreting G.S. § 97-2(e), found that an award based
on wages representing the amount the decedent would have earned had
he been a full-time employee was erroneous under the circumstances
presented here. The correct basis would be the wages of a part-time
employee of the same grade and character employed in the same class of
employment. As the Court points out, this proposition is in accord with
decisions of other jurisdictions having similar statutory provisions."
Blood Test
Where a medical blood test is required by statute' 2 in the interest of
public health because of the nature of the work, the Court held that an
injury resulting therefrom is not compensable under the Workmen's
Compensation Act.' 3 Apparently, the reason for so holding is that
10 244 N.C. 653, 94 S.E.2d 790 (1956).
11 See 58 Am. Jum., Workmen's Compensation § 309 (1948) ; 71 C.J.S., Work-
men's Compensation Acts §§ 521-22 (1935) ; Annot., 112 A.L.R. 1094 (1)38).
12 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130-20 (1952).
3' King v. Arthur, 245 N.C. 599, 96 S.E.2d 846 (1957).
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the employer was obligated by law to see that the employees submitted
to the tests. Therefore, the employee, in submitting, was merely satis-
fying a condition precedent to qualifying for the particular type of
employment.
Although it may be said that the employee was qualifying for con-
tinued employment it seems equally logical to say that in having the
tests administered the employer was qualifying for continued operation.
Thus, the benefit to the employer is certainly as great as that to the
employee, and in the light of the social policy which engenders com-
pensation legislation, the soundness of this decision seems open to
question. 14
Effect of "Release" by Administratrix as to Minor Dependent
In McGill v. Bison Fast Freight, Inc.,' 5 a case of first impression, the
Court held that a "full release" executed by the wife of a deceased em-
ployee as administratrix and individually was effective as a complete bar
to her claim for compensation under G.S. § 97-38, but that the release
was not effective as a bar to a claim for compensation by a minor de-
pendent for whom no guardian had been appointed at the time the
release was executed.' 6 The Court points out that the recovery should
be diminished by the amount of the release consideration actually avail-
able for the child.
Highway Accidents
In Hardy v. Small17 a thirteen-year-old general farm laborer was
killed by an automobile as he crossed a highway on his way home from
the employer's barn. The highway traversed the farm and lay between
the barn and the employee's home. The Court, in affirming the award,
held that since the highway was a hazard necessary to be crossed in
going from one part of the farm to another and was not being used as
a means of travel to and from work, the employee was in the course of
his employment from the time he left his home for work until he returned
to the area of his home located on the farm.
In Horn v. Sandhill Furniture Co.'8 it was held that an injury re-
ceived by an employee resulting from an accident on a highway while
going to a place of his own choice for lunch (a parking lot on the
employer's' property) was not compensable.' 9
,See Note, 36 N.C.L. REv. 110 (1957).
' 245 N.C. 469, 96 S.E.2d 438 (1957).
'o "No limitation of time provided in this article for the giving of notice or
making claim under this article shall run against any person who is mentally in-
competent, or a minor dependent, as long as he has no guardian, trustee, or com-
mittee." (Emphasis added.) N.C. GEN. SrAr. § 97-50 (1950).
17 246 N.C. 581, 99 S.E.2d 862 (1957).
18245 N.C. 173, 95 S.E.2d 521 (1956).
"For a discussion of Hardy v. Small, 246 N.C. 581, 99 S.E.2d 862 (1957), and
1958]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Silicosis and Asbestosis
In Brinkley v. United Feldspar & Minerals Corp.20 the Court states
that the Industrial Commission has again misconstrued Honeycutt v.
Carolina Asbestos Co.21 with reference to the interpretation of G.S.
§ 97-54 prior to the 1955 amendment.2 2 The Court holds that "dis-
ablement" resulting from asbestosis or silicosis means the event of be-
coming actually incapacitated from performing normal labor in the last
occupation in which remuneratively employed and that such occupa-
tion may be one wholly separate and apart from the employment in
which the employee was last exposed to the hazards of the occupa-
tional disease(s) .23 Perhaps the present decision adds somewhat to the
confusion of the Honeycutt case in that there is seemingly a discrepancy
between the holding of that case as recited in the present decision and
that reported in the original decision. In the present case the Court
implies that the last occupation in which Honeycutt was remuneratively
employed at the time he became disabled was that of a policeman of the
Town of Davidson. In the Honeycutt case the Court held that he had
become incapacitated from performing normal labor while employed as
an asbestos worker, and that this was the last occupation in which he
was remuneratively employed when he became so disabled. The legis-
lature amended G.S. § 97-54 in 1955, and since it is not likely that
Honeycutt will again be cited as precedent, this discrepancy would not
seem to be important.
The statutory provisions relating to compensation payable to em-
ployees suffering from silicosis as rewritten by the legislature in 1955
were held to be correctly interpreted by the Commission in Pitman v.
Horn v. Sandhill Furniture Co., supra note 18, see Note, 36 N.C.L. Ray. 367
(1958).20246 N.C. 17, 97 S.E.2d 419 (1957).
21235 N.C. 471, 70 S.E.Zd 426 (1952).
22 Prior to the 1955 amendment this section read: "The term 'disablement' as
used in this article as applied to cases of asbestosis and silicosis means the event
of becoming actually incapacitated, because of such occupational disease, from per-
forming normal labor in the last occupation in which remuneratively employed...."
It now reads: "The term 'disablement' as used in this article as applied to cases
of asbestosis and silicosis means the event of becoming actually incapacitated be-
cause of asbestosis or silicosis to earn, in the same or any other employment, the
wages which the employee was receiving at the time of his last injurious exposure
to asbestosis or silicosis . . . ." (Emphasis added.)
8 The Industrial Commission in both Brinkley v. United Feldspar & Minerals
Corp., 246 N.C. 17, 97 S.E.2d 419 (1957), and Huskins v. United Feldspar Corp.,
241 N.C. 128, 84 S.E.2d 645 (1954), erroneously interpreted the statute as if to
read that disablement resulting from asbestosis or silicosis meant the event of be-
coming actually incapacitated from performing normal labor in the last occupation
in which remuneratively employed while exposed to the hazard of silica. For a
discussion of the Huskins case, supra, and Honeycutt v. Carolina Asbestos Co., 235
N.C. 471, 70 S.E.2d 426 (1952), see Third Annual Survey of North Carolina Case
Law, 34 N.C.L. Rav. 1, 12-13 (1955).
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Carpenter.24 Thus, where the employee was found in the first hearing 25
to have silicosis and ordered to abstain from work having the hazards
of silica dust and to report for second2 6 and third2 7 medical examina-
tions, it was proper that he be awarded compensation as provided by
G.S. § 97-61.5(b) 28 without consideration of the fact that his condition
was complicated by pulmonary tuberculosis. 29 The total amount of com-
pensation is to be determined on the final hearing after the third medical
examination."0 At this time consideration should be given to the
tubercular condition of the employee, prior payments being credited
toward the total amount.
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS
CORPORATIONS
Liability of Corporate Officers
In Peed v. Burleson's, Inc.1 an officer of the defendant corporation
converted plaintiff's goods which the corporation received and handled
in the course of its business. The Court affirmed a nonsuit as to
another officer of the corporation who neither participated in nor had
knowledge of the conversion. The Court held that the mere fact that
the corporation accepted the benefits of the conversion is not a sufficient
basis to impose individual liability on the innocent officer of the corpora-
tion.2 The Court reversed a judgment of nonsuit as to the corporation
and the officer participating in the conversion. The question of whether
the original seller could sue the corporation is covered under SALES.
21247 N.C. 63, 100 S.E.2d 231 (1957).
11 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-61.5 (Supp. 1957).2
-N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-61.3 (Supp. 1957).
'
7 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-61.4 (Supp. 1957).
' This section provides that "if the employee is removed from the industry the
employer shall pay or cause to be paid as in this subsection provided to the em-
ployee affected by such asbestosis or silicosis a weekly compensation equal to 60%
of his average weekly wages before removal from the industry, but not more than
thirty-two dollars and fifty cents ($32.50) or less than ten dollars ($10.00) a week,
which compensation shall continue for a period of 104 weeks." (Emphasis added.)
Thus the terms of the statute are mandatory in nature upon the finding of either
asbestosis or silicosis and removal from the industry.
" "In case of disablement or death, due primarily from silicosis and/or asbestosis
and complicated with tuberculosis of the lungs compensation shall be payable as
hereinbefore provided, except that the rate of payments mway be reduced one-sixth."
(Emphasis added.) N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-65 (Supp. 1957). The reduction of
"one-sixth" apparently is merely permissive in nature.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-61.6 (Supp. 1957).
'244 N.C. 437, 94 S.E.2d 351 (1956).
2 This is in accord with the general view that an officer is not liable for the
torts of the corporation unless he participated in, authorized, or acquiesced iri the
tort. 19 C.J.S., Corporations § 845 (1940).
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Dividends
In Bell Bakeries, Inc. v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co.8 the pro-
visions of a deed of trust restricted the payment of dividends by the
debtor if such payment would reduce working capital below a stated
amount. The debtor corporation paid interest on debentures of its
parent corporation which owned all of the debtor's stock. The Court
held that such payments were dividends and were made in violation of
the provisions in the deed of trust. The Court pointed out that in such
closely held corporations as the debtor corporation, a dividend may be
paid although it is distributed informally and without denomination as
such in the corporate documents.
UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS
In Solon Lodge v. Ionic Lodge4 an unincorporated fraternal organ-
ization, hereinafter called the Lodge, formed a non-stock corporation to
which it had title to real estate conveyed in trust for the Lodge and
its members. Subsequently, to prevent the Lodge from losing the prop-
erty in case it became inactive, the corporate charter was amended
to authorize the issuance of stock. Shares of stock were issued to each
member of the Lodge and some shares were issued to the Lodge itself.
This was done to substitute stock in the corporation for interest in the
property. The corporation managed the property and charged rent to
the Lodge for the use thereof. The Court held that if all the members
of the Lodge and the Lodge itself accepted the stock in exchange for
their interests in the realty, the giving up of their interests in the realty
was sufficient consideration for the stock issued. Therefore, the Court
held that the finding of fact by the superior court that the issuance of
stock was without consideration was an erroneous conclusion of law.5
The consent of all the members of the Lodge to the exchange was
necessary since the.property was being diverted to a use that was not
one of the objects of the association.6
PARTNERSHIPS
In Hardy & Newsome, Inc. v. Whedbee7 the Court held that the
appearance of the partners defending an action in which liability is
asserted against the partnership gives the Court jurisdiction to enter a
judgment against the partnership. The Court pointed out that if only
-245 N.C. 408, 96 S.E.2d 408 (1956).
4 245 N.C. 281, 95 S.E.2d 921 (1956).
'For the subsequent appeal from the new trial, see Solon Lodge v. Ionic Lodge,
247 N.C. 310, 101 S.E.2d 8 (1957).
'Venus Lodge v. Acme Benevolent Ass'n, Inc., 231 N.C. 522, 58 S.E.2d 109
(1950).
" 244 N.C. 682, 94 S.E.2d 837 (1956).
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one of the partners appeared in the action, a judgment against the
appearing partner individually and against the partnership property
would be valid. However, a judgment against partners not appearing
and not served would not bind them individually.8
CIVIL PROCEDURE (PLEADING AND
PARTIES)
PARTIES
Necessary and Proper Parties
In Etheridge v. Wescott' the alleged cloud on plaintiffs' title was a
contract to sell land to defendant married woman, who pleaded a coun-
terclaim based upon the contract. The Court held, that, under the
present statutes, 2 her husband was neither a necessary nor a proper
party to the plaintiffs' action, or- her counterclaim, 'and his motion for
dismissal as to him should have been granted.3 , "
In Willcox v. Di Capadarso4 plaintiffs sued for damages and for an
injunction against interference with their easement. After preliminary
injunction was granted, plaintiffs sold their rights in the land, expressly
making no warranty as to the easement. The Court, per curiam, -dis-
missed the action for the injunction but not the action for. damages.. The
plaintiffs were held to have no property rights affected by, the injunc-
tion. The Court raised without answering the question of whether
plaintiffs' vendees could join in the pending action. At any rate, con-
tinuation of the action for damages would not affect the vendees' rights
and it was not necessary to join them as plaintiffs.5
In another per curiam case 6 the Court ruled that in a suit by a sub-
contractor against a home owner to enforce a lien for materials furnished,
the contractor is a necessary party. The contractor was joined, but
'However, even after judgment, the partner not appearing may be brought in
and made a'party. Dwiggins v. Parkway Bus Co., 230 N.C. 234, 52 S.E.2d 892
(1949).
2244 N.C. 637, 94'S.E.2d 846 (1956).
1 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 52-2, 52-10 (1950). Cf. former N.C. CONSOL. STAT. § 454.
'This result was foreshadowed by Lipinsky v. Revell, 167 N.C. 508, 83 S.E.
820 (1914), a case in which land title was not involved.
'244 N.C. 741, 94 S.E.2d 925 (1956).
'The Court's question as to whether they could be joined apparently relates
to joinder for the purpose of reinstating a prayer for an injunction. As bearing
on the question, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-74 (1953) ; Fidelity and Cas. Co. v. Green,
200 N.C. 535, 157 S.E. 797 (1931). See also Veasey v. King, 244 N.C. 216, 92
S.E.2d 761 (1956), where injunction was not involved, but the Court permitted the
vendees to be added as plaintiffs in the vendors' action for permanent damages.
I W. E. Linthicum & Sons, Inc. v. Kelly Constr. Co., 246 N.C. 203, 97 S.E.2d
863 (1957).
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was alleged to be a corporation. The evidence showed the contractor to
be an individual. Nonsuit was held proper for failure to join a neces-
sary party.
In a suit 7 by an executor for a declaratory judgment adjudicating
the rights of devisees to a parcel of land, a grantee of one of the devisees
was found to be a necessary party; and, though the defect of parties
had not been noticed in the lower court, the Court remanded the case
with a direction to make him a party. No decree could be entered
construing the will and settling the rights of the parties without affecting
his interest in the land. This ruling is in accord with the view of a
majority of state courts and with practice under the federal rules.8
Real Party in Interest
In Taylor v. Hunt9 plaintiff sued an alleged tortfeasor for negligence
in an automobile accident. Plaintiff had received payment for the same
injuries from his employer under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
The action, commenced within six months after the injury, was brought
with the consent of the insurance carrier, but was not brought by the
employer or the insurance carrier in the employer's name. The Court
held that under G.S. § 97-10, when the employee has accepted work-
men's compensation, no action may be brought during the six month
period in the name of the employee unless the complaint discloses that
it is so brought by the subrogated employer or carrier. Since no waiver
was alleged, the Court expressed no opinion as to whether an employer
or a carrier may waive this exclusive right.
Darden v. Boyette' ° stands for the proposition that once an estate
has been executed by the terms of the will and a final account has been
made, the administrator c.t.a. is not the real party in interest to maintain
an action to construe the will to determine whether the devisee was
given a life estate or a fee simple.
In Simmons v. Rogers"1 the Court held that where a defendant dies
pending appeal, the administrator is properly made a party defendant. 12
In the same case another defendant reached her majority while the
action was pending. Her guardian ad litem died. It was held not
necessary to have a new guardian ad litem appointed since she could
now defend the action in her own right.
'Edmondson v. Henderson, 246 N.C. 634, 99 S.E.2d 869 (1957).
' General Houses, Inc. v. RFC, 81 F. Supp. 202 (E.D. Ill. 1948); 3 MOORE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 19.17 (2d ed. 1948) ; 39 Am. Ju., Parties § 111 (1942).
'245 N.C. 212, 95 S.E.2d 589 (1956).1 247 N.C. 26, 100 S.E.2d 359 (1957).
11247 N.C. 340, 100 S.E.2d 849 (1957).12N.C. SUIaREmE CT. RULE 37.
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JOINDER OF PARTIES AND CAUSES
In NAACP v. Eure'8 the NAACP sued for declaratory judgment,
joining the Secretary of State and the Attorney General as parties de-
fendant. It sought to test the constitutionality of G.S. 120, Article 10,
which requires an organization which is engaged in influencing public
opinion to register with the Secretary of State before engaging in such
activity, and G.S. § 55-118, which requires every foreign corporation
doing business in this state to file a copy of its charter and certain in-
formation with the Secretary of State. The Court found that G.S.
§ 55-118 affected both the Secretary of State and the Attorney Gen-
eral since the former has certain ministerial duties and the latter has
authority to prosecute for noncompliance with the statute. However,
such is not the case in regard to G.S. 120, Article 10. The Secretary
of State is a proper party but the Attorney General has no enforce-
ment duties, these being vested in the various district solicitors. Thus
the action was defective because all causes did not affect all parties.
There was thus presented a situation which the Court ordinarily
treats as misjoinder of both causes of action and parties; and dis-
missal follows when demurrer for such dual misjoinder is sustained. 14
In this case the lower court sustained the demurrer, but being of the
opinion that a decision would not settle the G.S. 120, Article 10 con-
troversy, dismissed that cause of action and ordered plaintiff to replead
the G.S. § 55-118 cause of action. The Supreme Court affirmed, point-
ing to the discretionary power to dismiss declaratory judgment actions
given by G.S. § 1-127 and the court's power to sever misjoined causes*
under G.S. § 1-132. The case, however, should not be interpreted as a
significant step away from the dismissal rule. Defendants, in their
demurrer, spelled out the steps they desired the courts to take, and
both courts granted the relief so requested. Therefore, the proper
interpretation seems to be that defendants waived the right to dismissal,
just as they could have waived the misjoinder completely by failing to
demur. 5
By contrast, and indicating that the Court adheres to the dismissal
rule, in Davis v. Davis,16 the lower court sustained a demurrer for mis-
joinder of causes and parties, ordered a reframing of the complaint and
2 245 N.C. 331, 95 S.E.2d 893 (1956).
" See Brandis, Permissive Joinder of Parties and Causes ins North Carolina, 25
N.C.L. REv. 1 (1946) ; Brandis and Graham, Recent Developments in the Field
of Permissive Joinder of Parties and Catses in North Carolina, 34 N.C.L. Rxv.
405 (1956).
" It can be argued that this case presented only a single cause of action. That
apparently was the theory of plaintiff's counsel as there was no separation of causes
in the complaint. Cf. FEz. P. Civ. P. 20(a).6246 N.C. 307, 98 S.E.2d 318 (1957).
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severance of causes. The Supreme Court, agreeing as to the misjoinder,
directed dismissal. In that case plaintiffs attempted to join: (1) a
cause for an accounting of rents and profits alleged in their capacity
as tenants in common against defendant co-tenants as individuals;
with (2) and (3) causes for accountings against defendants as personal
representatives of two decedents. In one of the latter an executor, a
necessary party, had not been joined.
All in all there can be no quarrel with this aspect of the Court's
decision. However, the Court held that, considered alone, the cause
for accounting by tenants in common against co-tenants presented a
misjoinder of parties plaintiff (and, by implication, of causes of action).
It said that the right of one tenant in common for an accounting is in no
wise related to the similar right of a co-tenant.17 This is an unfortunate
result, since if independent actions are brought the same ground must be
covered in each.' 8
joinder of the executor of a deceased partner and a transferee of the
same partner was proper, in an action'9 for the dissolution of the partner-
ship and for application of the partnership assets, when the transferee
was alleged to be in wrongful possession of some of the assets of the
partnership. The Court said that the plaintiff partner is entitled to
have the entire controversy settled in one action in accordance with
G.S. § 1-69.
THIRD PARTY PRACTICE
In Jenkins v. Fowler2" A sued B and C for damages due to their
alleged negligence in an automobile accident. B and C pleaded and
" 'The Court said that on this question McPherson v. McPherson, 33 N.C. 391
(1850) is decisive. However, it is very doubtful that this early case stands for
more than the proposition that, in the pre-Code era, these plaintiffs could not join
in an action at law as distinguished from a proceeding in equity. The Court
likened the situation of tenants in common seeking accounting against their fellow
tenants in common to the situation of co-sureties seeking contribution against their
fellow sureties. It is clear that, prior to the Code, in actions for contribution,
each co-surety had to sue alone and each had to be sued alone when the action was
at law. Equity would settle all the rights in a single proceeding. There is ade-
quate authority to indicate that in this situation since the Code our Court has
adopted the equity rule. See the discussions of these matters in MCINTOSH,
NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES §§ 644, 646 (2d ed.
1956). (In the McPherson case the comparison to co-sureties was made with refer-
ence to defendants. In the case discussed in the text, the Court found the joinder of
the defendants proper since they had acted in concert. However, as indicated above,
the distinction between law and equity in the pre-Code era applied to both plain-
tiffs and defendants.)
"8 The Court has allowed joinder of promisees on a single contract even though
they are not joint promisees, when trial convenience would best be served. Brock
& Scott Produce Co. v. Brock, 186 N.C. 54, 118 S.E. 798 (1923); McINTOSH,
NORTH CAROLINA PRACICE AND PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES § 644 (2d ed. 1956).
" Bright v. Williams, 245 N.C. 648, 97 S.E.2d 247 (1957).
0247 N.C. 111, 100 S.E.2d 234 (1957). (A typographical error in the advance
sheet report of this case has the defendants denying that they were "negligible.")
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proved as a defense a judgment in another superior court action in
which D, a passenger in the car of B and C, sued A, who had B and C
made additional parties defendant, asking for contribution. B and C
had been adjudged free of any negligence. The Court affirmed a nonsuit,
stating that in the prior action A became a plaintiff as to B and C and
the issue in that case was the same as the one in this case. Therefore
the prior verdict was binding on A. The Court expressly approved the
motion for nonsuit at the close of all the evidence as an appropriate
method of presenting the res judicata question.
In Norris v. Johnson,21 another motor vehicle collision case, the
original defendant, acting under G.S. § 1-240, brought in plaintiff's
husband, owner-operator of the car in which plaintiff was riding. The
husband counterclaimed against the original defendant for damages to
his car. The lower court struck out the counterclaim. At the trial
the jury found that both the original defendant and the husband were
negligent. Judgment was entered for plaintiff against the original de-
fendant and for the latter against the husband for contribution. On the
husband's appeal, the Court granted a new trial as between the husband
and original defendant because the former had not been permitted to
assert his counterclaim.
The Court cited and discussed prior decisions and adhered to its
rule that, while original defendants may not cross-claim against each
other for their own injuries, 22 a third-party defendant may do so against
a third-party plaintiff. The explanation of this distinction is the best
yet advanced by the Court--i.e., that the original defendant's cross-claim
must be relevant to the plaintiff's claim against him; while the third-
party defendant's claim need be relevant only to the third-party plain-
tiff's claim against him. Or, to paraphrase, an original defendant may
counterclaim for his injuries against the plaintiff; hence the third-party
defendant may so counterclaim against the third-party plaintiff. The
clear import of the opinion is that even if plaintiff objected, the objec-
tion would be of no avail.
Nevertheless, this does not satisfactorily explain why identical issues
between defendants may be tried in one case, without regard to the
plaintiff's wishes, but may not be tried in another case, even if plaintiff
consents by failure to object. Whatever the technical rationalities, the
fact remains that the issues and the complications are identical. 23
The rationale of the instant opinion leads to two questions which in
the future the Court must face: (1) If, when the third-party defendant
21246 N.C. 179, 97 S.E.2d 773 (1957).
2 Wrenn v. Graham, 236 N.C. 719, 74 S.E.2d 232 (1953).
28 For further discussion of this question, see Brandis and Graham, mipra note
14, at 418.
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is joined, the complaint is amended to seek judgment against him in favor
of the plaintiff, will this prevent him from counterclaiming against the
third-party plaintiff? (2) When the plaintiff originally joins two de-
fendants, and one cross-claims against the other for contribution, will that
cross-claim open the way for the latter to cross-claim for his own in-
juries ?
One further question regarding the Norris decision automatically
presents itself. While the lower court struck out the husband's counter-
claim against the original defendant, both the husband and his plaintiff
wife had full opportunity to convince the jury that the husband was not
negligent (as was, indeed, alleged in the wife's complaint). They failed.
Had the counterclaim not been stricken, the only additional evidence
it would have made relevant would have related to the amount of
damages to the husband's car. Yet the Court granted a new trial be-
tween the defendants. Does this mean that the Court believes the read-
ing of the counterclaim to the jury and evidence of the car damage
would have significant psychological importance? Should a new trial
be granted because of the omission of an issue not relevant to fault?
Should not the striking of the counterclaim have been treated as non-
prejudicial error?
The Court in Johnson v. Catlett24 held that an employer who has
discharged his workmen's compensation obligations cannot be made an
additional party defendant to enforce contribution in a suit by the admin-
istrator of the deceased employee against a third party tortfeasor for
wrongful death. This case is in accord with the accepted practice in this
state.2 5 The facts of the case indicate that the deceased was riding in an
automobile driven by a fellow servant on company business when the
accident occurred. The defendant contended that the negligence of the
fellow servant concurred in producing injury so that the fellow servant
or the employer, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, ought to be
liable for contribution. The Court, however, ruled the joinder improper
since the employer had complied with his statutory obligation.26
In another case27 plaintiffs sued for wrongful trespass in the cutting
of timber on their land. Defendant sought to join its grantors as parties
defendant, alleging that they had pointed out the boundaries set forth
in the timber deed. It contended that if plaintiff recovered from it, it
24246 N.C. 341, 98 S.E2d 458 (1957).
"-unsucker v. High Point Bending & Chair Co., 237 N.C. 559, 75 S.E.2d
768 (1953) ; Lovette v. Lloyd, 236 N.C. 663, 73 S.E.2d 886 (1952).
" The question of the effect of the workmen's compensation paid on the amount
of recovery against the third party tortfeasor was not raised by the Court. As
to this see Poindexter v. Johnson Motor Lines, Inc., 235 N.C. 286, 69 S.E.2d 495
(1952) ; Brown v. Southern Ry., 204 N.C. 668, 169 S.E. 419 (1933).2 McBryde v. Coggins-McIntosh Lumber Co., 246 N.C. 415, 98 S.E.2d 663
(1957).
(Vol. 36
NORTH CAROLINA CASE LAW
was entitled to indemnity from its grantors. The plaintiffs and addi-
tional defendants demurred ore tenus for misjoinder of parties and
causes. The lower court sustained the demurrer and dismissed the
original defendant's claim against the additional defendants. On appeal
the Court held that the original defendant had a cause of action against
the additional defendants and that the joinder was proper since the
plaintiffs could have proceeded against the additional defendants in
their original complaint, and since G.S. § 1-240 clearly authorized the
procedure followed by the original defendant.2 8  The issue was raised
on plaintiffs' demurrer only, the Court holding that since the additional
defendantg had already filed an answer they were precluded from de-
murring ore tenus on this ground.29
In Standard Amusement Co. v. Tarkington0 plaintiff, as assignee of
a lessor, sued to recover the rent. Defendant lessees pleaded fraudulent
representations by plaintiff's assignors in inducing defendants to enter
into the lease. They asked that plaintiff recover nothing, that plaintiff's
assignors be made parties, and that defendants recover damages against
the assignors reduced by the amount of the unpaid rent. The Court,
reversing the court below, held that the defendants were entitled to have
the assignors joined and to litigate the claim against them. All the
matters involved in the claim arose out of the lease upon which plaintiff's
action was grounded; the same evidence would be necessary to defeat
plaintiff's action and to justify judgment against the assignors. (Defend-
ants could use defensively against the plaintiff-assignee the claim against
the assignor, existing before notice of the assignment.) Thus the relation
between plaintiff's claim and defendants' claim was such that adjustment
of both was necessary to full determination of the entire controversy. The
principal statute relied upon for this result was G.S. § 1-137(1), which is
the transaction clause of the counterclaim statute. Since defendants here
sought no affirmative relief against the plaintiff, and the statute refers
to a claim "existing in favor of a defendant and against a plaintiff," the
construction given the statute here is indeed liberal, as the Court said
it should be. A more adequate basis might have been G.S. § 1-69, which
" See Norris v. Johnson, 246 N.C. 179, 97 S.E.2d 773 (1957). The controlling
opinion in the McBryde case deals with the matter entirely as one of contribution
between ordinary joint tortfeasors. In a concurring opinion Johnson, J. points out
that defendant actually asked for indemnity on a primary-secondary liability
theory, and that this justified joinder on grounds not dependent upon G.S. § 1-240.
" Another question of timing regarding third party practice was raised in
Denny v. Coleman, 245 N.C. 90, 95 S.E.2d 352 (1956), an action for conversion.
Plaintiffs obtained a judgment by default and inquiry. A motion lodged by the
defendant thereafter to bring in alleged joint tortfeasors to determine their liability
for contribution was held to be too late. The Court said that he might enforce
his right of contribution in the manner prescribed by G.S. § 1-240-i.e., by in-
dependent action.
"247 N.C. 444, 101 S.E.2d 398 (1957).
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authorizes joinder of defendants "who are necessary parties to a com-
plete determination or settlement of the questions involved." How-
ever, whatever the statutory basis for the decision, the result is excellent
and, unlike the results of some other recent cases, completely in line with
modern procedural trends.
COUNTERCLAIMS
In Everett v. Yopp 3l the Court held that unless a defendant has
some matter existing in his favor on which he can maintain an inde-
pendent action if separately alleged, his claim is not a counterclaim and,
in the absence thereof, defendant is unable to object to the allowance
of a voluntary nonsuit for the plaintiff.8 2
In one recent case33 the Court dealt with the problem of permissive
as compared with compulsory counterclaims. The plaintiffs brought
action for unpaid salary due their testator from defendant corporation.
The defendant interposed a plea in abatement in which it alleged that
there was a prior action pending between the parties for conversion of de-
fendant's funds by plaintiffs' testator and his associates. The Court said
that the prior action did not abate the present action because even if a
plaintiff has a counterclaim which was permissible in the prior action,
he "may elect to plead it as such or institute a separate action thereon
unless the issues raised in the prior action, if answered in favor of the
plaintiff therein, would preclude and bar the prosecution of the second
action." (Emphasis by the Court.) The Court found that the issues
raised in the prior action related to the alleged fraudulent withdrawal
and misapplication of corporate funds and that even if the issues were
found in favor of the corporation, the plaintiffs would not be barred from
bringing the action for withholding of salary. The Court also pointed
out that the two actions were pending in the same county and that the
situation, in respect to competition to secure the first trial, was not the
same as if they were in different counties.
In Etheridge v. Wescott34 executors of T joined with Etheridge in
an action against Wescott to quiet title to land conveyed from T to
Etheridge. Wescott set up a counterclaim based upon a contract by
T to convey the land to her. She asked for conveyance of the land to
her, or if title could not be conveyed to her that she have judgment
against the executors for the purchase money which she paid to T.
The Court said that if it was determined that Wescott was entitled to
--247 N.C. 38, 100 S.E.2d 221 (1957).
" The question of voluntary nonsuit after a counterclaim is filed is discussed
in TRIAL PRAcTIcE.
"' Hill v. Hill Spinning Co., 244 N.C. 554, 94 S.E.2d 677 (1956).
'244 N.C. 637, 94 S.E.2d 846 (1956).
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a conveyance of the premises, Etheridge would be a necessary party in
order for the court to cancel his deeds as a cloud on the title of Wescott.
On the other hand, if it was determined that Wescott had abandoned
her rights under the contract except in respect to a refund of the alleged
purchase price, she could not get a money judgment against Etheridge.
However, the Court said it was within the purview of G.S. § 1-137 to
permit the counterclaim to be litigated between the parties.
Assuming that the counterclaim states two causes of action, this
decision possibly does technical violence to the requirement that all
causes affect all parties, but it is a realistic approach to the problem since
the alternatives are easily submitted to the jury (if this is justified by
the evidence) and it avoids a multiplicity of law suits between the
parties. Quaere: Would the Court have permitted joinder of executors
of T and Etheridge by Wescott in an action for this alternative relief
where Wescott was a plaintiff in the first instance? The provisions of
G.S. § 1-69-both those dealing with actions for recovery of possession
of real estate and those dealing with alternative joinder of defendants-
seem to authorize it. Further, Etheridge, though not liable for return
of the purchase price, is affected by that cause in the sense that if the
contract has been abandoned that fact negates the cause against him for
recovery of the land.
Another case allowing a counterclaim to be filed though technically
all causes did not affect all parties was Burns v. Gulf Oil Corp.3 5 In
that case plaintiff alleged a cause of action for conspiracy to defame and
interfere with his business. The defendants were Gulf Oil Company,
a former employee of plaintiff, and three employees of Gulf. Gulf coun-
terclaimed for wrongful interference with its contractual relations with
its customers, damage to its property removed by plaintiff from the
premises of Gulf's customers, and conversion of Gulf's property by the
plaintiff. The Court first decided that the counterclaims would have
been proper if Gulf had been sued alone. This was because they, like
the plaintiff's claim, grew out of the relations between the plaintiff and
Gulf in connection with the existence and eventual termination of a
contract under which plaintiff had been a distributor for Gulf. Even if
the complaint be regarded -as stating several causes of action, the coun-
terclaims were permissible if proper in respect to any cause of action
alleged in the complaint.
The Court then examined the propriety of Gulf's counterclaims in
the light of the presence in the case of the other defendants. It said
that if the plaintiff's causes of action for conspiracy are proved, the de-
fendants will be liable jointly'and severally. It then stated the rule that
" 246 N.C. 266, 98 S.E.2d 339 (1957).
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if the counterclaim is otherwise permissible, and the liability of the
defendant who asserts it is several, or joint and several, the mere fact
that plaintiff joins the other defendants will not operate to deprive this
defendant of the statutory right to interpose such counterclaims.
In Moore v. Humphrey 6 plaintiff brought an action for possession
of property, which he had sold to defendant on conditional sale, and took
possession of the property in claim and delivery proceedings. In the
latter plaintiff filed a bond with two sureties. Defendant denied he
was in default and filed a counterclaim for the wrongful seizure and
detention of the property, seeking recovery for the part of the purchase
price already paid, for loss of profits, and for improvements which he
had made on the property. The jury returned a verdict for the de-
fendant and plaintiff's appeal was never perfected. The Court affirmed
the ruling that the sureties were liable on the plaintiff's undertaking.
The Court also ruled that the fact that the defendant did not seek the
return of the property wrongfully seized from him in the claim and
delivery proceedings had no effect on the result since the parties had
stipulated that the property could not be returned. The propriety of
the counterclaim, as grounded upon events occurring in the course of




In Jenkins v. Trantham38 the plaintiffs alleged what they claimed
to be the boundary lines located between their lands and the lands of
the defendants and contended that this line was the true boundary be-
tween the properties. In their amended complaint the plaintiffs con-
tended in the alternative that if the boundaries were not found to be as
they claimed then they had become the owners of the land in dispute by
virtue of their adverse possession for more than twenty years. The
Court held that the plaintiffs should not have been required to elect
between theories before the case went to the jury since they were claim-
ing coexisting and consistent remedies and could have the issues
submitted to the jury in the alternative. The position taken by the Court
is sound. By submission of the issues in the alternative the plaintiffs
311247 N.C. 423, 101 S.E.2d 460 (1957).
37 Counterclaims based upon wrongful seizure of property in claim and delivery
have been held to be proper. Ludwick v. Penny, 158 N.C. 104, 73 S.E. 228 (1911) ;
Smith v. French, 141 N.C. 1, 53 S.E. 435 (1906). Cf. Gatewood v.sFry, 183 N.C.
415, 111 S.E. 712 (1922); McINTosH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
IN CIVIL CASES § 1242 (2d. ed. 1956).8 244 N.C. 422, 94 S.E.2d 311 (1956).
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do not lose one of their potentially legitimate grounds for relief as
they would if required to elect.
No election was required in Competition Liason Bureau of Nascar,
Inc. v. Midkiff,39 but for a different reason than that in the Johnson
case. Plaintiff was the mother of the intestate who was killed while
driving in a race sanctioned and sponsored by the defendant. When
intestate registered with defendant to enter the race, he signed a contract
for group insurance in which the plaintiff Was named beneficiary and
which purported to relieve defendant of liability in case of an accident.
Plaintiff brought this action to enforce payment of the insurance. De-
fendant claimed that plaintiff must either elect to take the insurance
and waive the right of action for wrongful death or waive all rights
under the insurance contract and bring the action for wrongful death.
The Court held that the defendant could not compel the plaintiff to elect
between the remedies. In order for the doctrine of election of remedies
to apply, there must be available co-existing but inconsistent remedial
rights vested in the same person.40 While the plaintiff had the right
under the insurance agreement, the exclusive right to the wrongful death
recovery vested in the administrator. Therefore, since there is but one
right to recover in the plaintiff, no election can be forced. The Court
said that the question of the legal effect of the insurance recovery could
be raised in the wrongful death action.
Amendment
The Court reached a highly desirable result in Litaker v. Bost.41 The
plaintiff was allowed to amend his complaint after a verdict was returned
in his favor against the defendant owner of an automobile when the
proof as to identity of the driver did not conform with his allegations.
The issues were submitted to the jury in such a manner that they could
find the driver and the owner liable separately. One allegation did not
depend on the other. The Court said that even though the motion
to amend was not made until after the verdict was in, the variance did
not prejudice the defendant in such a manner as to require a reversal.
This is in accord with the modem policy 42 of allowing amendment after
verdict if the cause of action is not materially changed. 43
In Burrell v. Dickson Transfer Co.44 one superior court judge sus-
-- 246 N.C. 409, 98 S.E.2d 468 (1957).
"' 18 Am. JuR., Election of Remedies § 10 (1938).
'1247 N.C. 298, 101 S.E.2d 31 (1957).
" The federal rules allow amendment after verdict in such a situation. 3
MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 15.13 (2d ed. 1948).
"'Wheeler v. Wheeler, 239 N.C. 646, 80 S.E.2d 755 (1954), discussed in
Second Annual Survey of North Carolina Case Law, 33 N.C.L. Rav. 157, 170
(1955); MCINTOSH, NoRTn CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN CIL CASES
§ 1283 (2d ed. 1956).
"244 N.C. 662, 94 S.E.2d 829 (1956).
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tamined a demurrer to the complaint for failure to state a cause of action,
but granted permission to amend. The exercise of discretion to permit
amendment was held to be the equivalent of a ruling by the judge that
the complaint presented merely a defective statement of a cause of action,
as distinguished from a statement of a defective cause of action. This
ruling was not open to later review by another superior court judge;
and it was error for the latter to decide that the permission to amend
was surplusage and to dismiss the action, on the ground that there
had been a statement of a defective cause. This case is one more illustra-
tion of the problems which arise from this difficult distinction.
Allegations
Hill v. Hill Spinning Co.4 & by implication raises a question of some
concern to North Carolina attorneys. Defendant interposed as a coun-
terclaim a cause of action identical with the cause in a prior, still pend-
ing action in which it was plaintiff and the plaintiffs here were de-
fendants. The counterclaim was pleaded by alleging the existence of
the prior pending action and incorporating by reference the complaint,
bill of particulars, and reply in that action, all of which were attached
to the answer. The Court held that it was proper to strike the counter-
claim because the method of pleading it violated the Supreme Court
Rules, which, in effect, require every cause of action to be self-contained
and prohibit incorporation of allegations in. one cause by reference to the
allegations of another.46
The Court reasoned that if incorporation by reference is improper as
between causes alleged in the same pleading, then it is necessarily im-
proper as between the pleadings in different actions. However, the
basic purpose of the Rule would seem to be to prevent an attempt to
make one set of allegations serve at two different places in a pleading.
Permitting such double duty would force the judges to shift back and
forth to determind whether a cause of action is stated. In the instant
case, the allegations were needed in the counterclaim only once and it is
difficult to perceive why it is a fatal defect that they are contained on
sheets attached to the answer rather than copied into the body of the
answer.4 7 The decision is also difficult to understand in the light of the
' 244 N.C. 554, 94 S.E.2d 677 (1956).
"N.C. SuPREM E CT. RULE 20(2). The Court, however, considered the plead-
ings from the prior action for the purpose of determining whether the present
action should be dismissed pursuant to defendant's plea of prior action pending.
(For discussion of this phase of the case see Counterclaims.) Cf. Alexander v.
Norwood, 118 N.C. 381, 24 S.E. 119 (1896), holding that when a complaint refers
to another action pending between the same parties concerning the same subject this
is, in effect, an incorporation by reference and demurrer may properly be used to
raise the question of whether the second action should be abated.
47 Concededly the method of pleading in the principal case was extremely
awkward. Attaching complaint, bill of particulars, and reply, with no answer,
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fact that the Rule, on its face, contemplates that exhibits may be attached
to a pleading and incorporated by reference. Attachment and incorpora-
tion by reference of an entire pleading from another case seems entirely
comparable to attachment and incorporation of a contract or other
written instrument, which time honored practice clearly permits.48
In Taylor v. Brake49 plaintiff alleged that defendant was liable be-
cause of "negligently, recklessly, and carelessly failing to yield the right-
-of-way to this plaintiff's automobile as by law required." He sought
to have the issue submitted to the jury on the theory that defendant had
failed to yield the right-of-way because plaintiff was in the intersection
when defendant approached it. The Court held that pleading as well
as proof of a theory is required; and plaintiff's general allegation 0 of
negligence did not sufficiently plead his theory. Therefore a nonsuit was
affirmed. 51 (As a clincher, the Court also found that there was no evi-
dence that plaintiff was in the intersection first.)
In another case 2 an executor joined the six children of the testator,
who were the only legatees and devisees, in an action for a declaratory
judgment to construe the will and for instructions in the administration
of the estate. When three of the children filed a cross action against
the other three, alleging certain facts concerning testator's relation to his
children, the latter three moved to strike these allegations as incompe-
tent and highly prejudicial. The superior court judge allowed, the
motion. The Court stated that when a motion to strike is made in
respect to matters to be decided by the jury it is proper for the trial
judge to allow the motion before trial since otherwise the challenged
material will be read to the jury and the adverse party might be preju-
diced. However, in this case, the allegations presented, a question of
fact for the judge rather than an issue of fact. for a jury. The -same
left the courts to do considerable scrabbling and-some guesiing. Condemnation of
this could readily be applauded. However, the Court's condemnation would apply
equally to attachment and incorporation by reference of a simple, clear complaint
from the prior pending actidn.
4' Sossamon v. Oaklawn Cemetery, Inc., 212 N.C. 535, 193 S.E. 720 (1937).
McINT0So , NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN CIvIL CASES § 988(2d ed. 1956) states that if a cause of action or defense is based on a written instru-
ment it is not a mistake to plead the writing in full by copying it as part of the
allegations, or by attaching a copy as an exhibit and referring to it in the pleading.I'245 N.C. 553. 96 S.E.2d 686 (1957).
" Note, 29 N.C.L. REv. 89 (1950).
alCf. Pruett v. Pruett, 247 N.C. 13, 100 S.E.2d 296 (1957). There the de-
fendant in an action for absolute divorce counterclaimed for divorce from bed
and board under G.S. § 50-8 (1950). She failed to allege in her pleading that the
grounds had existed to her knowledge for at least six months prior to the filing
of her counterclaim as required by the statute. It was held that while it was
advisable that the statute be complied with, she had alleged sufficient facts from
which the court could imply that the grounds had existed for the requisite length
of time.
" Collier v. Mills, 245 N.C. 200, 95 S.E.2d 529 (1956).
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question will arise at the trial when evidence is offered. Therefore, said
the Court, the question should not be decided in advance of trial and
the allegations should not have been stricken. In the situation presented,
this is good riddance of unnecessary preliminary motions, which can
only cause delay and waste time. As the Court pointed out in the
instant case, a contrary decision could result in a series of such motions
and in multiple hearings on essentially the same questions.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
Plaintiff's intestate, an employee of a Virginia corporation, was
killed in an automobile accident in North Carolina. The car in which
deceased was riding was being driven by a fellow employee. Plaintiff
received compensation under the Virginia Workmen's Compensation
Act,' which provided that the award would be a bar to further liability
on the part of the employer or his employees.2 In Johnson v. CatiettP
plaintiff sought recovery for wrongful death against the driver of the
other car. The defendant sought by cross-action to bring in the em-
ployer and employee-driver as joint tort-feasors. The Supreme Court
held that the Virginia award must be given full faith and credit in this
state.4 Thus, since the Virginia award excluded any further liability
on the part of the employer or employee, the lower court was correct
.in granting their motion to strike the cross-claim. The Virginia decree
was res judicata as to any further liability on their part.
EMINENT DOMAIN
The condemnation of lands necessary for the restoration of Tryon's
Palace in New Bern, North Carolina, was held to be for a public
IVA. CoDE A~w. c. 65 (1950).
'VA. CoDE ANN. § 65-37 (1950). Fietig v. Chalkley, 185 Va. 96, 38 S.E.2d
73 (1946), and Griffith v. Raven Red Ash Coal Co., 179 Va. 790, 20 S.E.2d 530
(1942), hold that an employee covered by the Workmen's Compensation Act is
deprived of any common law right of action for damages against the employer
by the act and that the compensation award is exclusive.
s246 N.C. 341, 98 S.E.2d 458 (1957).
'U.S. CoNsT. art. 4, § 1. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1952).
Accord, Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943). But see
Carrol v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955); Industrial Comm'n v. McCartin, 330 U.S.
622 (1947). In Miller v. National Chair Co., 127 N.J.L. 414, 22 A.2d 804(1941), the court held that an agreed award which was approved by the North
Carolina Industrial Commission was not res judicata to an award in New Jersey.
58 Am. JuR., Work-men's Compensation § 492 (1948) states that the prevailing
trend of the recent cases is toward regarding the original award as res judicata and
entitled to full faith and credit in another state, though there is some authority to
the contrary. See also Note, 34 N.C.L. REv. 501 (1956); Annot., 8 A.L.R.2d 628
(1949).
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purpose in In re Department of Archives and History.6 The historic
palace was not only a residence for the governor, but also served as a
capitol or state house and contained a hall where the assembly met.7
NECESSITY Op ADVERSE INTERESTS
The City Council of Greensboro, pursuant to the Redevelopment
Act,8 appointed a Redevelopment Commission to plan and develop a
redevelopment area within the corporate limits of the city. The Com-
mission was to have the power of eminent domain. Defendant, who
neither resided nor had property within the redevelopment area, sug-
gested that this action3 be instituted to obtain a declaratory judgment
as to the constitutionality of the powers given the Redevelopment Com-
mission. Defendant's contention was that redevelopment is not a public
purpose or a public use. The Court determined that there was no real
controversy existing between the parties and that this was only a
"friendly suit." In dismissing the action, the Court stated: "Jurisdic-
tion under the Declaratory Judgment Act . .. may be invoked 'only in
a case in which there is an actual or real existing controversy between
parties having adverse interests in the matter in dispute.' "10
In Fox v. Commissioner of Durham" the Court refused to decide the
constitutionality of a zoning ordinance because the plaintiffs failed to
show that enforcement of the ordinance would cause them to suffer per-
sonal and direct injury.12
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
The court in State v. Lee'3 held that imprisonment for two years
0246 N.C. 392, 98 S.E.2d 487 (1957).
See Yarborough v. Park Conm'n, 196 N.C. 294, 145 S.E. 563 (1928).8 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160-454 to -474 (1952).
'Greensboro v. Wall, 247 N.C. 516, 101 S.E.2d 413 (1958).
0 Id. at 519, 101 S.E.2d at 416. Accord, Lide v. Mears, 231 N.C. 111, 56
S.E.2d 404 (1949); Tryon v. Duke Power Co., 222 N.C. 200, 22 S.E.2d 450(1942). 'But see Britt v. Wilmington, 236 N.C. 446, 73 S.E.2d 289 (1952), in
which plaintiff alleged that the construction and maintenance of an off-street park-
ing lot by the city was not a proper public purpose. The Court said that there
was grave doubt as to whether the action was a bona fide adversary proceeding and
that it seemed that the parties to the action were seeking the same end. The Court
further said that if such were the case, a single resident should not be allowed to
stipulate away the rights of all the taxpayers of the municipality. However, the
Court decided the questions on the assumption that they were raised in good
faith. In Wells v. Housing Authority, 213 N.C. 744, 197 S.E. 693 (1938), the
Court mentioned that it was only a friendly suit, but still decided the consti-
tutionality of the Housing Authorities Act.
-1244 N.C. 497, 94 S.E.2d 482 (1956).2
"See NAACP v. Eure, 245 N.C. 331, 95 S.E.2d 893 (1957), which is included
in PLEADINGS herein. There the Court held that a foreign corporation could not
bring a declaratory judgment proceeding against the Secretary of State to de-
termine the constitutionality of G.S. § 120-48, concerning registration of persons
and organizations engaged principally in influencing public opinion or legislation.
13247 N.C. 230, 100 S.E.2d 372 (1957).
1958]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor does not constitute
cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of article I, section
14 of the state constitution when no maximum time of imprisonment is
fixed by the statute.14
For a discussion of two recent cases holding custody decrees invalid




In Monteith v. Welch' the trustee of a deed of trust given as security
for promissory notes collected the notes before maturity. The trustee
did not have possession of the notes or the deed of trust nor did he have
actual authority to collect for the creditor. The Court held that the
trustee was not the implied agent of the creditor for collection merely
because of his position as trustee and that he had no apparent authority
to collect. Therefore, collection of the unmatured notes by him was not
a discharge of the debt.
The trustee also made a marginal entry on the record of the deed
of trust acknowledging satisfaction of the debt as provided for in G.S.
§ 45-37. The statute provides in part: "The trustee or mortgagee ...
may . . . acknowledge satisfaction" of the provisions of the instrument
and thus sign a marginal entry acknowledging such satisfaction and
thereby discharge any interest of the trustee or mortgagee in such deed
or mortgage. The language of the statute would seem to make the
trustee a proper party to sign the marginal entry. But the Court
indicated that an unauthorized cancellation by the trustee does not
protect the defendant-purchasers of the property, unless they purchased
the land after the cancellation without notice of its invalidity.2 There
being no evidence of this, the cancellation was held void. The Court
further stated that if the defendants paid the amount secured by the
11N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-179 (1953). State v. Miller, 94 N.C. 904 (1886), held
that when the limit of punishment is not fixed by the legislature it is left as a
matter of discretion with the presiding judge, but State v. Driver, 78 N.C. 423(1877) held that a five year sentence for assault and battery was unconstitutional.
1244 N.C. 415, 94 S.E.2d 345 (1956).
2 Other North Carolina cases indicate that the trustee must have authority from
the creditor to enter a cancellation on the record. Woodcock v. Merrimon, 122
N.C. 731, 30 S.E. 321 (1898); Browne v. Davis, 109 N.C. 23, 13 S.E. 703 (1891).
However, in Williams v. Williams, 220 N.C. 806, 18 S.E.2d 364 (1941), the Court
stated that in the absence of evidence that the trustee's act of signing a cancella-
tion on the record was unauthorized, it is presumed from the trustee's possession
of the secured notes and deed of trust that his acts were authorized.
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deed of trust to the trustee/at the time of cancellation, erroneously
believing that he had authority to receive payment and cancel, such
cancellation would not destroy the lien.
In Staunton Military Academy, Inc. v. Dockery3 plaintiff held a
judgment lien on certain property on which there were five prior deeds
of trust. The trustee under the fifth deed of trust held a foreclosure
sale, advertising beforehand and announcing at the sale that the
property would be sold subject to the liens of the four prior deeds of
trust. The plaintiff notified the trustee of his judgment lien before
the proceeds of sale were distributed, but the trustee applied the pro-
ceeds to the five deeds of trust, ignoring the plaintiff's judgment lien.
The Court held that the allegation of these facts constituted a cause of
action against the foreclosing trustee since he had no right to pay any
amount to satisfy the other four deeds of trust. This was so because
the trustee sold the property subject to the four prior deeds of trust.
Their liens remained intact on the property in the hands of the pur-
chaser and did not attach to the proceeds of the sale. Thus any sur-
plus remaining after satisfying the fifth deed of trust would belong to the
owner of the equity of redemption, on which the plaintiff had a lien.
However, the trustee would not be liable to a subsequent mortgagee or
judgment creditor in the absence of actual notice.4 Also, it would seem
that the trustee could have sold the full title to the mortgaged property
and applied the proceeds to satisfy the prior encumbrances if the obliga-
tions secured by the other four deeds'of trust were due and the holders
consented to or ratified the sale.y
In Bell Bakeries, Inc. v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co.,6 the Court
held that a provision in a deed of trust requiring the debtor to pay a
3244 N.C. 427, 94 S.E.2d 354 (1956).
'Barrett v. Barnes, 186 N.C. 154, 119 S.E. 194 (1923); Norman v. Hallsey, 132
,N.C. 6, 43 S.E. 473 (1903).
'If the property is sold free from encumbrances, the proceeds must be applied
to discharge prior encumbrances. - Bank v. Watson, 187 N.C.- 107, -121 S.E. 181(1923). No direct authority was found in North Carolina concerning the consent
necessary for the property to be sold free from prior encumbrances. The rule
in other jurisdictions seems to be that with the prior mortgagees' consent, the
property can be sold free of encumbrances. 59 C.J.S., Mortgages § 576 (1949).
However, in Brett v. Davenport, 151 N.C. 56, 58, 65 S.E. 611, 612 (1909), the
Court said: "Authority (certainly the decided weight of authority) is to the effect
that, except with the consent of the senior mortgagee and of the mortgagor, and
perhaps subsequent encumbrances [sic], or by their ratification, a trustee in a deed
of this-character, a second mortgage with power of sale, can only sell the interest
conveyed to him and which he is authorized to sell by the terms of the instrument
under which he is acting." It is not apparent why the mortgagor and subse-
quent encumbrancers would have to consent before the second mortgagee could
sell the full interest in the mortgaged property. It is certainly true that as to sub-
sequent encumbrances, a mortgagee can convey a good title to mortgaged property
by foreclosure sale without the consent of the subsequent encumbrancers. Bank v.
Watson, supra; Dunn v. CEttinzer, 148 N.C. 276, 61 S.E. 679 (1908).
'245 N.C. 408, 96 S.E.2d 408 (1956).
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premium over and above the principal plus accrued interest if the se-
cured obligations were paid before maturity was valid. This was held
not to be usurious interest since it was compensation to the creditor for
the trouble it would incur and the loss it would probably sustain be-
cause of lower interest rates if the debtor should exercise his privilege of
retiring the debt before maturity. The trust agreement restricted the
payment of dividends by the debtor if such payment would reduce work-
ing capital below a stated amount. The debtor paid interest on de-
bentures of its parent company even though its working capital was
below the stated minimum and the creditor threatened to foreclose if any
further payments of this sort were made. The Court held that such
payments constituted a payment of dividends which was a breach of
the trust agreement. Therefore, the creditor had a legal right to fore-
close and a threat to exercise the right did not constitute duress.
DEFICIENCY JUDGMENTS
In Fleishel v. Jessup7 the Court held that it was error to refuse
to admit oral evidence offered by the defendant to show that part of the
property covered by a deed of trust was affixed to the realty included.
This evidence was admissible to determine what proportion of the
value of all the property was realty, since as to that proportion the
plaintiff was not entitled to a deficiency judgment under G.S. § 45-21.38.8
RECORDATION
In Coastal Sales Co. v. Weston9 a deed of trust and two contracts
executed on the same date in the aggregate gave the plaintiff a security
on lumber and other property. The deed of trust and one contract were
recorded, but not the other contract. The Court found it unnecessary to
decide whether the recordation was sufficient because it held that as to
the administratrix of the deceased debtor's insolvent estate recordation
was not required. Recognizing that the authorities are in conflict on
the question, the Court followed a previous North Carolina decision
and held that the title to the intestate's personal estate passing to the
administratrix is the same title that was vested in the intestate immedi-
ately prior to his death.10 Therefore, the title passing to the admin-
istratrix was subject to plaintiff's lien. The Court refused to draw an
analogy between receiverships and administration of estates. The basis
for its refusal was that by receivership proceedings a lien attaches to the
insolvent's property for general creditors. In the administration of
7244 N.C. 451, 94 S.E.2d 308 (1956).See Note, 35 N.C.L. R1v. 492 (1957), for a comment on this statute.
'245 N.C. 621, 97 S.E.2d 267 (1957).
"0 McBrayer v. Harrill, 152 N.C. 713, 68 S.E. 204 (1910).
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estates, the only event at which a lien could be said to attach would be
the debtor's death and that event alone does not change the rights of
secured or unsecured creditors.
ASSIGNMENTS OF MORTGAGES
In Gregg v. Williamson1 1 X, Y, and Z were joint mortgagees of
property. X and Y made a marginal entry on the mortgage as follows:
"For value received we hereby transfer and assign the within mort-
gage deed from [mortgagors] to [Z] without recourse." Concerning
this assignment, the Court uttered dicta to the effect that: (1) the
assignment sufficed to transfer only the debt which the mortgage had
been given to secure; and (2) the assignment did not pass any title
to the land. Z later conveyed the mortgaged land to a third party by
warranty deed. Concerning this conveyance, the Court in a dictum
stated that the grantee in the warranty deed became a mere trustee
chargeable with a duty and responsibility to both the owner of the equity
of redemption and the owner of the debt secured by the instrument.' 2
CONTRACTS
INTERPRETATION OF TERM "WIDOW"
In Collins v. Covert' the stockholders of a close corporation entered
into an agreement for the repurchase of stock of a deceased stockholder
by the corporation. The agreement provided: "Prior to the payment of
the balance of the purchase price, the widow of the deceased stockholder
shall be paid by the corporation a monthly salary .... " (Emphasis
added.) 2
The term "widow" was presented for interpretation in this action to
recover salary payments made to the surviving wife of a deceased stock-
holder after her remarriage and prior to the payment of the purchase
price on the stock held by the deceased at his death. 3 In affirming the
judgment for the defendant, the Court upheld the interpretation of the
lower court to the effect that "widow," under these circumstances, re-
ferred to the person rather than the status of the wife. Therefore, the
wife was entitled to the payments notwithstanding her remarriage. It
11246 N.C. 356, 98 S.E.2d 481 (1957).
1 See Note, 36 N.C.L. R~v. 225 (1958), for a comment on this case.
1246 N.C. 303, 98 S.E.2d 26 (1957).
'Id. at 305, 98 S.E.2d at 27.
' The term "widow," in contracts, has often raised problems of interpretation
requiring settlement by court action. However, it is believed that this is the first
decision on the point in North Carolina.
1958]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
seems that a few words in the contract-"until remarriage," or "regard-
less of remarriage"-would have eliminated all the uncertainty.
LIMITED LIABILITY OF Bus CARRIERS
In Neece v. Richmond Greyhound Lines, Inc.4 the defendant carrier
refused to allow the plaintiff to carry on a bus a package exceeding the
dimensions as allowed in tariffs filed with the Interstate Commerce
Commission. However, she was permitted to check the package for
transportation and was given a baggage check which recited a limita-
tion of liability.5 Defendant failed to return the package on demand
and plaintiff brought this action to recover its full value. The liability
of the carrier, if any, was held to be that of a gratuitous baileep for the
full value of the package, notwithstanding the recital of limited liability
in the baggage check, since the limitation was not applicable where the
package did not come within the specifications of "baggage" as contained
in the tariff.
PAROL MODIFICATION OF WRITTEN CONTRACT
In Childress v. Myers Trading Post7 the Court restates the propo-
sition that cofitracts8 may be modified by a subsequent parol agreement
even though containing a provision that any modification, to be effective
and binding, shall be in writing and signed by the parties.9 Thus, in
'246 N.C. 547, 99 S.E.2d 756 (1957).
5 Common carriers operating in interstate commerce may, by contract, limit
their liability for negligence when expressly so authorized by statute, Boston &
M.R.R. v. Hooker, 233 U.S. 97 (1913), or by a regulatory body with power to
grant that privilege, Knight v. Carolina Coach Co., 201 N.C. 261, 159 S.E. 311
(1931). However, before this limitation on liability takes effect, the carrier
must show that: (1) it received the property as a common carrier; (2) it issued a
written receipt which contained the asserted limitation; (3) the Interstate Com-
merce Commission has expressly authorized the limitation which is based on a rate
differential. See, e.g., New York, N.H. & H. R.R. v. Nothnagle, 346 U.S. 128
(1953).
The Court reviewed the pertinent provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act
and concluded that Congress did not intend 49 STAT. 563 (1935), 49 U.S.C. § 319
(1952), to amend 24 STAT. 386 (1887), 49 U.S.C. § 20(11) (1952) so as to permit
limitation of liability for baggage carried on motor buses under the latter section.
Patton v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 75 Ohio App. 100, 60 N.E.2d 945 (1944),
reaches the opposite conclusion on this point. It seems likely to arise again, and is
probably not yet finally settled.
' See TORTS infra.
1247 N.C. 150, 100 S.E.2d 391 (1957).
' The general rule seems to be that "a written contract can not be modified
by parol as to those matters required to be in writing under the statute of
frauds, but that those portions of a written contract which the statute does not
require to be in writing may be orally modified if they constitute a distinct and
severable part of the contract." 37 CJ.S., Frauds, Statute of § 232 (1943). See
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 22-2 (1953).9 Whitehurst v. F. C. X. Fruit and Vegetable Service, 224 N.C. 628. 32 S.E.2d
34 (1944); Allen v. Raleigh Say. Bank & Trust Co., 180 N.C. 608, 105 S.E.
401 (1920). The old common law did not follow this rule as to sealed contracts:
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this action for breach of a written building contract, where the defendant
asserted that the contract provisions relied upon by plaintiff had been
modified by parol agreement of the parties, an instruction to the effect
that the parties' right to modify was limited to those provisions of the
contract that were not substantial was erroneous.
RIGHT OF WAY AGREEMENT
DeBruhl v. Highway Conmnzn'0 presented a problem of interpre-
tation of a right of way agreement executed in conformity with an
option to purchase, the pertinent provisions of which provided: "This
option also includes the purchase price of a 132 story brick veneer resi-
dence and any and all other improvements on said right of way ....
[I]t is further understood and agreed that the consideration herein
stipulated to be paid shall be paid and received in full payment of the
purchase price of said right of way and in full compensation for all
damages." (Emphasis added.) 1  Only a small part of the dwelling lay
within the boundaries of the right of way.
The Highway Commission subsequently deemed it necessary to ac-
quire plaintiffs' remaining property rights and gave notice thereof.
Plaintiffs instituted this condemnation proceeding,12 alleging ownership
of the lot with the dwelling thereon, subject to the easement acquired by
the defendant. Defendant asserted that it had paid for and acquired
the entire dwelling. The lower court adopted the contention of the
defendant. A new trial was awarded on the ground that the evidence
did not support the verdict. However, to prevent protracted litigation,
the Court construed the agreement, holding that the defendant did not
acquire any portion of the building or land lying outside the right of way
conveyed to it.13 Therefore, the plaintiffs were entitled to be fairly
compensated for the remaining part of the house as well as the land,
and the interest acquired by the defendant under the agreement was no
more than would have been acquired by condemnation. 14
RIGHTS oF LICENSEE
In Wynne v. Allen16 the licensor sought to recover royalties allegedly
but the modern tendency is to allow modification even of these agreements by
a later informal contract. 3 WILLISTON, CONrRACTS § 631, at 185 (rev. ed. 1936)
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 407 (1932) ; 17 C.J.S., Contracts § 378 (1939).
10245 N.C. 139, 95 S.E.2d 553 (1956).
Id. at 143, 144, 95 S.E.2d at 556, 557.
12 The proceeding was brought pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-19 (Supp.
1957).
1" The decision gives effect to what the Court considered to be the true intention
in the minds of both parties when they signed the agreements.
14 Shepard v. Suffolk and Carolina R.R., 140 N.C. 391, 53 S.E. 137 (1906);
Hodges v. Western Union Tel. Co., 133 N.C. 225, 45 S.E. 572 (1903).245 N.C. 421, 96 S.E.2d 422 (1957).
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due under a licensing agreement to manufacture and sell goods under a
patent. The licensees counterclaimed for the amount already paid under
the agreement, alleging failure of consideration and fraudulent repre-
sentations. The facts disclosed that the licensees continued to operate
under the contract in spite of knowledge that liability might be imposed
upon them by a third person claiming infringement of a prior patent.
No warranty was alleged by the licensees, although there was evidence
that such an agreement was made. The licensees prevailed, and the
licensor appealed.
In awarding a new trial, the Court points out that under these cir-
cumstances the licensees could not recover royalties paid unless they
were protected by express contract of indemnity or warranty. The rela-
tionship between licensor and licensee of a patent is similar in many
respects to that of landlord and tenant,16 the principal point of dis-
tinction being that whereas a tenant is protected by an implied covenant
of quiet enjoyment, 17 there is no such implied warranty or covenant in
the sale or lease of a patent right.'8
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
CRIMINAL LAW
Homicide
In State v. Tingen' defendant was charged with driving under the
influence of intoxicating liquor and with involuntary manslaughter re-
sulting from culpable negligence in the operation of a vehicle while in-
toxicated. Defendant's motions for nonsuit were denied and a jury
verdict of guilty was returned on both charges. The evidence tended
to show that defendant, though intoxicated, was operating the automobile
in a careful and reasonable manner. In reversing the manslaughter
conviction, the Court held that something more than intoxication must
be shown in order to fix criminal responsibility 2 and that there was
insufficient evidence to show a causal connection between the drunken
driving and the resulting death.
" Davis Co. v. Burnsville Hosiery Mills, 242 N.C. 718, 89 S.E.2d 410 (1955);
Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Headley Good Roads Co., 284 Fed. 177 (D. Del.
1922).
"
7Huggins v. Waters, 154 N.C. 443, 70 S.E. 842 (1911) ; Poston v. Jones, 37
N.C. 350 (1842).
" Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Headley Good Roads Co., 284 Fed. 177 (D.
Del. 1922) ; Cansler v. Eaton, 55 N.C. 499 (1856) ; Hiatt v. Twomey, 21 N.C. 315
(1836).
'247 N.C. 384, 100 S.E.2d 874 (1957).
2 State v. Lowery, 223 N.C. 598, 27 S.E.2d 638 (1943).
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Burglary
The felony of larceny requires that the property stolen have a value
of more than one hundred dollars.3 The statutory crime of felonious
breaking and entering4 requires that the breaking and entering be accom-
plished with the intent to commit a felony. In State v. Andrews'
defendant's conviction of felonious breaking and entering was reversed
because the instruction to the jury had presupposed that the intent to
steal any examination papers constituted the requisite felonious intent
to steal property with a value of more than one hundred dollars. It
should be noted, however, that where the larceny is from a dwelling by
breaking and entering, the one hundred dollar requisite of G.S. § 14-72
has no application6 and the intent to steal property of any value is
sufficient to support a conviction of first degree burglary.7
In State v. McAfee8 North Carolina for the first time squarely held
that the opening of a window which was held in place by its own weight
was a sufficient "breaking" to support a conviction of first degree
burglary. The imposition of the death penalty was affirmed.
Criminal Assault
In State v. Allen9 defendant, on several occasions, stopped his car
within a few feet of prosecutrix where she was awaiting her customary
ride to work and stared at her while moving the lower part of his body
back and fort. These actions on the morning of his arrest caused
prosecutrix to run from her usual waiting place on the corner to the
steps of a nearby public school. Defendant's conviction of assault on a
female'0 was affirmed. The Court, in accord with the great weight of
authority,:" reaffirmed its well established position that an actual ability
to commit battery is not an essential element in the crime of simple
assault so long as there is some show of violence causing a reasonable
fear of bodily harm "whereby another is put in fear, and thereby forced
to leave a place where he has a right to be .... ,11
Entrapment
In a prosecution for unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor for
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-72 (1953).
' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-54 (Supp. 1957).
246 N.C. 561, 99 S.E.2d 745 (1957).
"If the larceny is . . . from the dwelling by breaking and entering, this sec-
tion shall have no application." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-72 (1953).
'State v. Richardson, 216 N.C. 304, 4 S.E.2d 852 (1939). To support a con-
viction of first degree burglary the dwelling must be occupied at the time of the
offense. N.C. GEN. STAr. § 14-51 (1953).
8247 N.C. 98, 100 S.E.2d 249 (1957). 9245 N.C. 185, 95 S.E.2d 526 (1956).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-33 (1953).
"6 C.J.S., Assault and Battery § 64 n. 50 (1937).
'2 245 N.C. at 189, 95 S.E2d at 529. For an extensive discussion of the prin-
cipal case, see Note, 36 N.C.L. REv. 198 (1958).
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the purpose of sale, the only evidence for the state was two bottles of
beer and the testimony of the law enforcement officer that he purchased
them from defendant. The defense was entrapment. The Court in line
with previous decisions' 3 held that the defense of entrapment is not
made out where the defendant is merely given the opportunity to
commit the offense.14
In State v. Boles,15 where the fact situation was essentially the same
as above, it was held that where defendant contended she was not present
and did not participate in the act with which she was charged, the
defense of entrapment was not available to her.
An instruction to the jury that entrapment may be a defense is re-
versible error,16 because once entrapment is present, it is a defense.17
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Search and Seizure
A new trial was granted in State v. Mills'8 because of the admission
of evidence' 9 obtained by an illegal search of defendant's room. Two
warrants were involved :20 one described the defendant's filling station;
the other described the home on the adjoining lot where defendant
rented a back room. The warrant describing defendant's premises not
only gave the officers authority to search those premises, but by its own
description limited their authority to those premises alone. Thus there
was no authority under this warrant to search the room. The second
warrant, describing the home, could only include that part used by the
owner and not the part rented to the defendant unless specifically in-
cluded. The room was a separate "place" or "dwelling."
21
Is State v. Burnette, 242 N.C. 164, 84 S.E.2d 191 (1955) ; State v. Love, 229 N.C.
99, 47 S.E.2d 712 (1948) ; State v. Hughes, 208 N.C. 542, 181 S.E. 737 (1935);
State v. Hopkins, 154 N.C. 622, 70 S.E. 394 (1911); State v. Smith, 152 N.C.
798, 67 S.E. 508 (1910). See also Note, 34 N.C.L. Rxv. 536 (1956).
State v. Kilgore, 246 N.C. 455, 98 S.E.2d 346 (1957).
246 N.C. 83, 97 S.E2d 476 (1957).
Is State v. Wallace, 246 N.C. 445, 98 S.E.2d 473 (1957).
" "The charge as given left it optional with the jury whether to apply the law
of entrapment as a defense. The court should have, but did not, charge that
entrapment is a defense; and upon a finding that the defendant had been entrapped
into the commission of the offense charged, it would be the duty of the jury to
return a verdict of not guilty." Id. at 447, 98 S.E.2d at 329.
Is246 N.C. 237, 98 S.E.2d 329 (1957), 36 N.C.L. REv. 344 (1958).
"
9 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-27 (1953).
"0 Neither warrant sufficiently described the premises to be searched, but the
sworn affidavits did. The affidavits, having been made part of the warrants by
proper reference, cured the defect.21 United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) ; People v. Stokes, 334 Ill. 200,
165 N.E. 611 (1929); Tarwater v. State, 160 Tex. Crim. 59, 267 S.W.2d 410
(1954) ; 79 C.J.S., Searches and Seizures § 12 (1952). See also State v. Hanford,
212 N.C. 746, 194 S.E. 481 (1938).
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Sufficiency of Warrant and Indictment
In two cases the Court held that where willfulness is an essential ele-
ment of the offense, the warrant is fatally defective if it fails to charge
that defendant's conduct was willful.22 In State v. Danziger23 a warrant
charging that defendant "did .. .willfully . .. refuse to show his Op-
erator's license to a public officer.. .-24 was struck down on the ground
that it did not charge a criminal offense because it failed to allege that
the officer requested25 defendant to exhibit his driver's license. The
Court further stated that the warrant should have included the name
of the officer. In State v. Everett26 a warrant charging that defendant
directed his agent to commit specific acts of larceny without alleging
what, if anything, the agent did pursuant to such direction did not
charge a criminal offense.
The case of State v. Cooke27 was before the superior court for a trial
de novo on appeal from a conviction of criminal trespass in the Greens-
boro Municipal County Court. The trial was on the original warrant
charging defendant with criminal trespass on the property of Gillespie
Park Golf Course in violation of G.S. § 14-126 and G.S. § 14-134. Dur-
ing the trial the warrant was amended to read that defendant had tres-
passed on the property of Gillespie Park Golf Club, Inc. Defendant was
found guilty of the crime charged in the amended warrant. The Court,
arresting the judgment, held that since possession was an essential ele-
ment of criminal trespass, the amending of the warrant so as to substi-
tute one property owner for another was in effect charging the defendant
with an entirely different crime.28  The jurisdiction that vests in the
superior court in criminal cases on appeal from an inferior court is
purely derivative2 9 and there can be no conviction on the amended war-
rant for a crime different from that of which the defendant was con-
victed in the inferior court.30
" State v. Smith, 246 N.C. 118, 97 S.E.2d 442 (1957) ; State v. Coppage, 244
N.C. 590, 94 S.E.2d 569 (1956) (wilful neglect to support illegitimate child).
23 245 N.C. 406, 95 S.E.2d 862 (1956).
'Id. at 407, 95 S.E.2d at 862. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-29 (1953).
201244 N.C. 596, 94 S.E.2d 576 (1956).
27 246 N.C. 518, 98 S.E.2d 885 (1957).
" In a concurring opinion Justice Parker suggested that a test to determine
whether the change was material was whether a conviction under the original
warrant would bar a subsequent conviction under the amended warrant. He was
of the opinion that it would not. Id. at 521, 98 S.E.2d at 888.20 State v. Goff, 205 N.C. 545, 172 S.E. 407 (1933).
20 State v. Cooke, 246 N.C. 518, 98 S.E.2d 885 (1957). For a discussion of the
principal case and the power of the superior court to amend a warrant on a trial
de noyo, see Note, 36 N.C.L. REv. 80 (1957).
In a later case, State v. Cofield, 247 N.C. 185, 100 S.E.2d 355 (1957), it was
held error, citing State v. Cooke, supra, for the warrant charging a violation of
G.S. § 18-50 (unlawful possession of nontax paid liquor for the purpose of sale) to
be amended by the superior court to include a violation of G.S. § 18-48 (unlawful
possession of nontax paid liquor).
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Trial
The evidence in State v. McAfee,3' where defendant was indicted
for first degree burglary, established that the dwelling house was occu-
pied at the time of the offense. This being so, "there was no evidence of
burglary in the second degree. Hence, burglary in the second degree
was not and should not have been submitted to the jury."32 G.S. § 15-171
previously authorized the submission of an issue of second degree
burglary in such a case but was repealed in 1953.33
In State v. Wynue 4 the indictment charged the four defendants with
riot. One defendant pleaded guilty. The trial judge, instructing the
jury separately as to the other three defendants, charged that each must
have participated "with two or more other persons." The Supreme
Court, reversing the convictions, held that where the paiticular offense
charged requires a certain number of participants, 5 it is prejudicial
error if the court's instruction permits the jury to go beyond the in-
dictment to find the requisite number. The instructions would have been
justified had the indictment charged each named defendant and others
with the particular offense.3 6
In State v. Meshavw it was held that where a general verdict of
guilty is returned on an indictment charging mutually exclusive crimes,
viz. larceny and receiving stolen goods, the conviction could not stand
in the face of an erroneous instruction as to one of the counts since the
Court had no way of determining whether the error was prejudicial.
One case38 involved the failure of the trial judge to instruct the jury
regarding the common law presumption that when a wife is charged with
having committed a criminal offense in the presence of her husband, she
is presumed to have acted under his influence and therefore absolved of
guilt of the crime. This presumption is rebuttable and the state must
carry the burden of proving that she was free from this influence and
had acted of her own free will and volition.P
Two other cases were reversed because of erroneous instructions to
the jury. It was held reversible error to instruct the jury that an in-
tentional violation of a traffic law constitutes reckless driving even though
a later part of the charge correctly defines reckless driving,40 or that a
31247 N.C. 98, 100 S.E.2d 249 (1957).
82 Id. at 103, 100 S.E.2d at 252. N.C. Sess. Laws 1953, c. 100.
1'246 N.C. 686, 99 S.E.2d 923 (1957).
" The offense of riot requires three or more persons. MmiLn, CRiXmitAL LAW
§ 167 (1934).
3' State v. Abernethy, 220 N.C. 226, 17 S.E.2d 25 (1941).27246 N.C. 205, 98 S.E.2d 13 (1957), 36 N.C.L. Rtv. 84.
" State v. Cauley, 244 N.C. 701, 94 S.E.2d 915 (1956).
" See Note, 35 N.C.L. Ray. 104 (1956), for an extensive discussion of this
presumption of coercion.
40 State v. Sutton, 244 N.C. 679, 94 S.E.2d 797 (1956). "[A] person is guilty
of reckless driving (1) if he drives an automobile on a public highway in this
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conviction of armed robbery may be supported if the jury found the
elements of common law robbery present.41
Sentencing Problems
It is provided by G.S. § 20-16 (a) (9) that the Department of Motor
Vehicles shall have the authority to suspend the driver's license of any
operator who has been convicted of two or more offenses of speeding in
excess of fifty-five miles per hour within a period of twelve months.
The term conviction means a final conviction.42 Defendant was found
guilty of speeding sixty-five miles per hour on two separate occasions
within a period of twelve months by two separate courts. Both courts
had, upon the verdict of guilty, entered orders continuing prayer for
judgment upon payment of costs. Pursuant to the statute, the depart-
ment ordered defendant's license suspended. The department, after
granting defendant a hearing, and the superior court, on appeal, affirmed
the suspension order, holding that defendant had been twice convicted of
speeding. The Supreme Court, in a comprehensive statement of the
law by Justice Denny, held that a prayer for judgment continued upon
payment of costs was not a final conviction from which an appeal would
lie and therefore was not a final conviction within the purview of
G.S. § 20-24(c). The suspension order was reversed.43  However,
where a prayer for judgment is continued upon condition of payment of
a fine and costs, there is a final conviction from which an appeal will
lie44 because the judgment is the imposition of the fine. It is to be noted
that a "prayer for judgment continued" is a suspended judgment, as
distinguished from a suspended sentence,45 and within the inherent
power of the court to grant.46
If a sentence is suspended upon certain conditions and defendant
State, carelessly and heedlessly, in a willful or wanton disregard of the rights or
safety of others, or (2) if he drives . . . without due caution and circumspection
and at a speed or in a manner so as to endanger or be likely to endanger any person
or property." State v. Folger, 211 N.C. 695, 697, 191 S.E. 747, 748-49 (1937).
,' State v. Rogers, 246 N.C. 611, 99 S.E.2d 803 (1957). The offense of armed
robbery requires the additional element of the use or threatened use of firearms .or
other dangerous weapons. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-87 (1953).
'"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-24(c) (1953).
Barbour v. Scheidt, 246 N.C. 169, 97 S.E.2d 855 (1957).
"State v. Griffin, 246 N.C. 680, 100 S.E.2d 49 (1957). The lower court's
statement that the prayer for judgment be continued was inconsistent with the
imposition of the fine and treated as mere surplusage. In State v. St. Clair, 247
N.C. 228, 100 S.E.2d 493 (1957), the judgment of the lower court was "that the
defendant pay fine of $100 and costs; and that he be not convicted of a similar
offense for a period of 12 months." Id. at 229, 100 S.E.2d at 494. Held, that thejudgment that the defendant pay the fine was a final judgment. The provision
that the defendant not be convicted of a similar offense was stricken as surplusage.
"State v. Graham, 225 N.C. 217, 34 S.E.2d 146 (1945).
'State v. Gibson, 233 N.C. 691, 65 S.E.2d 508 (1951).
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accepts the conditions, e.g., pays the fine, he waives his right of appeal.47
Where a sentence is activated for breach of a condition under which the
sentence was suspended, defendant, having undertaken to comply with
the conditions, cannot, after his breach, challenge the validity of the
conditions.48
Several cases involved improper sentences which, on appeal, resulted
in remand for proper judgment. It is improper to sentence a mis-
demeanant to confinement in Central Prison;49 only felons may receive
sentences there. 50 A sentence to the roads for a term of thirty days was
not proper;51 the sentence should have been thirty days in jail, "to be
assigned work under the State Highway and Public Works Commis-
sion ..... 52
Miscellaneous
In State v. Sutton53 defendant sought to have his conviction set
aside on the ground that the illegality of his arrest54 deprived the court
of jurisdiction. In passing on this question for the first time, the Court
held, aligning itself with the overwhelming weight of authority,55 that
the presence of the defendant in court on a valid warrant was sufficient
to confer jurisdiction.
In State v. Blackwel56 defendant was tried and convicted on a war-
rant charging him with reckless driving. The warrant had been issued
by a police sergeant. Before the superior court, on a trial de novo,
defendant moved to quash the warrant, contending that the statute 7
which authorized the police sergeant to issue the warrant was unconsti-
tutional. The motion was granted. On appeal by the State, the Court
held that the motion to quash was properly granted but for an improper
reason; the question of constitutionality of the statute was not properly
' State v. Griffin, 246 N.C. 680, 100 S.E.2d 49 (1957); State v. Canady, 246
N.C. 613, 99 S.E.2d 776 (1957). For a discussion of suspended sentences in North
Carolina, see Note, 31 N.C.L. Ray. 195 (1953).
48 State v. Collins, 247 N.C. 248, 100 S.E.2d 492 (1957).
"State v. Floyd, 246 N.C. 434, 98 S.E.2d 478 (1957).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-28 (1953), State v. Cagle, 241 N.C. 134, 84 S.E.2d
649 (1954).
" State v. Stephenson, 247 N.C. 231, 100 S.E.2d 327 (1957).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-30 (1953). The statute has been amended to read
"State Prison Department" instead of "State Highway and Public Works Com-
mission." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-30 (Supp. 1957).
"244 N.C. 679, 94 S.E.2d 797 (1956).
"' Defendant was pursued and arrested for a misdemeanor by municipal police
officers outside the corporate limits of the municipality. Such arrest was illegal
since the fresh pursuit doctrine only applies to fleeing felons. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15-42 (1953), Alexander v. Lindsey, 230 N.C. 663, 55 S.E.2d 470 (1949) ; Wilson
v. Mooresville, 222 N.C. 283, 22 S.E.2d 907 (1942).
" ORFIEMLD, CRIMINAL PROCED RE 30-31 (1947) ; 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law § 144
(1940).
"6246 N.C. 642, 99 S.E.2d 867 (1957).
" N.C. Sess. Laws 1949, c. 703.
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presented. The 1949 statute5 s in question, giving police sergeants
authority to issue warrants, purported to amend section 27(5) of the
1909 Municipal Charter of the City of High Point,59 which had estab-
lished the recorder's court for that city. Section 27(5) was expressly
repealed in 191380 by an amending act establishing the High Point
Municipal Court in lieu of the recorder's court. Thus, said the Court,
the 1949 act had amended a repealed statute and, there being nothing
to amend, the amendatory act (the 1949 act) was a nullity.61 Many
jurisdictions hold otherwise, 2 the theory being that since the provisions
in the new statute are complete and independent in themselves, the new
statute may stand alone as a valid independent enactment.65 An inter-
esting aspect of this case is that it would seem that the 1949 statute did
not intend to amend the repealed section of the 1909 law at all. The
1949 statute erroneously referred to the 1909 charter as creating the
municipal court when it was manifest that the legislature ihtended to
refer to the 1913 act which did establish the municipal court.64 Thus
the erroneous reference to the 1909 charter should have in no way
affected the validity of the 1949 amendment.65
DAMAGES
EMINENT DOMAIN
The trial judge's charge to the jury as to the amount of compensation
the defendant-landowner was to receive in an eminent domain proceeding
was held to be prejudicial error in Statesville v. Anderson.' A street
being widened by the city would run through a portion of defendant's
house. The trial judge correctly charged that the jury should determine
the fair market value of the entire tract before the taking and sub-
" N.C. Sess. Laws 1949, c. 703.
"N.C. Pub. Laws 1909, c. 395, § 27(5).
" N.C. Pub. Laws 1913, c. 569, § 33.
"Accord, Tiger Creek Bus Line v. Tiger Creek Transp. Ass'n, 187 Tenn.
654, 216 S.W.2d 348 (1948).
'2 82 C.J.S., Statutes § 245 (1953).
"Mayor and Counsel of Wilmington v. State ex rel. Du Pont, 44 Del. 332, 57
A.2d 70 (1947) ; Hansen v. Morris, 3 Utah 2d 310, 283 P.2d 884 (1955).
" Section one of the 1949 statute stated "that Chapter 395 of the Public Laws
of 1909 . . . [was] enacted to establish the Municipal Court for the City of High
Point," N.C. Sess. Laws 1949, c. 703, § 1, when actually this court was established
by N.C. Pub. Laws 1913, c. 569, § 33. The 1909 law was the entire Municipal
Charter for the City of High Point, of which section 27(5) had established the
recorder's court, not the municipal court.
"An erroneous reference by an amending act to a repealed statute does not
vitiate the amending act when it is clear that the legislature intended to refer in-
stead to a valid statute. Clare v. State, 68 Ind. 17 (1879) ; 82 C.J.S., Statutes § 245
(1953).
'245 N.C. 208, 95 S.E.2d 591 (1956).
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tract therefrom the fair market value after the taking.2 However, he
further charged that the jury was to consider that the defendant had
the right to remove the house, and also the right to use the property
for any purpose not inconsistent with the purposes for which plaintiff
acquired its right. This was held to be prejudicial in view of the fact
that there was no evidence on which the court could formulate a rule
by which the jury could measure these rights which the defendant was
said to have. The city had the right to take possession at the moment
it paid the amount fixed by the jury. No time was fixed within which
the defendant could remove the house. There was no evidence as to
the cost of moving the house, the distance it would be necessary to
move it, the method of construction, or the feasibility of moving it.3 The
Court stated that these were material factors and that in their absence
the right to remove the house or to use the property consistently with
the right of the plaintiff was too conjectural to measure, and should not
be submitted to the jury.
MITIGATION OF DAMAGES
In Scott v. Foppe4 defendant contracted to build a house for plain-
tiff. Just before the house was completed the plaintiff admitted that he
would be unable to pay for it, and the parties then agreed to sell the
house to mitigate any loss. The plaintiff alleged that he told defendant
of a buyer who would pay $40,000 for the house, but that the defendant
held out, thinking it was worth more, until the buyer bought another
house. The house was subsequently sold for a lesser amount, all of
which went to the defendant. Plaintiff brought this action claiming that
if defendant had accepted the first offer, there would have been an
excess over the amount due the defendant, and thus the plaintiff suffered
a loss as he had expended money on the lot and certain appliances.
Plaintiff's suit was based on the defendant's duty to minimize the
damages. In affirming a nonsuit the Court said that the equitable doc-
trine of mitigation of damages is a defense to an action in which the
plaintiff seeks damages for defendant's breach of duty and does not con-
stitute an independent cause of action.5 The Court further said that
'See Highway Comm'r v. Black, 239 N.C. 198, 79 S.E.2d 778 (1954) ; Proctor
v. Highway Comm'n, 230 N.C. 687, 55 S.E.2d 479 (1949).
' See Annot., 75 A.L.R. 855 (1931).
'247 N.C. 67, 100 S.E.2d 238 (1957).
'See 1 SoUTH mEAND, DAMAGE-S § 149 (4th ed. 1916), where it is said: "Miti-
gation of damages is what the expression imports, a reduction of their amount,
not by proof of facts which are a bar to part of plaintiff's cause of action, or ajustification, nor of facts which constitute a cause of action in favor of the de-
fendant, but rather of facts which show that the plaintiff's cause of action does
not entitle him to so large an amount as the showing on his side would otherwise
entitle him." See also 26 C.J.S., Danmges § 142 (1941), which states that facts
in mitigation may be pleaded in partial, but not full defense.
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when the plaintiff breached the contract the defendant had the right to
dispose of the property as he saw fit, and that there was no evidence of
a contract requiring defendant to accept the highest net offer.
INTEREST
The case of Jackson v. GastoniaO involved a judgment upon quantum
mneruit in which the parties stipulated the value of the water and sewage
system taken over by the city to be $9,522.46. The case was first tried
in the December 1956 term of superior court, and a judgment of non-
suit was entered. On appeal the Supreme Court reversed the judgment
of nonsuit, and sent the case back for judgment in accordance with the
stipulations of the parties.7 In the retrial by the superior court judg-
ment was entered for the stipulated amount bearing interest from the
date of filing the complaint, October 22, 1952. The Supreme Court
held this to be error since the parties had stipulated the amount of the
reasonable value involved.8 The Court said that the stipulation fixed
the amount of recovery and the judge was without discretion to superadd
an allowance for interest as additional damages or compensation. How-
ever, if the case had been decided correctly in favor of the plaintiffs when
it was nonsuited at the December 1956 term, the judgment would have
drawn interest from the date of the first trial in superior court. There-




In two decisions the Court reversed custody awards because the
judge interviewed the child in private without consent of the parties.'
The Court held that this violated the constitutional right of the litigants
to hear all the evidence and have an opportunity to refute it.2 These
decisions are consistent with the logic of In re Gupton,3 where in a
8 247 N.C. 88, 100 S.E.2d 241 (1957).
" 246 N.C. 404, 98 S.E.2d 444 (1956).
8 See Annot., 100 A.L.R. 775, 776 (1936), which states the general rule to
be that a stipulation distinctly and formally made can be introduced in evidence
and is available as proof of the facts admitted upon a subsequent trial of the same
action, unless it is limited to a particular occasion or temporary object, or unless
the court permits its withdrawal upon proper application therefor.
' See Kneeland v. American Loan and Trust Co., 138 U.S. 509 (1891); 15 Alf.
JuR., Damages § 168 (1938).
1 Raper v. Berrier, 246 N.C. 193, 97 S.E.2d 782 (1957); In re Gibbons, 245
N.C. 24, 95 S.E.2d 85 (1956).
' See N.C. CONST. art. I, § 35.8238 N.C. 303, 77 S.E.2d 716 (1953).
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custody contest between' separated parents the judge ordered "an officer
of the law" to make an independent investigation of the parties without
their knowledge and based an award to the mother largely upon secret
information contained in the officer's report. The Court on appeal held
that the fact that the father had been deprived of his right to hear, test,
and explain or rebut all the evidence vitiated the decree. This line
of decisions would appear to cast some doubt upon the constitutionality
of G.S. § 7-103(i),4 which sets up a procedure whereby the domestic
relations court may conduct investigations concerning the custody of
children affected by divorce actions in the superior court and make
recommendations to the superior court judge.
In re Gibbons5 appears to indicate that the Court has abandoned
the position taken in the case of In re CranfordO to the effect that
in a contest between a parent and non-parent, the legal right of the
parent to custody will prevail unless the non-parent establishes the un-
suitability of the parent. A trend away from this holding has been
noted in prior Case Surveys.7 The Gibbons decision is discussed in a
case note in this issue of the Law Review.8
In Holmes v. Sanders,9 a per curiam opinion, the Court held that
residence of a child in North Carolina was sufficient to give the state's
courts jurisdiction to make a custody award, although the domicile
of the child might be elsewhere.10 Seeking modification of a prior
judgment" awarding custody to the deceased mother's parents, who were
residents of North Carolina, the non-resident father contended that
the trial court lacked jurisdiction to make a custody award because the
child's domicile followed that of his parent. In rejecting the father's
argument the Court quoted with approval a statement by Justice Cardozo
in Finlay v. Finlay:12 "The jurisdiction of a state to regulate the
custody of infants found within its territory does not depend upon the
'"In an action for divorce where the pleadings show that there are minor
children; if the pleadings also show that the" custody of said children is contro-
verted; or if any judge of the superior court having jurisdiction to try said action
so direct, it shall be the duty of the clerk of the superior court to refer the case
for investigation as to the child, or children, to the domestic relations court, and
the judge of the domestic relations court shall make his recommendations to the
judge of the superior court as to the disposition of the child, or children, for the
consideration of the judge of the superior court in disposing of the custody of the
said child or *children." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7-103(i) (Supp. 1957).
5247 N.C. 273, 101 S.E:2d 17 (1957).
0231 N.C. 91, 56 S.E.2d 35 (1949), 28 N.C.L. REV. 323 (1950).
T See Fourth Annual Survey of North Carolina Case Law, 35 N.C.L. REv.
177, 225 (1957) ; Second Annual Survey of North Carolina Case Law, 33 N.C.L.
REv. 157, 194 (1955).
'See Note, 36 N.C.L. R-v. 491 (1958).
246 N.C. 200, 97 S.E.2d 683 (1957).
"0 See Note, 35 N.C.L. REv. 83 (1956), for a discussion of the domicile problem
in custody proceedings.
2' See Holmes v. Sanders, 243 N.C. 171, 90 S.E.2d 382 (1955).12240 N.Y. 429, 431, 148 N.E. 624, 625 (1925).
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domicile of the parents. It has its origin in the protection of the in-
competent or helpless . . . . For this, the residence of the child suffices,
though the domicile be elsewhere." The Court pointed out that the
child had resided with the maternal grandparents since 1954 and that
the father had come into North Carolina and invoked the jurisdiction of
the courts. The result of the Holmes litigation was rested upon the
prior case of Richter v. Harmon,13 although the Court in an earlier
case 14 had asserted that residence was not sufficient and that a child
must be domiciled in the state to give the courts jurisdiction to award
custody.
DIVORCE AND AmLIMONY
A consent judgment entered into by the parties in an action for
divorce from bed and board, which provides for monthly support of
the wife but does not decree that the payments by the husband be
made, constitutes nothing more than a contract between the parties, the
Court held in Holden v. Holden.15 Consequently, without the consent
of the parties, it may not be modified nor may it be enforced by con-
tempt unless the decree itself so provides. While not inconsistent with
prior North Carolina decisions, the Holden case re-emphasiies the im-
portance of careful drafting of consent judgments in order to preserve
further rights to have the court modify or enforce a decree by con-
tempt.
However, as the Holden decision intimates and later cases' 6 hold,
the fact that the consent judgment is enforceable only as a contract
between the parties does not withdraw the children of the marriage
from the court's protection. Hence, the court may modify provisions
of the consent judgment concerning support of the children when
warranted by a change of circumstances.
In Beeson v. Beeson17 the Court held that a 1955 amendment to G.S.
§ 50-1618 authorizing the wife to plead an action for alimony without
divorce as a cross action in her husband's suit for divorce was not a
mandatory method of procedure. Consequently, the wife's right to seek
alimony without divorce in an independent suit was not disturbed 19 and
a pending action for divorce would not abate a subsequent independent
13243 N.C. 373, 90 S.E.2d 744 (1955). And see Note, 35 N.C.L. REv. 83,
87 (1956).
"Allman v. Register, 233 N.C. 531, 64 S.E.2d 861 (1951).15245 N.C. 1, 95 S.E.2d 118 (1956), 35 N.C.L. REv. 405 (1957).
18 Smith v. Smith, 247 N.C. 223, 100 S.E.2d 370 (1957) ; Bishop v. Bishop, 245
N.C. 573, 96 S.E.2d 721 (1957).
' 246 N.C. 330, 98 S.E2d 17 (1957).8 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16 (Supp. 1957).
1" Prior to the amendment the alimony without divorce action could only be
prosecuted as an independent suit. See Silver v. Silver, 220 N.C. 191, 16 S.E.2d
834 (1941).
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action for alimony without divorce. The Beeson decision may prevent
application of the abatement tests formulated in the prior case of Cam-
eron v. Cameron20 and has been criticized in an earlier issue of the Law
Revie V.21
A point of first impression in North Carolina was decided in
Harmon v. Harmon.22 Here, the husband, after obtaining a decree
of absolute divorce, remarried. The divorce decree was subsequently
set aside because of the failure of the clerk to mail a copy of the order
of service by publication to the first wife as required by statute.23 The
husband ceased to cohabit with the second wife upon the court's inti-
mating that it would set aside the decree. Although the decree was subse-
quently set aside, the court retained the action which the husband had
originally brought against his first wife on the ground of two years' sep-
aration. After being properly served, the first wife alleged that the co-
habitation of the husband with the second wife was adulterous and a
bar to the divorce. This argument was rejected by the Court. The
evidence indicated that the husband had done everything legally re-
quired to obtain a valid divorce and that he had acted in good faith.
Consequently, the Court held that his cohabitation with the second
wife up to the time when he learned that the decree would be set
aside did not constitute adultery and bar his right of action for divorce.
Prior law to the effect that a criminal abandonment was necessary
to defeat a divorce sought on the ground of two years' separation under
G.S. § 50-624 appears to have been changed by the Court's decision
in Pruett v. Pruet.25 A discussion of the holding appears elsewhere
in this issue.26
EVIDENCE
ADMISSIBILITY OF OFFER TO PAY MEDICAL EXPENSES
In Hughes v. Anchor Enterprises, Inc.,' the plaintiff, on leaving
defendant's restaurant, slipped and fell on the floor, which was allegedly
wet from mopping. On direct examination the plaintiff's husband was
permitted to testify that the assistant manager of defendant's restaurant
had stated to him: "I have told the boy not to mop the floor like this."
The Court held this testimony was properly admitted for the purpose of
20 235 N.C. 82, 68 S.E.2d 796 (1952).
"Note, 36 N.C.L. REv. 203 (1958).22245 N.C. 83, 95 S.E.2d 355 (1956), 35 N.C.L. REV. 409 (1957).
23N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-99.2(c) (Supp. 1957).
"4 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6 (1950).
2"247 N.C. 13, 100 S.E.2d 296 (1957).
"0 See Note, 36 N.C.L. REv. 495 (1958).
1245 N.C. 131, 95 S.E.2d 577 (1956).
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impeaching the prior testimony of the assistant manager that the floor
was dry and that it had not been mopped. However, on cross examina-
tion of the assistant manager and on direct examination of plaintiff's
husband, plaintiff elicited testimony that the assistant manager, after
reaching the hospital, offered to be responsible for medical expenses.
The Court held that such testimony should not have been admitted over
defendant's objection, and stated: "[I]n accord with the weight of
authority elsewhere, the rule in this jurisdiction is that, in the absence of
other relevant statements or circumstances, evidence of an offer or
promise made by the defendant to pay the hospital and medical expenses
of the injured person is not competent as an admission of liability."'2
The court distinguished Gibson v. Whitton on the ground that
there the testimony went beyond an offer to compromise, and tended
to show an admission of liability on the part of the defendant. In that
case the trial court admitted testimony that the defendant had told
the plaintiff at the hospital the day after the accident that if the plaintiff
would wait until he got out of the hospital he would take care of every-
thing.
The Court also distinguished Brown v. Wood,4 where the defendant
had stated that he would "see that everything was all right." The
Court said that these facts justified the jury in finding that defendant
had gone beyond the mere assumption of hospital care and tretment
for the plaintiff. However, the language in the Brown case supports
the rule set out in the-principal case. - In Brown, the Court said that
the Good Samaritan's caring for an injured man and paying his charges
at the inn has never been said to be an admission of liability on the
part of the Good Samaritan.
If the statement goes beyond the giving of first aid or medical care
as an act of mercy, it then becomes an admission of liability. The ques-
tion seems to be one of degree. In the principal case, plaintiff's proof
was that defendant's assistant manager had told her husband to "go
ahead and put [the plaintiff] in a private room and get the best medical
care available and they would take care of it." If this language is
construed as being merely an offer to see that plaintiff received first aid
treatment, then the Court is clearly correct in holding it inadmissible.
On the other hand, if it is construed as an offer to take care of all
medical expenses that might arise, then it would appear to approach an
admission of liability which should be competent evidence.
-245 N.C. at 136, 95 S.E.2d at 582. See also Biddix v. Rex Mills, 237 N.C.
660, 75 S.E.2d 777 (1953); Patrick v. Bryan, 202 N.C. 62, 162 S.E. 207 (1932)
(giving first aid and medical care to the injured person is not an admission of
negligence).
3239 N.C. 11, 79 S.E.2d 196 (1953).
'201 N.C. 309, 160 S.E. 281 (1931).
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CONTRADICTION OF HEARSAY TESTIMONY WITHOUT LOSING EXCEPTION
In an action to recover for damage to an automobile, the trial judge
in Jones v. Bailey5 allowed the plaintiff to testify that after the acci-
dent he heard a conversation between the defendant and an officer at
the hospital and that the defendant asked the officer if she had the
right of way and the officer said she did not. The defendant's objection
and motion to strike were overruled. The defendant then took the
stand and denied that she made any such inquiry of the officer. She
then called the officer and he testified that he had no recollection of
having said anything to the defendant at the hospital. On appeal the
Court said that the testimony of the plaintiff was clearly hearsay and
should not have been admitted. The plaintiff-appellee urged that it
was competent for the purpose of contradicting or impeaching the testi-
mony of the defendant and the officer who testified in behalf of the de-
fendant on the ground, that when the defendant offered evidence to
contradict plaintiff's incompetent testimony, she lost the benefit of her
exception to the admission of such evidence. Plaintiff relied on Hopkins
v. Colonial Stores,0 in which the plaintiff testified that the driver of the
defendant's truck had said that he must have been about half asleep.
The Court held that the testimony of the plaintiff was competent to
contradict and impeach the testimony of defendant's driver. The Court
in the principal case refused to concur in this view. The Court said:
"Moreover, any statement in the opinion of Hopkins v. Colonial Stores,
supra, that may be inferred to be in conflict with this opinion, on this
particular point, is disapproved. It is the well established rule with us
that when incompetent evidence is admitted over objection, but the same
evidence has theretofore or thereafter been admitted without objection,
the benefit of the objection is ordinarily lost, but . . . 'the rule does not
mean that an adverse party may not, on cross-examination, explain the
evidence, or destroy its probative value, or even contradict it with other
evidence, upon the peril of losing'the benefit of his exception.' ,,
PRESUMPTION AS TO OWNER'S DRIVING CAR AT TIME OF ACCIDENT
The issue in Parker v. Wilson8 was which of two deceased persons
was driving the automobile at the time of the fatal crash. There was
evidence that after the accident plaintiff's intestate was found lying on
the steering column with her head on the switch, and that defendant's
testate, the owner of the automobile, was found on the right side of the
*246 N.C. 599, 99 S.E.2d 768 (1957). 8224 N.C. 137, 29 S.E.2d 455 (1944).
* 246 N.C. at 602, 99 S.E.2d at 771, quoting from Shelton v. Southern Ry., 193
N.C. 670, 675, 139 S.E. 232, 235 (1927). Accord, State v. Godwin, 224 N.C. 846,
32 S.E.2d 609 (1944). The rule was cited with approval in State v. Tew, 234
N.C. 612, 68 S.E.2d 291 (1951).
8 247 N.C. 47, 100 S.E.2d 258 (1957).
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front seat. Plaintiff alleged in his complaint that defendant's testate
was driving, relying on the rule that "an owner present in his auto-
mobile at the time of a collision is presumed to be in control of his
automobile by himself or through some other person, and, if there be no
direct proof as to the driver of the automobile, the owner will be pre-
sumed to have been driving." 9  The Court recognized that there had
been considerable legal controversy over the extent to which such a pre-
sumption may follow proof of ownership.10 However, the North Caro-
lina statute"- on registration evidence of ownership does not provide that
proof of ownership of an automobile, or proof of the registration of an
automobile in the name of any person, shall be prima facie evidence
that the owner of the automobile, or the person in whose name it was
registered, was the driver of the automobile at the time of the accident.12
'The Court refused to recognize the presumption as to driving, stating
that it was up to the General Assembly as to whether such a rule should
be adopted in North Carolina.
FUTURE INTERESTS
SALE WITH CONTINGENT REMAINDERS
In Barnes v. Dortch' testator devised land to his brothers, sisters,
and nephew "for their lives and then to their children." In a special
proceeding brought subsequent to the testator's death in 1913, the land
was partitioned into equal lots between the six life tenants without
joinder of the remaindermen. After partition the life tenants entered
into possession of their respective shares. In 1945 the two living life
tenants and the remaindermen conveyed their respective interests in
lot six to W, who, being joined by her husband, the life tenant of lot
9 Rodney v. Staman, 371 Pa. 1, 89 A.2d 313 (1952).
1o See 5A Am. JUR., Automobiles § 919 (1956), which states the rule and cites
only Rodney v. Staman, supra note 10, as authority. See also Annot., 32 A.L.R.2d
988, 990 (1953), which states that Iowa, Michigan, Ohio, and South Dakota have
recognized the doctrine. However, the Iowa and Ohio cases relied on were cases
in which the presumption arose from the fact that the owner had been seen
driving shortly before the accident. Claussen v. Johnson's Estate, 224 Iowa 990, 278
N.W. 297 (1938) ; Renner v. Pennsylvania R.R., 61 Ohio L. Abs. 298, 103 N.E.2d
832 (1951). In the Michigan case the issue was whether the deceased person was
riding in the car, and the presumption arose from the fact that he had been seen
riding in the car prior to the accident. Koob v. Lansing, 321 Mich. 150, 32 N.W.2d
373 (1948). In the South Dakota case, the court recognized the rule but said that
the circumstances were equally consistent with an inference that the guest was
driving. Lund v. Dwyer, 74 S.D. 559, 56 N.W.2d 772 (1953).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-71.1 (1953).
12 See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 739 (1953), which provides that the registra-
tion plate displayed on such vehicle shall be prima facie evidence that the owner
of such vehicle was then operating the same.
1245 N.C. 369, 95 S.E.2d 872 (1957).
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six, conveyed the lot to the petitioners. In 1949 a special proceeding
was brought to adjudicate the title to lot one, which had also been
allotted in the 1913 proceeding. It was held that all of the testator's
heirs had "acquiesced in and ratified, approved and accepted" the parti-
tion and therefore were bound thereby.
After the death of W's husband without children, petitioners insti-
tuted this ex parte proceeding under G.S. § 41-11 for authorization
to sell lot six subject to the contingent interests involved. A guardian
ad litem was appointed to represent the unknown and unborn heirs of
testator, but neither the surviving life tenant nor the remaindermen
were joined. The Court held that G.S. § 41-11 requires joinder of "all
persons now in esse who might have an interest in the land' 2 notwith-
standing the former partition, conveyance, and prior adjudication.
This is not to say that upon joinder of the aforementioned parties the
1949 adjudication would not be deemed res judicata. Clearly it would.,
But the provisions of G.S. § 41-11 must be met.
If. one of the remaindermen who joined in the 1945 conveyance
should predecease his life tenant, and the life tenant should die without
issue, the heir of such remainderman would take directly from the testa-
tor and not as an heir of the remainderman. Therefore, this heir would
not be bound by the deed of his ancestor. The Court did not say
whether or not the heir would be bound by the former partition. Ap-
parently he would not.4
EXECUTORY LIMITATIONS OVER IN PERSONAL PROPERTY
The general rule is that both real and personal property can be made
objects of executory limitations providing no rule of law (e.g., the Rule
against Perpetuities) will be violated. Barton v. Campbell5 is a further
application of this rule. In that case testatrix left all of her real and
personal property to her son D, but "if he should never have any bodily
heirs at his death the property above described shall then go back to my
estate." D adopted two children. He then sought a declaratory judg-
ment to determine whether or not he had satisfied the condition in
testatrix's will. The Court, giving effect to the executory limitation over
with respect to personalty as well as to the realty, held that the prop-
erty would revert unless D subsequently became a natural father.
Although considered "children" of the adopting parent, adopted children
cannot qualify as "bodily heirs" under the terms of the will. This
result is consistent with prior North Carolina law.0
-Id. at 373, 95 S.E.2d at 875.
'Worthington v. Wooten, 242 N.C. 88, 86 S.E.2d 767 (1955).
'Whitesideq v. Cooper, 115 N.C. 570, 20 S.E. 295 (1894).
245 N.C. 395, 95 S.E.2d 914 (1957).
Bradford v. Johnson, 237 N.C. 572, 75 S.E.2d 632 (1953).
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INSURANCE
DEATH BY "ACCIDENTAL MEANS"
In Scarborough v. World Ins. Co.,' an action to recover for death
by accidental means, the facts disclosed that A, the insured, was the
aggressor in an assault on B. A advanced up the steps of B's home,
using violent language and with upraised arms. B, in order to protect
himself, pushed A, causing him to fall backward. He struck his head
on a water meter protruding from the ground and death resulted there-
from. Considering this evidence, the Court held that the defendant's
motion for nonsuit should have been allowed and judgment for the plain-
tiff was reversed.
The general rule seems to be that where the insured voluntarily
provokes or is the aggressor in an encounter, and knows or should know,
under the circumstances, that death or great bodily harm would be the
natural and probable consequence of his act, his death is not caused by
accidental means.2 However, even though he is the aggressor, if death
was not a natural and probable consequence of his acts, the insurer
may be liable.3
Granting that one normally assumes the ordinary risks of an en-
counter which he provokes, it seems questionable as to whether, under
these facts, the insured voluntarily assumed the risk of death. Whether
death was a natural and probable consequence of the type of combat here
invited would appear to be a question about which reasonable men
would differ. Nonetheless, the decision is clearly proper when con-
sidered in light of the distinction which exists between accidental death
and death by accidental mneans.4
Thus, if the death, although unforeseen or unexpected, results di-
rectly from insured's voluntary act, unaccompanied by anything un-
usual, unexpected, or unforeseen, it is not death by accidental means,
although the result may be such as to constitute an accidental death. 5
244 N.C. 502, 94 S.E.2d 558 (1956).
2 Clay v. State Ins. Co., 174 N.C. 642, 94 S.E. 289 (1917).
'Podesta v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 150 S.W.2d 596 (Mo. App. 1941) (dic-
tum). See also Clay v. State Ins. Co., 174 N.C. 642, 94 S.E. 289 (1917); 45
C.J.S., Inmsrance § 788 n. 93 (1946).
'" 'Accidental' means that which happens by chance or fortuitously, without in-
tent or design and which is unexpected, unusual and unforeseen .... 'Accidental
means' refers to the occurrence or happening which produces the result and not
to the result. That is, 'accidental' is descriptive of the term 'means.' The moti-
vating, operative and causal factor must be accidental in the sense that it is unusual,
unforeseen and unexpected. Under the majority view the emphasis is upon the
accidental character of the causation-not upon the accidental nature of the
ultimate sequence of the chain of causation." Fletcher v. Security Life and Trust
Co., 220 N.C. 148, 150, 16 S.E.2d 687, 688 (1941).
'Mehaffey v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 205 N.C. 701, 172 S.E. 331
(1934).
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This latter rule was applied in Allred v. Prudential Ins. Co.,6 an
action to recover under a policy providing for recovery for death by
accidental means. Judgment of nonsuit was affirmed where the facts
showed that the deceased was struck and killed by an automobile after
he had voluntarily lain prone in the center of a highway.
The Court places this case in the same category with a "Russian
roulette" case7 and a case of "William Tell" import,8 stating that the
death of the insured was "the natural and probable consequence of an
ordinary act in which he voluntarily engaged." 9  Therefore, the death
was not caused by accidental means.
In Fallins v. Durham Life Ins. Co.' 0 the deceased was struck and
killed by a bullet fired by a third party who shot in his direction in order
to stop a fight in which the deceased was engaged. There was no evi-
dence that the deceased was the aggressor in the fight, and the evidence
showed that the third party did not intend to injure either participant.
The Court, affirming the judgment for the plaintiff, held the evidence
sufficient to go to the jury on death by accidental means. A prima facie
case having been established, the burden was on the defendant com-
pany" to show a violation of conditions avoiding the policy under the
exclusion clause.'
2
8247 N.C. 105, 100 S.E.2d 226 (1957), Johnson and Bobbit, J.J., dissenting
without opinion.
Thompson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 84 Ga. App. 214, 66 S.E.2d 119 (1951).
8 Baker v. National Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 298 S.W.2d 715 (Tenn. 1957).
0 247 N.C. at 111, 100 S.E.2d at 231.
10247 N.C. 72, 100 S.E.2d 214 (1957).11 MacClure v. Accident & Cas. Co., 229 N.C. 305, 49 S.E.2d 742 (1948) ; Col-
lins v. United States Cas. Co., 172 N.C. 543, 90 S.E. 585 (1916). However, in
Warren v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 215 N.C. 402, 404, 2 S.E.2d 17, 18 (1939), the Court
stated: "There is a distinction, with respect to the burden of proof, between the
rule applicable to actions upon ordinary life insurance policies containing excep-
tions, where proof of policy and death of insured imposes upon the insurer the
burden of sustaining the pleaded exception, and the rule applicable where the
insurance is against death by accident or accidental means. In the lattter case...
where unexplained death by violence is shown, the defendant who seeks to avoid lia-
bility on the ground that the death resulted from bodily injuries inflicted intention-
ally by another person, has the burden of going forward with evidence-that is that
evidence of death by external violence is sufficient to take the case to the jury-
but that the burden of the issue of death by accidental means still remains upon the
plaintiff." No North Carolina case has been found where this distinction has been
followed, although apparently it is recognized and followed in a number of otherjurisdictions. See Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Clemmer, 79 F.2d 724 (4th
Cir. 1935).
" The exclusion clause provided: "Insurance under this policy shall be null and
void if the insured's death resulted directly or indirectly from any of the following
causes: ... (d) participating in or attempting to commit an assault or felony, (e)
violence intentionally inflicted by another person." Fallins v. Durham Life Ins.
Co., 247 N.C. 72, 73, 100 S.E.2d 214, 216 (1957). As to subsection (e), the
Court distinguished Epps v. Gate City Life Ins. Co., 201 N.C. 695, 161 S.E. 211
(1931) (officer intentionally shot insured: recovery denied), stating that in the
present case the insured was unintentionally shot, and that the intention of the
person inflicting the injury is controlling.
[Vol. 36
NORTH CAROLINA CASE LAW
ONE "ACTIVELY AT WORK" WHILE ON TERMINAL LEAVE
Gaulden v. Pilot Life Ins. Co.,'3 a case of first impression, presented
an interesting problem of interpretation of a group life insurance policy.
The insured, while on terminal leave14 immediately preceding his retire-
ment, made application for additional insurance coverage under a new
group policy. While still on such leave, insured died without having
been actively at work on any date subsequent to the commencement of
leave. The policy expressly provided that the additional coverage should
not become effective until the first date on which the insured was both
actively at work and enrolled for insurance under the new policy; until
such time, the insured was to remain covered for the amount under the
old policy. It was further provided that "cessation of active work shall
be deemed to constitute termination of employment except .. . [that]
if any person is absent from active work on account of leave of absence
or temporary lay-off, his employment may be deemed to continue, for
purposes of insurance hereunder .. . ."" This was an action seeking to
recover the full amount under the new policy.
judgment for the defendant was reversed, the Court stating: "The
leave of absence granted to the insured... is the identical type of 'leave
of absence or temporary lay-off' which was not to be deemed 'cessation
of active work,' so as to affect the status of the insurance held under the
policy . . .,,6
Granting (1) that the insured was eligible for the increased cover-
age, and (2) that the terminal leave of the insured did not terminate the
employment for purposes of insurance, nonetheless the soundness of the
decision seems open to question. The requirement that the insured be
enrolled for insurance and actively at work seems clearly to be a condi-
tion precedent to the taking effect of the additional coverage which had
not been met.17 Further, this would seem to be the exact type of situa-
tion in which the condition was to be applicable. Quaere: Would the
result have been the same if the insured, while on temporary leave of
absence, had been injured in an accident and while on the verge of
death filed the application for additional coverage?
WINDSTORM INSURANCE
In Wood v. Michigan Millers Mut. Fire Ins. Co.' 8 a windstorm
13246 N.C. 378, 98 S.E.2d 355 (1957).
" Terminal leave was defined as leave bf absence, prior to retirement, with
regular salary for the number of days equal to the unused annual leave and sick
leave.
13 246 N.C. at 382-83, 98 S.E.2d at 358-59.10 246 N.C. at 384, 98 S.E.2d at 359.
" See Rayburn v. Pennsylvania Cas. Co., 138 N.C. 379, 50 S.E. 762 (1905).Is 245 N.C. 383, 96 S.E.2d 28 (1957).
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policy provided that the insurer should not be liable for loss caused di-
rectly or indirectly by "high water. . . whether driven by wind or not."
Insured's property was damaged during hurricane Hazel in October
1954.
The plaintiff contended that the loss was caused solely by winds of
hurricane velocity and that heavy rains occurring on that day came after
the loss had been sustained. The defendant contended that the damage
was caused by high water resulting from the rains. Defendant appealed
from an adverse judgment, assigning error to the court's refusal to
instruct that if water was a contributing cause of the loss, the plaintiff
could not recover. The Court upheld the lower court, holding that the
policy did not expressly exclude rains, no matter how heavy, and it was
only high water which would excuse defendant.
The general rule in this type of situation is that if the wind-or other
peril insured against-is the proximate cause of the loss, it need not be
the sole cause; and it is usually sufficient to authorize recovery that the
cause designated in the policy was the efficient cause of the loss, although
other causes contributed thereto. 19 This would be true even though the
contributing cause was expressly excepted. 20  However, in Miller v.
Farmers Mit. Life Ins. Ass'n2' there is dictum to the effect that the
insurer would not be liable if the contributing cause was expressly ex-
cluded by the terms of the policy. The present decision apparently
strengthens this stand in North Carolina. There is no decision in this
jurisdiction holding squarely on that point.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
ZONING
The constitutionality of extra-territorial zoning ordinances enacted
pursuant to legislative authorization was upheld in Raleigh v. Morand.'
The municipality had been granted power to extend its zoning juris-
diction one-mile beyond the corporate limits2 and sought to enforce
provisions of the ordinance excluding trailer camps. This was a point
of first impression3 and the Court, with a minimum of discussion, applied
1 45 C.J.S., Insurance § 888 (1946).
" Phenix Ins. Co. v. Charlestown Bridge Co., 65 Fed. 628 (4th Cir. 1895). See
also Note, 33 N.C.L. REv. 288, 293 (1955).
21198 N.C. 572, 152 S.E. 684 (1930).
1247 N.C. 363, 100 S.E.2d 870 (1957).
'N.C. Sess. Laws 1949 c. 540.
' In State v. Owen, 242 N.C. 525, 88 S.E.2d 832 (1955), the Court held invalid
an extra-territorial zoning ordinance which had been adopted without legislative
authority. However, the Court's language permitted the inference that such an
ordinance, if adopted after a legislative grant of power, would be valid.
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the general rule that the legislature may grant police power jurisdiction
to municipalities over a reasonable area outside the corporate limits.
4
Zoning, the Court held, was an exercise of the police power. Hence, an
extra-territorial ordinance supported by enabling legislation was valid.
The decision is of major importance to cities and towns faced with
the problem of haphazard development on their fringes, particularly to
the nineteen North Carolina municipalities which already have been
granted power to zone areas of from one to five miles beyond their
corporate limits.
The Morand case also holds that through, zoning ordinances munici-
palities may exclude trailer camps from residential districts. Con-
tentions that this provision of the Raleigh ordinance constituted "arbi-
trary, unreasonable, an1. discriminatory restrictions" 6 upon the de-
fendant's property were rejected on the ground that the ordinance applied
alike to all property within the territory. It was held that the defendant
had failed to overcome the presumption of validity in favor of municipal
ordinances and that the ordinance was enforceable by injunctive relief.7
GOVERNMENT IMMUNITY
Evidence that a municipality received substantial revenue from the
operation of a city park was held sufficient to repell a motion for nonsuit
based upon the governmental immunity doctrine in Glenn v. Raleigh.8
The Court's application of the "pecuniary advantage test" and its failure
to decide whether maintenance of a city park is a governmental or
proprietary function has been criticized in a previous issue of this
Law Review.9
Governmental immunity was upheld, however, in Denning v. Golds-
boro Gas Co.10 Here the Court ruled that a municipality would not be
liable for injuries or death caused by a gas explosion even though its
governing officials had "carelessly and negligently," as alleged, granted
a franchise to a public utility whose pipe lines and equipment were de-
fective. Granting of the franchise was a discretionary decision in the
governmental field made by the town officials under legislative authority
and subjected neither them nor the municipality to liability for an
erroneous decision. Although, as the Court pointed out, city officials
'See 62 C.J.S., Municipal Corporations § 141 (1949); 37 Am. JJR., Municipal
Corporations §§ 122, 284 (1941).
See Green, Supreme Court Upholds Extra-Territorial Zoning, Popular Gov-
ernment, Mar. 1958, p. 6.
0 247 N.C. at 367, 100 S.E.2d at 873.
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160-179 (1952) authorizes the use of the injunctive powers
of the court to enjoin violations of zoning ordinances.
8 246 N.C. 469, 98 S.E2d 913 (1957).
'Note, 36 N.C.L. Rav. 97 (1957).1 246 N.C. 541, 98 S.E.2d 910 (1957).
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may be subject to individual liability when they act corruptly or oppres-
sively in exercising a governmental function,"' any stricter liability,
especially in the area of discretionary or legislative decisions, would
make responsible persons reluctant to serve on town boards.
MUNICIPAL UTILITIES
Validity of Contract Exempting City from Liability for Negligence
The validity of a city ordinance relieving the municipality from a
negligent failure to provide nonresidents with services contracted for
was upheld in Smith v. Winston-Salem.'2 Although it is ordinarily
against public policy for a public service corporation to exempt itself
from liability and the city in providing nonresidents with services acts in
a proprietary capacity, the legislature had here determined public policy
by providing that municipalities might base charges for services furnished
nonresidents on non-liability for breach of contractual obligations.1 3
Hence, the ordinance was valid and became part of plaintiffs' contract
with the city when they voluntarily connected their homes with the
municipal sewage system. Accordingly they could not recover for
damages arising out of or related to defendant's contractual obligation
to provide services and had no cause of action for injury to their homes
caused by sewage which backed up in their pipes and overflowed fixtures
as a result of the city's improper maintenance and operation of the
sewage system.
Rates
Nonresident consumers of municipal utilities were also involved in
Chandler v. Asheville,' 4 where the Court held that the power to fix rates
for utilities was a legislative or governmental act as to which a municipal
corporation was under the absolute control of the legislature. Hence,
although the power to fix utility rates has been delegated to municipali-
ties by general statutes,15 the General Assembly by a local act 0 could
prohibit Asheville from charging nonresident consumers in sanitary
districts adjoining the city a higher rate than was charged resident con-
sumers.
Public Convenience and Necessity
In North Carolina Utilities Comm'n v. Casey'7 the Court declined to
" 1d. at 544, 98 S.E.2d at 912. 12247 N.C. 349, 100 S.E.2d 835 (1957).
" N.C. GEI. STAT. § 160-249 (1952). See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160-255
(1952), which provides that as to nonresident water and electric consumers the
municipality shall "in no case be liable for damages for a failure to furnish a
sufficient supply of either water or light."
14247 N.C. 398, 101 S.E.2d 470 (1958).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160-255 to -256 (1952).
"e N.C. Public-Local Laws 1933, c. 399.17245 N.C. 297, 96 S.E.2d 8 (1957).
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determine whether electricity should be furnished residents by the
municipality or by a power company. This was a question of "public
convenience and necessity" to be determined by the State Utilities Com-
mission and not subject to judicial inquiry.
Compensation for Annexation of Water and Sewer Systems
As a means of decreasing the cost of developing utilities, municipali-
ties frequently enact ordinances providing that water and sewer systems
installed by developers in subdivisions within a specified area outside the
corporate limits and connected with the municipal system will become
the city's property whenever the subdivision is annexed. In 1952 such
an ordinance was involved in Spaugh v. Winston-Salem,1 where the
Court ruled that the developer was not entitled to compensation from
the city for the water and sewer lines. In connecting his lines with
the city's system, the developer was presumed to have bad knowledge
of the ordinance and to have made it a part of his contract with the
city. After the annexation the city merely continued to furnish water
and sewer service to subdivision residents in the same manner as dur-
ing the preceding twenty years. Further, the city had never agreed
to compensate the developer for the facilities. Although several earlier
cases were distinguished, 19 the Court did not cite Farr v. Asheville,"0
where in a similar situation the same result had been reached without
an ordinance of the Winston-Salem type being involved. In the Farr
case the Court had concluded that a mere annexation of the development
did not of itself amount to a taking or appropriation of the water and
sewer lines which plaintiff had installed for his own convenience and
profit in order to increase the value of his lots.
The problem arose again in Jackson v. Gastonia.21 Here also there
was no ordinance providing that the water and sewer lines would become
the city's property upon annexation. The subdivider installed the pipes
to increase the salability of his lots and connected with the city mains.
After inspecting the lines to protect against water leakage, the city
began supplying water to and collecting from individual consumers.
Lot purchasers were not required to connect their homes with the de-
18234 N.C. 708, 68 S.E.2d 838 (1952).
10 Charlotte Consol. Constr. Co. v. Charlotte, 208 N.C. 308, 180 S.E. 573 (1935)
(upheld recovery upon evidence that city took lines constructed inside city by
plaintiff through exercise of its eminent domain powers) ; Stephens Co. v. Char-
lotte, 201 N.C. 258, 159 S.E. 414 (1931) (city held liable for reasonable value of
sewer and water lines in subdivision after annexing the territory and taking over
the lines); Abbot Realty Co. v. Charlotte, 198 N.C. 564, 152 S.E. 686 (1930)
(subdivider installed sewage facilities on unimproved land within the city to
enhance the value of the property and in reliance upon an unenforceable contract
by the city to reimburse him. City upon taking over the lines and incorporating
them into the municipal system was held liable for their reasonable value).
20 205 N.C. 82, 170 S.E. 125 (1933).
21246 N.C. 404, 98 S.E.2d 444 (1957).
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veloper's system, and connections were made at the expense of the lot
owners. The developer maintained the lines without reimbursement from
the property owners. Although no written contract to compensate him
for the lines was made, the municipality did have the system appraised
prior to its annexation of the area. After the decision in the Spaugh
case, however, the city declined to pay for the water and sewer lines.
In an action to recover their value the parties stipulated that since an-
nexation the city had "taken over, used and controlled" the water and
sewer lines to the same extent as if they had been originally installed by
the city.
Distinguishing the Spaugh and Farr cases, the Court allowed a
recovery. Unlike Spaugh, there was here no applicable city ordinance.
The case differed from Farr because the city had "taken over, used and
controlled" the system as if it had originally belonged to the city.
Further, the transactions between the developer and the lot purchasers
did not amount to a public dedication because they were not for the
benefit of the public at large. This being so, and there being no written
contract with the city for purchase of the lines, plaintiff was held en-
titled to a quantum reruit recovery.
Although the decision may be just, the basis on which the Court
reached this result is not made explicit. The Court points to the absence
of an ordinance providing that the mains would become the property of
the city upon annexation. But this would not seem to be a determinative
factor. The city may provide in an ordinance that upon the happening
of a particular event the title to the property shall vest in the municipal-
ity, and such ordinance may be construed to be part of an implied con-
tract made with the municipality when the developer voluntarily con-
nects his lines with the city's system; nevertheless, the city would seem
to be still under an obligation to. pay compensation for the property
taken. Otherwise, the municipality would be appropriating private prop-
erty by legislative fiat without paying just compensation.2 2
On the other hand, where the developer has assessed the cost of
building the system against the price of the lots he sells, an element
of "unjust enrichment" enters the picture and it seems equally unreason-
able for him to be reimbursed both by the lot purchasers and by the
municipality as well.
However, absent an ordinance similar to that in the Spaugh case,
an extension of the municipal limits alone would not seem to amount to
a taking or appropriation of the water and sewer system by the city,
especially where the city merely continues to supply water and sewer
services to consumers as it had been doing in the past. Yet where the
" See Spaugh v. Winston-Salem, 234 N.C. 708, 715, 68 S.E.2d 838, 843 (1952)(concurring opinion).
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developer has himself operated and maintained the water and sewer
system, perhaps by purchasing water in bulk from the municipality and
retailing this to his consumers; he would seem clearly to have reserved
his rights. He should then be entitled to compensation, even though he
has connected to the city's mains pursuant to an ordinance providing
for the vesting of title in the city upon annexation.
No comprehensive rule seems to- emerge from an examination of
the cases. Instead, as the Court itself pointed out in both the Spaugh
and Jackson decisions, "this case and others of like nature must be con-
sidered -and determined in the light of the pertinent facts presented by
the record in each case." 23
EMINENT DOMAIN
As a general rule, property already devoted to a public use may not
be taken for an inconsistent public use by the exercise of general em-
inent domain powers.2 4  A specific legislative authorization or one of
unmistakable intent is considered necessary for the taking. The Court
has, however, recognized exceptions to the rule. Hence, in Goldsboro v.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R . 2 the Court upheld the exercise of a munici-
pality's general powers to condemn a portion of a railroad right-of-way,
consisting of an unused strip of land and track, for use as a traffic circle.
The trial court had found that the property showed no evidence of use
in recent years and was not necessary to the railroad in the operation of
its business. Affirming the condemnation, the Court stated that "when
the property is not in actual public use and not necessary or vital to
the operation of the business of the owner" the "land may be taken under
general" powers of eminent domain "as freely as from a private indi-
vidual." 20
The Court has also intimated that the rule may be more flexible
where the property sought to be condemned belongs to a public service
corporation than where the property belongs to a governmental' unit or
instrumentality.27
A different application of this doctrine was involved in Southern
2 8 Id. at 714, 68 S.E2d at 824; Jackson v. Gastonia, 246 N.C. 404, 408, 98
S.E.2d 444, 447 (1957).
"See Yadkin County v. High Point, 217 N.C. 462, 8 S.E.2d 470 (1940) (en-
joining city from construction of dam and reservoir which if built as designed
would have flooded various highways in neighboring county and portion of county-
home site) ; Fayetteville Street R.R. v. Railroad, 142 N.C. 423, 55 S.E. 345 (1906)
(enjoining defendant from prosecuting condemnation proceedings under general
eminent domain powers to acquire abandoned road-bed for which plaintiff had ob-
tained prior right to use as its right-of-way).
25246 N.C. 10J, 97 S.E.2d 486 (1957).
20 Id. at 108, 97 S.E.2d at 491.
', Yadkin County v. High Point, 217 N.C. 462, 466, 8 S.E.2d 470, 473 (1940).
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Ry. v. Greensboro2 Pursuant to a street improvement plan involving
the elimination of a traffic "bottleneck" and relocation of an interstate
highway, the city had commenced construction of six grade crossings
over the railroad's main-line right-of-way within a distance of 1,670
feet. This was being done without specific legislative authorization and
in the face of objections by the railroad. Alleging that the unauthorized
construction made use of its tracks dangerous, constituted a trespass,
and would retard the future development of railroad service and un-
reasonably interfere with its business, the railroad sought and obtained
a temporary restraining order against further construction work by the
city. At a further hearing, however, the injunction was dissolved. The
Supreme Court granted supersedeas pending appeal, and on appeal held
that the temporary injunction should have been continued until the final
hearing.
The Court indicated that the city would be taking the railroad's
property to the extent that the construction interfered with the rail-
road's operations over its right-of-way. This was property already de-
voted to a public use, and the Court pointed out that the city admittedly
did not have a specific legislative grant of authority to take it for an in-
consistent public use. The Court also noted that if the railroad's allega-
tions of trespass were established the cit) might be required to restore
the property, as nearly as possible, to its former condition.
Municipalities ordinarily may extend streets across railroad tracks
in a manner which does not interfere with the use of the tracks, 20 and
through the exercise of their police powers may require railroad com-
panies to construct overhead crossings or viaducts at their own expense
when traffic conditions warrant.30 However, in the instant case the
plaintiff's allegations of trespass, a wrongful taking of its property, and
interference with its business were deemed sufficient to require the
halting of the construction work so that the status quo might be main-




G.S. "§ 44-2 codifies the common law possessory lien arising by im-
plication of law for repairs made by an artisan on personal property.
This lien under some circumstances enjoys priority over previously
28 247 N.C. 321, 101 S.E.2d 347 (1957).
"See Southern Ry. v. Greensboro, 247 N.C. 321, 330, 101 S.E.2d 347, 356,
citing with approval Ft. Wayne v. Lake Shore & M.S.R.R., 132 Ind. 558, 32 N.E.
215 (1892).
"o See Durham v. Southern Ry., 185 N.C. 240, 117 S.E. 17 (1923).
[Vol. 36
NORTH CAROLINA CASE LAW
acquired chattel mortgages as long as possession is continued by the
lien holder.' However, once possession is voluntarily surrendered the
lien terminates and becomes incapable of future revival.
2
A recent illustration of the characteristics of this lien is Barbre-
Askew Finance, Inc. v. Thompson,3 where the defendant-mechanic sur-
rendered possession of a partially repaired automobile to the "owner or
legal possessor" under an oral agreement that the automobile would be
returned for final repairs. The defendant alleged that under G.S. § 44-2
his lien had priority over plaintiff's previously recorded chattel mortgage.
The Court held that even though possession was thereafter re-acquired
and maintained, the defendant had lost his lien as to the initial repair
work done prior to the car's surrender. Although defendant acquired
a contractual lien upon surrender of possession as between himself and
the car owner by virtue of the oral agreement, it was inferior to plain-
tiff's previously recorded chattel mortgage.
As to the repair work done subsequent to the return of the car, the
defendant had a valid lien under G.S. § 44-2. Technically, liens arising
under this statute are common law possessory liens, not to be con-




In Burns v. Crump' the defendant asserted title to land through
adverse possession.. In order to satisfy the statutory period he attempted
to tack periods in which the property had been held adversely by his
predecessors. The evidence indicated that G originally held the land
adversely, but without color of title. He conveyed the adjoining forty-
five acres to S by deed, the description therein failing to include the
land in question. This deed further provided that "the above J. P.
Gragg is to have a home on and full possession of said land as long as
he lives." Thereafter S, with G joining in the deed, conveyed the forty-
five acres to the defendant. Here again the description included only
the forty-five acre tract. However, at the time of conveyance G went
on the land with the defendant and pointed out corners and boundaries
which did in fact include the disputed area.
'Johnson v. Yates, 183 N.C. 24, 110 S.E. 603 (1922).
'53 C.J.S., Liens § 17d(3) (1948). Contra, Gardner v. LeFevre, 180 Mich.
219, 146 N.W. 653 (1914).3247 N.C. 143, 100 S.E.2d 381 (1957), 36 N.C.L. REv. 512 (1958).
' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44-1 (1950). See also 36 Am. JuR., Mechanics' Liens
§§ 1-3 (1941); note 2 supra.
1245 N.C. 360, 95 S.E.2d 906 (1957).
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It is generally conceded that in order to tack successive adverse
possessions there must be privity between the several occupants. 2 Fur-
ther, a deed will not create privity as to land not described therein.8
After stating these principles the Court concluded that no privity could
exist as between the defendant and G. The deed given by G to S, said
the Court, conveyed a'fee simple title and the attempt to reserve a life
estate, being repugnant to the estate granted, was ineffective. Therefore,
G's joinder in the defendant's deed was mere surplusage. The pointing
out by a third party of land not embraced within a given deed does not
create the required privity between grantor and grantee. As to S no
evidence appeared that she had ever intended to assert title to the land
in question, adversely or otherwise.
An interesting question still undecided in this state is whether privity
will arise if the grantor personally, or by means of his duly authorized
agent, goes on the land conveyed and in the process of pointing out to
the grantee the land to be conveyed includes other adjoining lands
held adversely by him which are not embraced within the boundaries
of the deed delivered. Some authorities indicate that such action on
the grantor's part would create the necessary privity.4
In Scott v. Lewis5 the plaintiffs alleged ownership through adverse
possession. Due to a previous adjudication against them in favor of the
defendant-owner in 1907, the Court held that even though the plaintiffs
continued in possession thereafter, their possession could not be con-
sidered adverse without further notice of their intent to hold adversely.
DEDICATION
In Todd v. White6 the owners sold lots with reference to a recorded
map which indicated that a certain area had been set aside as a "Park"
(later changed to "Park-Subject to Revision"). Each deed conveying
a lot provided that the owners "shall have the right to change, alter or
close up any street or avenue shown upon said map or plat not adjacent
to the lot above described and not necessary to the full enjoyment by the
[grantee] . . . of the above described property and shall retain the right
and title to, and the control and disposition of all parks, streets, avenues
• . . as shown on said map or plat, subject only to the rights of the
party of the second part for the purposes of egress and ingress necessary
to the full enjoyment of the above described property."
'1 Am. JUR., Adverse Possession § 152 (1936).
a 1 id. § 156.
"Gregory v. Thorrez, 27 Mich. 197, 269 N.W. 142 (1936) ; 1 AM. JUR., Ad-
verse Possession § 157 (1936) ; see Note, 31 N.C.L. REv. 478 (1953).
246 N.C. 298, 98 S.E.2d 294 (1957).8246 N.C. 59, 97 S.E.2d 439 (1957).
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It is the general rule that when the grantor has his land subdivided
into lots, streets, alleys, courts, and parks according to a map or plat
and thereafter sells or conveys the lots with reference to such map or
plat, nothing else appearing, he thereby dedicates such streets, alleys,
courts, and parks to the use of the lot purchasers and those claiming
under them.7 However, the Court held that the language in the deed
retaining title and control of the park area in the owners was effective
to take the case out of the foregoing rule. Therefore, the owners could
convey the park area free of any easement for park purposes regardless
of whether or not the area had been used as a park by the various
grantees or an effective withdrawal under G.S. § 136-96 had been
accomplished. The record indicates that the city in which the land was
located had not accepted the park area.
DEEDS
Delivery on Death
If a grantor attempts to postpone the effectiveness of an executed
deed until his death he must risk one of two possible hazards. If he
records the deed there is a rebuttable presumption of delivery, placing
him under a considerable disadvantage if his grantee gains possession of
the deed before the grantor's death.8 If on the other hand he places his
deed of gift in escrow without recordation he runs the risk presented
by G.S. § 47-24, which requires all deeds of gift to be recorded within
two years measured from the time of execution. If not so recorded
such deeds will be deemed void ab initio.
In Harris v. Briley9 the grantor and his wife executed their deed
of gift in escrow, delivery to be made upon the deaths of the grantors.
This deed was not recorded until its surrender to the grantee, which
occurred some three years after the date of execution. The Court held,
per curiam, that the deed was void for noncompliance with G.S. § 47-24.
This case is consistent with prior North Carolina law.' 0
Limitations
The term so long as is said to create an estate on special limitation
or, as the case may be, a determinable fee. No right of reversion need
be reserved in order for the limitation to become effective. Upon the
happening of the contingency the title reverts back to the grantor auto-
matically by operation of law. On the other hand, the term upon condi-
tion is said to create an estate on condition, but in order for the limita-
'Home Real Estate Loan and Ins. Co. v. Town of Carolina Beach, 216 N.C.
778, 7 S.E2d 13 (1940).
8 Burton v. Peace, 206 N.C. 99, 173 S.E. 4 (1934).
244 N.C. 526, 94 S.E.2d 476 (1956).
"0 Allen v. Allen, 209 N.C. 744, 184 S.E. 485 (1936).
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tion to be effective in North Carolina the power of termination must
be expressly reserved."
The case of The Washington City Bd. of Educ. v. Edgerton12 pre-
sents an interesting problem in that land was conveyed to the plaintiff
by deed "upon condition that the same shall be held and possessed by
the party of the second part only so long as the said property shall be
used for school purposes."'13  (Emphasis added.) The issue arose as
to whether the plaintiff received under this deed a fee simple absolute
or an estate subject to a condition subsequent. No consideration was
given to the third possibility, that of a determinable fee. The Court
construed the language ag merely denoting the grantor's motive or pur-
pose in conveying the land with the result that the grantee took a fee
simple absolute title. The deed did not create a fee on condition subse-
quent since no right of re-entry was reserved.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
In Stokes v. Smith14 the plaintiff brought an action to recover land
held by the defendant. The following facts were stipulated. In 1909
W conveyed land to H, her husband, without complying with G.S.
§ 52-12.'5 This deed was therefore void. On October 4, 1912, W and
H conveyed W's land to D in consideration of $100. On the following
day D and wife reconveyed the land to H for $100. The land was sub-
sequently .sold by court order in payment of H's personal debts. The
Court held that since the parties failed to stipulate the absence of good
faith, the mere fact that the land was reconveyed on the following day
for the identical consideration was not sufficient to indicate conclusively
that D was used solely to avoid compliance with G.S. § 52-12. The
opinion contains a worthwhile review of the history of the North Caro-
lina homestead laws.
EASEMENTS
Two recent cases concerning easements are worthy of mention.
The first is Cooke v. Wake Elec. Membership Corp.,'6 where an owner
of land granted an easement to a power company allowing it to run
" See McCall, Estates on Condition and on Special Limitations in North Caro-
lina, -19 N.C.L. R.v. 335 (1941).
-244 N.C. 576, 94 S.E.2d 661 (1956).
13 Id. at 577, 94 S.E.2d at 662.
'246 N.C. 694, 100 S.E.2d 85 (1957).
" In all conveyances of real property by a wife to her husband for a period
in excess of three years, the wife must undergo a privy examination and the
person taking the wife's acknowledgment must further certify, as a matter of fact,
that the wife's conveyance was not unreasonable or injurious to her, before such
conveyance will be deemed valid. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-12 (1957).16245 N.C. 453, 96 S.E.2d 351 (1957).
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its lines over his land with the right to re-locate its electric poles. It
subsequently became necessary to relocate the poles because of the con-
struction of a dual highway. It was held that the power company was
under a duty to relocate the poles so that they would be substantially
the same distance from the new highway as they were from the old
unless the owner consented to another location or unless dangerous
hazards were present. Further, although the grantor desired the poles
to be placed at a greater distance from the new road, the power company
was under no legal obligation to oblige him, notwithstanding the owner's
offer to pay the additional expenses.
The second case is Grimes v. Virginia Elec. and Power Coyt Here
the plaintiff and his wife granted to the defendant company, "its suc-
cessors and assigns, the perpetual easement to construct, operate, and
maintain one or more pole or tower lines, as the company may from
time to time deem expedient or advisable . . ." Thereafter the de-
fendant company assigned to the city of Washington a license to attach
wires to its poles. The plaintiff was allowed to recover for the addi-
tional burden placed upon his land. Although the power company was
allowed to make maximum use of its poles for its own use, to allow the
assignment without additional compensation to the owner would be im-
posing two easements over the owner's land rather than the single ease-
ment for which the parties bargained.
EMINENT DOMAIN
Hedrick v. Graham8 upholds the power of the State Highway and
Public Works Commission to condemn a land owner's right of access to
and from highways on which his land abuts. This right of access, how-
ever, is in the nature of an easement which is considered property and
thus cannot be taken without just compensation. The Court held that
the condemnation of the right to ingress and egress by eminent domain
was authorized by G.S. § 136-9 and G.S. § 136-18(b). 19
In Gatling v. State Highway and Public Works Comm'n ° the Court
held that unless notice of the final meeting of the appraisers in a con-
demnation proceeding is given in accordance with G.S. § 40-17 to in-
terested parties, G.S. § 40-19, which requires exceptions to be filed
within twenty days from the filing of the commissioner's report, does not
bar exceptions filed after the twenty day period.
17245 N.C. 583, 96 S.E.2d 713 (1957).
"s 245 N.C. 249, 96 S.E.2d 129 (1957), 36 N.C.L. REv. 87 (1957).
1" See Note, 34 N.C.L. REv. 130 (1956).
20 245 N.C. 66, 95 S.E.2d 131 (1956).
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ESTATE BY THE ENTIRETY
In McLamb v. Weaver2' commissioners partitioned certain lands.
At the request of one of the parties, who had been a tenant in common
in the partitioned property, they deeded her share to her and her hus-
band as an estate by the entirety. The Court held that no such estate
was created. The only purpose of a partitioning proceeding is to sever
the unity of possession, and not to create a new estate or title. There-
fore, the commissioners had no power to convey the respective shares
to the several tenants after severance.
In Shimer v. Traub22 the Court held that where two persons, be-
lieving themselves to be husband and wife when in fact they are not,
purchase land jointly, they will be deemed tenants in common and not
tenants by the entirety.
A split of authority exists as to whether a conveyance from one
spouse to himself and the other spouse creates a tenancy in common or
an estate by the entirety.23 In Woolard v. Smith 24 the North Carolina
Court declared for the first time that such a conveyance would create
an estate by the entirety. This practical result obviates the useless
formality of conveying to a straw man, who, in turn, conveys the prop-
erty back to the spouses.
FIXTURES
Where a tenant attaches fixtures to the freehold he has the right
to remove them at the end of the term upon a showing that they were
annexed for the purposes of trade or manufacture. Fixtures so attached
do not become a part of the realty. But when the owner of land attaches
fixtures thereto, his motive is deemed to be the enhancement of the
freehold.2 5 Accordingly, the Court concluded in Stephens v. Carter26
that when the owner sells the land, the fixtures are deemed to be a part
of the freehold. Therefore, a sale of such fixtures must be evidenced
by a paper writing in accordance with the Statute "of Frauds and the sale
of fixtures by parol prior to the sale of the land is ineffective.
LANDLORD AND TENANT
Assignment
Where the lessor subsequent to the lessee's breach of a covenant or
21244 N.C. 432, 94 S.E.2d 331 (1956).
-22244 N.C..463, 94 S.E.2d 363 (1956).
2"26 Am. JuR., Husband and Wife § 72 (1940).
24244 N.C. 489, 94 S.E.2d 466 (1956); now confirmed by N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 39-13.3 (Supp. 1957), discussed in Comments on North Carolina 1957 Session
Laws, 36 N.C.L. REv. 41, 47 (1957).
22 Springs v. The Atlantic Refining Co., 205 N.C. 444, 171 S.E. 635 (1933).
26246 N.C. 318, 98 S.E.2d 311 (1957).
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condition accepts rent from his tenant with full' knowledge of the
broken covenant or condition, the lessor cannot thereafter assert his right
of forfeiture given by the lease, notwithstanding an express denial of
waiver upon acceptance of the rent.2 7  Fairchild Realty Co. v. Spiegel,
Inc.2 8 clearly illustrates this rule and the danger it entails for landlords.
The plaintiff leased his premises to the defendant at a minimum monthly
rate "plus three percent of all sales in excess of $500,000 made from
the demised property." The three percent additional rental netted the
plaintiff some $20,000 a year. The lease provided that no assignment
could be made without the lessor's consent. It also reserved to the
lessor the right to declare a forfeiture of the lease upon default or
breach of this condition. The defendant thereafter, without the plain-
tiff's consent, assigned the lease to another corporation which took
possession of the premises. The assignee's sales never equaled those
of the assignor and apparently never exceeded $500,000. Because the
lessor continued to accept rent from the original lessee after full knowl-
edge of the broken condition, he waived his right to terminate the
lease. The dissent questions whether the rule should have been applied
under these circumstances. However, the Court's decision, though
harsh, seems to be in accord with prior law. In another case the Court
followed the general rule that even though the lessor consents to the
lessee's assignment, the lessee, absent any stipulation to the contrary,
remains personally liable for the rents due.29
Liens
The statutory lien, arising under G.S. § 44-1 in favor of a tenant
for services rendered, cannot exist in the absence of a debtor-creditor
relationship. Thus where a landlord contracts to farm on halves with
his tenant and agrees that the tenant may sub-contract the growing of
part of the crops to other tenants, but stipulates that the tenant and sub-
tenants are to account to each other, the sub-tenants obtain no lien for
services rendered as against the landlord, since there is no contract or
debt between them. Further, the landlord's lien arising under G.S.
§ 42-15 for advances made enjoys priority over any claims which the
sub-tenants might possess against the original tenant.3 0
Duty to Repair
In Richnn Mfg. Co. v. Gable3' the defendant leased the second and
third floors of his building to the plaintiff "to have and to hold the same,
with the privileges and appurtenances thereunto in anywise appertaining
27 Winder v. Martin, 183 N.C. 410, 111 S.E. 708 (1922).28 246 N.C. 458, 98 S.E.2d 871 (1957).
"' Fidelity Bank v. Bloomfield, 246 N.C. 492, 98 S.E.2d 865 (1957).
80 Eason v. Dew, 244 N.C. 571, 94 S.E.2d 603 (1956).
"246 N.C. 1, 97 S.E.2d 672 (1957).
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. . . upon the following terms and conditions .... 3. It is further
understood and agreed that the [plaintiff] . . .shall be responsible for
two-thirds32 of the maintenance and upkeep of the heating plant and
equipment in said building.. .." ( Emphasis added.) When the furnace,
which was located in the basement, later exploded, the plaintiff brought
an action to recover damages from his landlord. The evidence indi-
cated that the explosion resulted from lack of maintenance in that the
furnace had not been properly cleaned or adjusted. The defendant's
motion for nonsuit was sustained, apparently for two reasons. First,
the Court stated that the furnace was an appurtenance within the mean-
ing of the contract since it was necessary to the present enjoyment of the
premises. Secondly, the Court construed the lease to the effect that
the tenant had expressly agreed and consented to repair and maintain
the furnace. Of course, where the tenant agrees to assume the re-
sponsibility of repairs, there is no question concerning his responsibility
to make them.33 However, the Court's determination that the furnace
was an appurtenance may in fact be misleading. Absent any express
undertaking, the duty to repair does not appear to depend upon whether
or not the object to be repaired is an appurtenance, but rather upon
the type of repair and other circumstances involved. 4 For example, had
the explosion resulted from defects caused by some broken or worn'out
mechanism, the tenant would have been under no obligation to repair it
unless he agreed to do so, for he is only bound to make ordinary repairs
and not those of a substantial or permanent nature35 On the contrary,
the obligation in such a case would probably fall upon the landlord if
he had partially leased his building to several tenants and the heating
plant were located in an unleased portion of the building.3 6
RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
It is the general rule in North Carolina that no notice, however full
and formal, can take the place of registration.3 T In respect to recorda-
tion the usual theory advanced seems to be that if a proper search of the
public records would have revealed that sought to be charged, sufficient
notice will have been given. Generally the definition of proper search
has been confined to the chain of title.38
Reed v. Elmore39 presents a case of first impression in this state.
" Plaintiff's co-tenant was responsible for the remainder of the upkeep and
maintenance.
'32 Am. JuR., Landlord and Tenant § 788 (1941).
s 32 id. § 780.
' TIFFANY, REAL PROpERy § 83 (1940).
3632 Am. JUR., Landlord and Tenant § 746 (1941).
a Austin v. Staten, 126 N.C. 783, 36 S.E. 338 (1900).
Turner v. Glenn, 220 N.C. 620, 18 S.E.2d 197 (1942).
a' 246 N.C. 221, 98 S.E.2d 360 (1957), 36 N.C.L. Ray. 233 (1958).
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An owner subdivided land into seven lots. Lot three was sold to the
plaintiff subject to a condition "that no structure shall be erected by the
grantee within 550 feet of the Pineville-Matthews Road, it being under-
stood and agreed that the 100 foot strip leading to said tract of land
from the Pineville-Matthews Road shall not be used for purpose of
constructing any building thereon, and this restriction shall likewise apply
to Lot No. 4, retained by the grantor, said Lot No. 4 being adjacent to
lands hereby conveyed. '40 Thereafter the owner conveyed lot four by
deed with no mention of the previous restriction thereon. Through
mesne conveyances the defendant subsequently became the owner of
lot four. All the deeds were duly recorded. The Court held that
plaintiff's deed imposed a mutual restrictive covenant on lots three and
four in the nature of a negative easement running with the land. Even
though plaintiff's deed was clearly off defendant's chain of title, this
restrictive covenant was held to be binding on the defendant-grantee. 41
SALES
BULK SALES
In Kramer Bros., Inc. v. McPherson' the evidence tended to show
that defendant had purchased a portion of the stock of merchandise
of a hobby shop, paying between $845.00 and $865.00 for the goods.
The seller did not notify his creditors of the proposed sale or otherwise
comply with the bulk sales statute.2 In an action by a creditor of the
seller against the defendant-purchaser to set aside the sale and obtain a
personal judgment for any of the merchandise the defendant had sold or
otherwise disposed of, the Court held the evidence sufficient to go to
the jury.
TRANSFER OF TITLE
In Putnam v. Triangle Publications, Inc a the Court held that when
10 Id. at 223, 98 S.E.2d at 361.
" See Waldrop v. Town of Brevard, 233 N.C. 26, 62 S.E2d 512 (1950), where
the plaintiff argued that no deed in his chain of title referred to the easement sought
to be charged. The Court, after holding that his land was nevertheless subject
to the easement, said: "This position might be well taken if we were dealing with
restrictive covenants instead of an easement and waiver and release of any and
all claims . .." Id. at 30, 62 S.E.2d at 514.
245 N.C. 354, 95 S.E.2d 889 (1956).
2 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-23 (1950). The statute provides in part: "The sale
in bulk of a large part or the whole of a stock of merchandise, otherwise than in
the ordinary course of trade and in regular and usual prosecution of the seller's
business, shall be void as against the creditors of the seller, unless . . ." the seller
makes an inventory showing the quantity, etc. of the articles to be sold and notifies
the creditors of the proposed sale at least seven days in advance of the sale.
- 245 N.C. 432, 96 S.E.2d 445 (1957).
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a foreign corporation sold magazines containing libelous matter to North
Carolina wholesalers and delivered them to a common carrier outside
North Carolina, the corporation was not guilty of tortious conduct in this
state, since title passed upon delivery to the carrier. This is in accord
with the general rule that, nothing to the contrary appearing, delivery
of goods to a common carrier for shipment passes title to the buyer.
4
In Peed v. Burlesoi's, Inc.5 plaintiff contracted to sell potatoes and
to deliver them to the buyer but the buyer was to pay the freight. Upon
shipment by motor vehicle carrier, the truck driver wrongfully sold
the potatoes to a defendant. The Court held that plaintiff still had title
at the time of the conversion. The Court recognized the general rule
that in a sale f.o.b. point of shipment, in the absence of an intent to the
contrary, title passes upon delivery of the goods to the carrier for
shipment, but held that this case falls within an exception to the general
rule, because the seller by his contract undertook to make delivery him-
self at the point of destination. This exception is also recognized by the
Uniform Sales Act.6
IMPLIED WARRANTIES
In Driver v. Snow7 the plaintiff bought a second-hand stove from the
defendant. The stove was equipped with a water jacket to be used for
heating water but the plaintiff made it known that he was going to use it
only for heating the kitchen and not for heating water. Defendant
gave plaintiff plugs to cover holes left on removal of pipes attached to
the water jacket. Plaintiff removed the pipes, put the plugs in the holes,
and started a fire in the stove. Unknown to either party the jacket
contained water. The steam, being unable to escape, caused an explosion
which injured the plaintiff. Plaintiff contended that there was an implied
warranty that the stove was safe for the purpose for which it was
bought. The Court held that in the sale of a second-hand article there
is no such implied warranty where the buyer and seller have equal
opportunity to inspect for defects. The Court found that the plaintiff
had a better opportunity to discover the defect under these circum-
stances. The Court distinguished cases involving latent defects not
discoverable on ordinary examination.8
TAXATION
PROPERTY TAx
In Ramsey v. Board of Comm'rs' the Court held that a statute giving
'VOLD, SALES § 76 (1931). 5 244 N.C. 437, 94 S.E.2d 351 (1956).8 UNEFORM SALEs Acr § 19, rule 5. 7245 N.C. 223, 95 S.E.2d 519 (1956).
8 For a general discussion of implied warranties, see Note, 32 N.C.L. REV. 351
(1954).
1246 N.C. 647, 100 S.E.2d 55 (1957).
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a county power to issue bonds for a water and sewage system was con-
stitutional. The Court stated that a county may levy taxes only for a
public purpose and, taking judicial notice of the urbanization of the
counties of the state, found that the projects were in the public interest.
The Court has long held that municipalities may issue bonds for the
construction of water and sewage systems.2  This case was the first
test of the same authority given to the counties.3 The holding is in
accord with the majority of American jurisdictions.4
Another recent case involving the powers of a county to tax was
Bragg Investment Co. v. Cumberland County.5  The Court there sus-
tained a county tax on buildings, on stoves and refrigerators in the
buildings, and on the value of the leasehold interest of the plaintiff.
Plaintiff had leased from the federal government land on a military
reservation and had built apartments thereon for the use of military
personnel. By sustaining an ad valorem tax on the value of the lease-
hold the Court in effect ruled that the state intangibles tax had not
eliminated all intangibles from county taxation.6
INCOME TAx
Goodwill Distributors, Inc. v. Shaw7 was a case of first impression
in North Carolina. There A and B corporations merged with and into
C corporation pursuant to G.S. §§ 55-165 to -173. In the following
fiscal year C, the surviving corporation, sued the Commissioner of Rev-
enue for a refund on taxes paid, claiming a deduction for a net-operating-
loss carry-over based on the pre-merger losses of B. The Court reversed
the lower court's judgment for plaintiff on the pleadings, stating that
it did not appear from the complaint that C corporation was substantially
the same taxpayer as the corporation sustaining the loss within the
meaning of G.S. § 105-147(6) (d) and thus entitled to deduct the pre-
merger loss.
This holding is in accord with a recent United States Supreme Court
case on the same point.8 There the Court disallowed a carry-over loss
for federal income tax purposes because there was not a "continuity of
business enterprise," i.e., the surviving business was not sufficiently
'McKinney v. High Point, 237 N.C. 66, 74 S.E.2d 440 (1952); Rhodes v.
Asheville, 230 N.C. 134, 52 S.E.2d 371 (1949) ; Fawcett v. Mt. Airy, 134 N.C. 125,
45 S.E. 1029 (1903).
IN.C. GEN. STAT. 153-77(p) (Supp. 1957).
'20 CJ.S., Counties § 261 (1940).
245 N.C. 492, 96 S.E.2d 341 (1956).
'The effects of this case have been thoroughly discussed in Lewis, Taxing
Private Interest on Public Lani, Popular Government, Nov. 1956, pp. 13-17; Local
Taxation of Intangible Personal Property, Popular Government, March 1957, p. 8.1247 N.C. 157, 100 S.E.2d 334 (1957).
' Lisbon Shops, Inc. v. Koehler, 353 U.S. 382 (1957).
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similar to the merged loss corporation to allow the deduction. This
test is a departure from the previous doctrine of "continuity of corporate
form," which allowed a deduction if the survivor corporation was
existing under the same state charter as the loss corporation.9 Although
the Court did not directly discard the corporate form test, the inference
is that it would not now be followed. This new doctrine is meritorious,
since tax consequences are not made to depend upon the technicalities
of state corporation laws. 10
The North Carolina Court indicated some of the criteria to be used
in determining whether the survivor may take advantage of the loss:
the types of business of the corporations before the merger; whether they
were in the same field of endeavor; whether they were in the same
territory; whether the same business was continued after the merger;
whether the net worth is relatively the same; whether the income of the
survivor corporation sought to be deducted was earned prior to or after
the merger. The Court held that it was error for the trial judge to
grant judgment for the plaintiff on the pleadings without determining
whether the survivor corporation met the tests prescribed.
TORTS
ABusE OF PROCESS
Abuse of process is the tort action which provides a remedy in cases
where legal procedure has been set in motion in proper form but has been
perverted to accomplish an ulterior purpose for which it was not de-
signed.' The essential elements have been stated to be :2 (1) an ulterior
purpose,3 and (2) a willful act in the use of process not proper in the
regular conduct of the proceeding. 4 The mere use of the process to
accomplish a purpose other than the proper one is not abuse of process ;r
' Standard Paving Co., 190 F2d 330 (10th Cir. 1951) ; California Casket Co., 19
T.C. 32 (1952).10 See The Supreme Court, 1956 Term, 72 HARv. L. Rzv. 83, 190 (1957);
Note, 41 MINN. L. REv. 136 (1957).
1 PROSSER, TORTS, § 100, at 667 (2d ed. 1955). The tort is said to be the misuse
or the misapplication of process justified in itself for an end other than that which
it was designed to accomplish. Abernathy v. Bums, 210 N.C. 636, 188 S.E. 97
(1936).
Ledford v. Smith, 212 N.C. 447, 193 S.E. 722 (1937), 16 N.C.L. REv. 277;
Railroad Co. v. Hardware Co., 143 N.C. 54, 55 S.E. 422 (1906).
'Where there was no allegation of an ulterior motive, a demurrer was sustained.
Barnette v. Woody, 242 N.C. 424, 88 S.E.2d 223 (1955).
'A distinct act not authorized by the process or an objective not legitimate in
the use of the process is required. Usually the process is used as a threat or a club
for purposes of extortion. Ludwick v. Penny; 158 N.C. 104, 73 S.E. 228 (1911).
'Melton v. Rickman, 225 N.C. 700, 36 S.E.2d 276 (1945).
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but where it is used in the course of negotiations, as a threat, to ac-
complish that purpose, there is abuse.6
In Bailey v. McGill7 the plaintiff alleged that he was suffering from
an incurable disease and had been under the care of the defendant; that
defendant, solely through malice and ill will toward him and to rid
himself of the plaintiff-patient, advised and influenced plaintiff's parents
to institute lunacy proceedings; that plaintiff was committed and held
for observation for thirty days and thereafter was released and declared
to be not mentally disordered. Plaintiff's counsel stated in open court
that they were not relying upon a cause of action for malicious prose-
cution or for abuse of process, or for false imprisonment.8 The trial
court sustained the defendant's demurrer ore tenus which was made
on the ground that aside from a cause of action for malicious prosecution
no cause of action was stated in the complaint. Reversing, the Supreme
Court held that plaintiff had stated a cause of action for abuse of
process and that since there was no showing that he had expressly
authorized his counsel to state that he was not relying on that cause
of action, counsel's statement to that effect was not binding.
Although the Court makes no effort to spell out the two elements
of the cause of action, it would appear that the first element, ulterior
purpose, is clear and distinct, while the second element, a willful act,
is not so clear and not distinct. It would seem that the willful act
required is some act or threat, in using the process after it has issued
and during the course of negotiations to accomplish the ulterior motive.9
The defendant is charged with influencing and advising plaintiff's
parents to execute and file the affidavit with the clerk of superior court."0
This act, however, occurred before the process was issued. The defend-
ant is also charged with influencing the examining doctors to execute
their affidavits without proper examination of the plaintiff. This act
could have taken place after the process issued, but it does not seem
to be in the nature of the act required heretofore for abuse of process."
FRAT
The grantor, knowing that a third person claimed superior title to
land, represented, through his agent, that he had a fee simple title to
that land. He executed a conveyance with full covenants of seisin,
'Carpenter, Baggott & Co. v. Hanes, 167 N.C. 551, 83 S.E. 577 (1914).
7247 N.C. 286, 100 S.E.2d 860 (1957).The effect of this statement is considered under TRIAL PRACTICE.
o See note 4 supra.
'o In the usual case the defendant has instituted the proceedings himself. Led-
ford v. Smith, 212 N.C. 447, 193 S.E. 722 (1937) ; Abernathy v. Burns, 210 N.C.
636, 188 S.E. 97 (1936).
" See note 4 supra.
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general warranty, and against encumbrances. The Court held that the
grantee did not have a cause of action for fraudulent misrepresentation. 2
Moreover, the Court stated that his action would be for breach of war-
ranty, which could not occur until he is evicted or ousted by one claiming
under superior title.
LIBEL AND SLANDER
When a physician makes affidavits before the clerk of court in a
lunacy proceeding, he is said to be acting in the role of a witness in a
judicial proceeding which gives the affidavits the cloak of absolute priv-
ilege when they are pertinent to the proceeding. 13
In Bell v. Simmons 4 the plaintiff was secretary-treasurer of a Farm
Bureau local. The defendant made statements to newspaper reporters
charging that certain records of the local were missing. These state-
ments subsequently appeared in a newspaper article. In the trial court,
plaintiff offered evidence tending to prove that no records belonging to
the local were missing. The Supreme Court reversed a nonsuit and said
that the statements were capable of a defamatory meaning in that they
charged the plaintiff with conduct from which unfitness for her occupa-
tion could be implied and that there was ample evidence that the state-
ments were intended for publication.15
TRESPASS
In McBride v. Coggins-McIntosh Lumber Co.16 the plaintiff sued
for trespass, alleging that the defendant cut and removed trees belonging
to the plaintiff. The defendant alleged that he had purchased timber
rights from the owners of adjoining land and that they had pointed
out the trees included in the sale. Therefore, he requested that they
be made parties defendant.17 The Court held that the vendors, even
fhough they did not physically participate in the cutting and removing of
the timber, could be joint tort-feasors with defendant.
"
2Shinier v. Traub, 244 N.C. 466, 94 S.E2d 363 (1957). "[W]here the vendor
executes a conveyance to the purchaser with a warranty of title... his previous
representations as to the validity of his title . . . are regarded, however highly
colored, as mere expressions of confidence in his title, and are merged in the
warranty . . . which determined the extent of his liability." Andrus v. St. Louis
Smelting & Refining Co., 130 U.S. 643, 648 (1889).
" Bailey v. McGill, 247 N.C. 286, 100 S.E.2d 860 (1957). For a discussion of
this problem, see Note 36 N.C.L. Rav. 552 (1958).
14247 N.C. 488, 101 S.E.2d 383 (1958).
Id. at 494, 101 S.E.2d at 387.18246 N.C. 415, 98 S.E.2d 663 (1957).
7 For a discussion of the third party practice, see CivuL PROCEDURE (PLEADING
AND PARTIES).
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An unavoidable accident was held to be a defense in an action for
trespass in Smith v. Pate.'8
PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS
In the earlier case of Powers v. Planters Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.'9
the defendant leased a .house to plaintiff without revealing that the
prior occupant had died one month before with tuberculosis and that
the house was probably infected. Eighteen months after becoming ex-
posed to the germs, plaintiff manifested symptoms of tuberculosis and
was hospitalized. Approximately two and one-half years after dis-
covery of the symptoms plaintiff instituted a suit for damages for negli-
gent breach of duty to disclose. The Court followed the general rule
that the cause of action for negligence accrues at the time of the original
breach of duty and held that the action was barred by the three-year
statute of limitation.20 In Shearin v. Lloyd2l the evidence was clear
enough to support the assertion that upon the completion of an appen-
dectomy the defendant had negligently left a foreign object in the
plaintiff's body. The question involved was whether the plaintiff had
commenced his action for malpractice within the prescribed period
of three years22 from the time the cause of action accrued. The opera-
tion was performed on July 20, 1951, and the physician-patient relation-
ship was terminated after the twelve-month checkup-presumably in
July 1952. On November 17, 1952, the doctor discovered and dis-
closed to the plaintiff the facts constituting the negligence. Plaintiff
commenced this suit on November 14, 1955.2 This case, presenting
three different dates-time of breach, termination of relationship, date
of discovery-all of which have been adopted by one jurisdiction or
another 24 as the date on which the cause of action for malpractice ac-
crues, gave the Court an opportunity to depart from its adherence to
the general rule. Yet, citing cases, 25 the Court said,26 "Our decisions
18 246 N.C. 63, 97 S.E.2d 457 (1957). The case is discussed in Note,.36 N.C.L.
REv. 251 (1958).19219 N.C. 254, 13 S.E2d 431 (1941), 19 N.C.L. REV. 599.
1o N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-15, 1-46, 1-52(5) (1953).
21246 N.C. 363, 98 S.E.2d 508 (1957).
'2 See note 20 supra.
"3 In the fall of 1953, after two subsequent operations and intervening clinical
treatment, plaintiff was advised by defendant that a third operation would be neces-
sary. Plaintiff refused to accede to this advice and terminated his relations with
defendant.
' Cappuci v. Barone, 266 Mass. 578, 165 N.E. 653 (1919) (time of breach,
majority view); Huysman v. Kirsch, 6 Cal. App. 2d 302, 57 P.2d 908 (1936)
(termination of the relationship) ; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 516.100 (Vernon 1952) (the
date damages are capable of ascertainment).
"
5Connor v. Schenck, 240 N.C. 794, 84 S.E.2d 175 (1954) ; Lewis v. Shaver,
236 N.C. 510, 73 S.E.2d 320 (1952) ; Powers v. Planters Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.,
219 N.C. 254, 13 S.E.2d 431 (1941); Mast v. Sapp, 140 N.C. 533, 53 S.E. 350
(1906).
" 246 N.C. at 370, 98 S.E.2d at 513.
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impel the conclusion that plaintiff's cause of action accrued 20 July,
1951, immediately upon the closing of the incision." That date was
more than three years prior to the commencement of the action.2 7  Ac-
cordingly, though not without some implication of regret,28 the Court




The duty of a bailor to reveal any latent defects in a chattel which
he delivers to a bailee was involved in Ashley v. Jones." In that case
the chattel was a gasoline truck containing propane gas held in liquid
form by pressure. The defect, known to the bailor, was a leaking pipe.
Without warning from the bailor about the defect, the bailee accepted
the chattel to make repairs. Lacking sufficient parts to make the repairs,
the bailee stored the truck overnight in his closed garage. Sometime
during the night an employee of the bailee opened the garage door, giving
the gas access to a flame which immediately ignited the gas and pre-
cipitated an explosion causing the destruction of the garage and equip-
ment. The Court held that such evidence was sufficient to withstand
the bailor's motion of nonsuit and carry the case to the jury on the
bailee's counterclaim for damage to the garage.30
In Neece v. Richmond Greyhound Lines, Inc.81 a bus carrier ac-
cepted as "baggage" a package exceeding the dimensions given in the
tariff filed by it with the Interstate Commerce Commission.32 The Court
reasoned that since the package exceeded the tariff specifications of
"baggage" the carrier was under no duty to accept it. Therefore, when
it did accept it, it did so as a gratuitous bailee and became liable for the
full value of the package upon loss occasioned by its gross negligence.
Moreover the Court said that the admission of the defendant that it re-
"According to the Court, even if it had been willing to adopt either of the
other two views, the only date which could have saved plaintiff's cause of action
was the date of discovery. It would seem, however, that there is reason enough
for contending that the termination of the doctor-patient relationship was not until
the fall of 1953. All subsequent operations and treatment were made necessary, at
least indirectly, by the appendectomy, and the twelve-month checkup was only
technically the termination of their relationship. IfYthis contention be justified and
if the Court had adopted this view, then this date would also save the cause of
action.
"8 "It is not for us to justify the limitation period .... [T]his is a matter
within the province of the General Assembly." 246 N.C. at 370, 98 S.E.2d at 514.
246 N.C. 442, 98 S.E.2d 667 (1957).
20 This action was instigated by the bailor, who asked for damages for the loss
of his truck. The bailee, denying negligence on his part, counterclaimed for the
loss of his garage and equipment.
38 246 N.C. 547, 99 S.E.2d 756 (1957).
" This case is also discussed under CoNTRAcrs.
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ceived the plaintiff's bag and failed to return it on demand was sufficient
to take the case to the jury, citing Perry v. Seaboard Air Line Ry.33
In the Perry case the trial judge was held to have committed error
for assuming in his charge to the jury that the plaintiff had established
the fact that the loss occurred while the suitcase was in the defendant's
possession. But in view of the new trial, the Court felt constrained to
deal with the defendant's contention that there was no presumption of-
negligence on proof of loss by a gratuitous bailee. In concluding that
there was a presumption of negligence sufficient for the consideration of
the jury, the Court recognized that a gratuitous bailee is liable only for
loss occasioned by its gross negligence-its failure to exercise slight
diligence. Quoting from Hanes v. Shapiro,3 4 the Court explained,3 5
"[T]he terms 'slight negligence,' 'gross negligence,' and 'ordinary neg-
ligence' are convenient terms to indicate the degree of care required;
but in the last analysis, the care required by the law is that of the man
of ordinary prudence. This is the safest and best rule and rids us of
the technical and useless distinctions in regard to the subject." Applying
this rule to ascertain the liability of the gratuitous bailee, the Court
said,36 "[F]ailure to exercise the care of a person of ordinary prudence
undertaking to carry the goods of another without compensation" is
,gross negligence. Thus it would appear that the test for gross negligence
is the same as that for ordinary negligence and that the gratuitous bail-
ment is merely to be considered as one of the circumstances.3 7
Furthermore, in answering the posed question of what the plaintiff
must prove, the Court said, "[P]roof of delivery to the carrier and its
failure to deliver is evidence of negligence sufficient to carry the case
to the jury and to support a verdict ..... ."38 Apparently fully aware
that some of the cases relied upon .were cases of bailment for hire39 in-
volving ordinary negligence as the standard of liability, the Court said
that the rule "prevails in every bailment." 40
Gas and Electric Companies
The highly explosive nature of liquefied petroleum gas imposes upon
a'171 N.C. 158, 88 S.E. 156 (1916).
"168 N.C. 24, 30, 84 S.E. 33, 36 (1915).
171 N.C. at 163, 88 S.E. at 159.
"Ibid.
37 "Ordinary care, being that kind of care which should be used in the particular
circumstances, is the correct standard in all cases. It may be high or low in de-
gree, according to circumstances, but is, at least, that which is adapted to the
situation." Hanes v. Shapiro, 168 N.C. 24, 30, 84 S.E. 33, 36 (1915).
"8 171 N.C. at 163, 88 S.E. at 159. The theory is that this evidence raises a
prima facie case, making it incumbent upon the defendant to accept the burden of
going forward to absolve itself.
" Hackney v. Perry, 152 Ala. 626, 44 So. 1029 (1907) ; Yazoo & M.V.R.R. v.
Hughes, 94 Miss. 242, 47 So. 662 (1908).10 17J N.C. at 164, 88 S.E. at 160.
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the distributors of such gas the duty of preventing its escape and min-
imizing its danger.4 1  Thus, where an agent of a gas company was
filling the tank of a customer and evidence would support the inference
that he was using defective equipment or making improper use of his
equipment resulting in the escape of gas and consequent explosion, the
Court reversed a nonsuit below.4
In Frazier v. Suburban Rulane Gas Co.43 the evidence indicated that
the defendant had agreed to conduct periodic inspections of the gas
fixtures which it had installed in the plaintiff's chicken house. There
was also evidence to the effect that defendant had negligently failed
to inspect the equipment and that the fire was caused by an accumulation
of soot in the burners or defects in the pipes, either of which could have
been discovered by an adequate inspection. The Court held that the
evidence on the issue of negligence was sufficient to go to the jury.
The maintenance of high tension power lines also imposes upon
power companies the duty of utmost care to avoid injury.4 4 That duty,
however, does not require the power company to cut and remove a sound
tree, located on or near the boundary line of its right-of-way, solely be-
cause the tree is of sufficient height to strike the power line if felled in
that direction.4 5
The duty of insulating high tension wires and of placing warning
signs is limited to those places where the power company could, in the
exercise of ordinary prevision, anticipate that someone might, in the
course of his legitimate activities, come in contact with the wires. 40
Owners and Occupiers of Land
An invitee who slips and falls on a waxed floor may maintain an
action against the owner or occupier only when he presents evidence
that the floors were improperly waxed or polished.47 In Copeland v.
Phthisic48 the plaintiff, a business invitee, presented evidence that at
the point where she slipped there was a large patch of accumulated wax
sufficient to reveal her shoe heel print imbedded therein. The Court
held that it was not error to submit the case to the jury.
" Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Modern Gas Co., 247 N.C. 471, 101 S.E.2d 389 (1958).
,2 Ibid.
'1247 N.C. 256, 100 S.E.2d 501 (1957).
"Lea v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 246 N.C. 287, 98 S.E.2d 9 (1957).
"'Ibid. A power company is not required to anticipate negligence on the
part of others.
"Philyan v. Kinston, 246 N.C. 534, 98 S.E2d 791 (1957).
Barnes v. Hotel 0. Henry Corp., 229 N.C. 730, 51 S.E.2d 180 (1949).
"245 N.C. 580, 96 S.E.2d 697 (1957). Where no evidence of improper waxing
was presented, a licensee -who slipped on a throw rug placed over a recently waxed
floor was nonsuited. Murrell v. Handley, 245 N.C. 559, 96 S.E.2d 717 (1957).
[Vol. 36
NORTH CAROLINA CASE LAW
Contributory Negligence
As a matter of law, a child three years old is incapable of negligence
or contributory negligence. 49
In Harris v. Bingham the plaintiff alleged that the defendant, a
real estate broker, in drafting a contrat to sell plaintiff's land to a third
person, negligently failed to indicate that the land was subject to a right-
of-way for a highway. The Court held that a person is presumed to
know the contents of what he signs and that when plaintiff signed the
contract he was charged with knowledge of the omission and of de-
fendant's breach of duty. Thus, he had a duty to be vigilant in attempt-
ing to avoid injury to himself. A demurrer to the complaint was sus-
tained.
Proximate Cause and Last Clear Chance
The failure to remove the switch key from a parked car does not
render the owner of an automobile liable for the negligent operation of
the car by a thief who steals it.S1 "To allow recovery would do violence
to the rule of proximate cause as understood and applied in this jurisdic.-
tion." 52
In Burr v. Everhart53 the plaintiff insisted that a scaffold was neces-
sary before he could begin to tear off a roof in safety and that the failure
of defendant to supply a scaffold was a breach of her duty to provide
a safe place to work. He alleged that the accident occurred when a
plate at the eave of the roof crumbled-4 as he stepped from the roof to a
ladder. The Court held that there was no showing that the presence
of the scaffold, rather than the ladder, would have prevented his fall
and, therefore, the breach of duty was not the proximate cause of the
injury.
When the judge charges the jury seriatim on the issues of (1) de-
fendant's negligence, (2) the plaintiff's contributory negligence, and
(3) the doctrine of last clear chance, he need not submit the doctrine of
last clear chance to the jury on the first issue. 55
AUTOMOBILES
The decisions involving motor vehicles since the last Case Survey
may be grouped into the following categories: five concerned collisions
" Arnette v. Yeago, 247 N.C. 356, 100 S.E.2d 855 (1957).10 246 N.C. 77, 97 S.E.2d 453 (1957).
" Williams v. Mickens, 247 N.C. 262, 100 S.E.2d 511 (1957).
" Id. at 264, 100 S.E.2d at 513.
246 N.C. 327, 98 S.E.2d 327 (1957).
Defendant was found to be under no duty to anticipate the rotten condition
of the plate.
" Hennis Freight Lines, Inc. v. Burlington Mills Corp., 246 N.C. 143, 97 S.E.2d
850 (1957). The application of this doctrine is considered in Barnes v. Horney,
247 N.C. 495, 101 S.E.2d 315 (1958), 36 N.C.L. REv. 545.
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between vehicles at intersections ;56 five arose when vehicles struck pe-
destrians or children on the road ;57 three involved train-motor vehicle
collisions ;58 four concerned vehicles moving in the same direction when
they collided ;59 five were concerned with stopped or parked cars ;O0 eight
involved vehicles traveling in the opposite direction ;61 two cases con-
sidered the question of which of the deceased occupants was driving the
car at the time of the accident ;62 and three cases considered the prob-
lem of the guest passenger.63
TRIAL AND APPELLATE PRACTICE
PROCESS
In 1955 the North Carolina legislature enacted G.S. § 55-38.1 (re-
cently designated as G.S. § 55-145), by which it is sought to subject
foreign -corporations to the jurisdiction of our courts to a far greater
extent than :was visualized in the "doing business" concept of old G.S.
§ 55-38. Paragraph (3) of the statute, which purported to make a
foreign corporation subject to the jurisdiction of our courts if it manu-
factured or'distributed goods with the reasonable expectation that such
goods would be used or consumed in North Carolina and such goods
". "Jackson v. McCoury, 247 N.C. 502, 101 S.E.2d 377 (1958); Edens v. Caro-
lina Freight- Carriers Corp., 247 N.C. 391, 100 S.E.2d 878 (1957); Price v. Gray,
246 N.C. 162, 97 S.E.2d 844 (1957) ; Mallette v. Ideal Laundry & Dry Cleaners
Inc., 245 N.C. 652, 97 S.E.2d 245 (1957); Taylor v. Brake, 245 N.C. 553, 96
S.E.2d.686 (1957):
" Barnes v. Horney, 247 N.C. 495, 101 S.E.2d 315 (1958); Barbee v. Perry,
246 N.C. 538, 98 S.E.2d 794 (1957); Lane v. Bryan, 246 N.C. 108, 97 S.E.2d 411(1957); Bridgers v. Wiggs, 245 N.C. 663, 97 S.E.2d 119 (1957); Fleming v.
Twiggs, 244 N.C. 666, 94 S.E.2d 821 (1956).5, Bumgarner v. Southern Ry., 247 N.C. 374, 100 S.E.2d 830 (1957) ; Faircloth
v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 247 N.C: 190, 100 S.E.2d 328 (1957) ; Irby v. Southern
Ry., 246 NC. 384, 98 S.E.2d 349 .(1957). ,
" Simmons v. Rogers, 247 N.C. 340, 100 S.E.2d 849 (1957) ; Queen City Coach
Co. v. Fultz, 246 N.C. 523, 98 S.E.2d 860 (1957) ; Crotts v. Overnite Transp. Co.,
246 N.C. 420, 98 S.E.2d 502 .(1957); Sloan v. Glenn, 245 N.C. 55, 95 S.E.2d 81
(1956).
"o Wilson v. Webster, 247 N.C. 393, 100 S.E.2d 829 (1957) ; Keener v. Beal,
246 N.C. 247, 98 S.E.2d 19 (1957) ; Basnight v. Wilson, 245 N.C. 548, 96 S.E.2d
699 (1957) ; Clark v. Emerson, 245 N.C. 387, 95 S.E.2d 880 (1957) ; Weavil v.
C. W. Myers Trading Post, Inc., 245 N.C. 106, 95 S.E.2d 533 (1956).
"' Wise v. Lodge, 247 N.C. 250, 100 S.E.2d 677 (1957) ; Durham v. McLean
Trucking Co., 247 N.C. 204, 100 S.E.2d 348 (1957) ; Robbins v. Crawford, 246 N.C.
622, 99 S.E.2d 852 (1957); Kirkman v. Baucom, 246 N.C. 510, 98 S.E.2d 922(1957); Morgan v. Bell Bakeries, Inc., 246 N.C. 429, 98 S.E.2d 464 (1957);
Hennis Freight Lines, Inc. v. Burlington Mills Corp., 246 N.C. 143, 97 S.E.2d 850
(1957) ; Lookabill v. Regan, 245 N.C. 500, 96 S.E.2d 421 (1957) ; White v. Lacey,
245 N.C. 364, 96 S.E.2d 1 (1957).
" Parker v. Wilson, 247 N.C. 47, 100 S.E.2d 258 (1957) ; Bridges v. Graham,
246 N.C. 371, 98 S.E.2d 492 (1957). These cases are considered in EvIDENCE.
"' Bell v. Maxwell, 246 N.C. 257, 98 S.E.2d 33 (1957) ; Tatem v. Tatem, 245
N.C. 587, 96 S.E.2d 725 (1957) ; Basnight v. Wilson, 245 N.C. 548, 96 S.E.2d 699(1957).
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were so used or consumed, was held unconstitutional as applied to the
facts presented in Putnam v. Triangle Publications, Inc.' Paragraph
(4) of the statute, which purported to make a foreign corporation sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of our courts for any tortious conduct it com-
mitted in North Carolina, was held valid and applied in Painter v. Home
Finance Co.
2
It is well established that a non-resident who comes into this state
to testify is exempt from the service of civil process while he is at court
or coming to or going from it. This exemption is not bottomed on
statute but was well established at common law.3 In 1937 North Caro-
lina adopted the Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses
from without a State in Criminal Proceedings.4 Under this statute, a
state having the act may request another state to summon a resident
of that state to appear as a witness in a criminal or grand jury proceed-
ing in the demanding state. Such summons will be issued by the state
receiving the request if it appears that no undue hardship will be caused
and that the witness will be free from the service of either civil or crim-
inal process while he is in the demanding state or going to or from it.
In Thrush v. Thrush5 a non-resident party litigant while in North
Carolina to attend a civil action was served in the civil action just
named. The Court properly held that the non-resident was exempt from
the service of civil process, cited the common law authority of Winder
v. Penniman,6 but then also cited as authority for its holding the fifth
section of the above mentioned uniform act which was entirely in-
applicable. In so doing the Court repeated the same sort of error that
was committed in Bangle v. Webb,7 also cited in the opinion.
NoNSUIT
In Cox v. Cox8 the Court held that a wife who has filed suit for di-
vorce cannot take a voluntary nonsuit if the defendant husband has ap-
peared in the action and filed a petition for custody of the child of the
marriage. It is familiar law that a plaintiff will not be permitted to take
a voluntary nonsuit when the defendant has filed a counterclaim arising
out of the transaction set forth in the complaint. 9 The custody petition
1245 N.C. 432, 96 S.E2d 445 (1957).
2245 N.C. 576, 96 S.E.2d 731 (1957). These cases and the general question bf
jurisdiction over foreign corporations are considered in Note, 35 N.C.L. REv. 546
(1957).8 Winder v. Penniman, 181 N.C. 7, 105 S.E. 884 (1921).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 8-65 to -70 (1953).
246 N.C. 114, 97 S.E.2d 472 (1957).
0181 N.C. 7, 105 S.E. 884 (1921).
7220 N.C. 423, 17 S.E.2d 613 (1941).8 246 N.C. 528, 98 S.E.2d 879 (1957).
' Samuel H. Shearer & Son v. Herring, 189 N.C. 460, 127 S.E. 519 (1925);
McLean v. McDonald, 173 N.C. 429, 92 S.E. 148 (1917).
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was an effort on the part of the husband to obtain affirmative relief and
the Court applied the counterclaim analogy to that petition in denying
the wife the right to take a voluntary nonsuit.
In the Cox case, the clerk on motion of the wife entered a judgment
of voluntary nonsuit. The superior court reversed and the wife appealed.
The Supreme Court not only held that the clerk's action was erroneous
but also held that the reversal of the nonsuit by the superior court
and the retention of the case was not such a final order as would sanction
an immediate appeal.10
RIEFERENCE
It is familiar law that an order of compulsory reference should not
be made in the face of an undisposed of plea in bar. It has been held
that the statute of limitations is a plea in bar which must be disposed
of prior to the making of a compulsory reference.1 The theory of the
Court has been that if the determination of the plea will defeat the action
of the plaintiff in its entirety the reference should be held up until the
merits of the plea are determined. Only if the defendant should fail in
establishing the plea would it then be necessary for the trial court to
consider the matters as to which compulsory reference is sought.
However, in Solon Lodge v. Ionic Lodge12 the Court held that a
plea of the statute of limitations would not bar a compulsory reference
under the particular circumstances of the case. The action was to
establish a trust in real property and so was one type of action in which
a compulsory reference could be ordered under G.S. § 1-189(5). It
appeared that no accounting was sought, but a specific sum was involved.
To establish the trust and to defeat the plea of the statute of limitations
it was necessary to rely on substantially the same evidence. Since one
trial on substantially the same evidence would answer both the issue
of the existence of the trust and the validity of the plea of the statute of
limitations, there would be no purpose in having separate trials. In fact
the reason of the rule-that the plea in bar must be first disposed of
before the reference-would be defeated.
JURY-PoLLING
The necessity of having the record clearly indicate the answers of
jurymen on a poll is illustrated in State v. Dow.12 Following a verdict
"0 See Veazey v. Durham, 231 N.C. 354, 57 S.E.2d 375 (1950), for a discussion
of nonappealability of interlocutory orders.
" Oldham v. Rieger, 145 N.C. 254, 58 S.E. 1091 (1907). See also Murchison
Nat'l Bank v. Evans, 191 N.C. 535, 132 S.E. 563 (1926).
12245 N.C. 281, 95 S.E.2d 921 (1957).
13246 N.C. 644, 99 S.E.2d 860 (1957).
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of guilty, defense counsel requested that the jury be polled. The tran-
script of the record shows that the court addressed the various jurors in
an effort to determine if they concurred in the verdict. Answers of some
of the jurors appear while the record fails to show a response or an in-
dication of their position by other jurors. Possibly the jurors nodded in
the affirmative but the record, while showing such indication as to cer-
tain jurors, is silent as to others. In granting a new trial the Court said,
"[T]he record must affirmatively establish that each juror assented to
the verdict entered .... The verdict now challenged does not, on the
record, meet the test."14
In North Carolina State Highway and Public Works Comm'n v.
Privett,15 the trial court properly polled the jury. Counsel then wished
to ask the jurors if they were aware of the amount of the commissioners'
award when they returned their verdict. This question was held to be
manifestly improper as it would tend to impeach the jurors' verdict by
seeking to ascertain the grounds upon which they agreed on their verdict.
It was properly ruled out by the trial court.
JUDGMENTS
Vacation of Judgments
A novel situation involving the vacation of a divorce decree after
the death of the wife who obtained the decree was presented in Patrick
v. Patrick.'6 It appeared that Mrs. Patrick filed suit for divorce on the
ground of five years' separation and desertion in 1929 when Patrick was
temporarily out of the state employed in Pennsylvania. Publication was
had, but no actual notice of the suit was given Patrick. After obtaining
the divorce Mrs. Patrick joined her "husband" in Pennsylvania. The
parties then returned to North Carolina and apparently lived happily as
man and wife until Mrs. Patrick's death in 1956. The first knowledge
Patrick had of the divorce was when letters of administration which
had been granted him on Mrs. Patrick's estate were revoked.
Within twenty-five days after learning of the divorce, Mr. Patrick
made a motion in the divorce action to have the decree vacated. The
trial judge granted the relief and his action was affirmed. The fact
that the wife was now deceased was held immaterial. There had been
a fraudulent concealment of the divorce action on the part of the wife.
The method of service, instead of being designed to inform the husband,
was designed to keep him in ignorance. The wife's action was a fraud
both on her husband and the court. The significant statement of the
Court is, "When the method of service is not intended to give notice,
"4Id. at 646, 99 S.E.2d at 862.
1 246 N.C. 501, 99 S.E.2d 61 (1957).
10 245 N.C. 195, 95 S.E.2d 585 (1956).
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but to conceal it, jurisdiction of the defendant is not acquired." 17 And
although the Court found the statutory requisites had been met as to
service by publication, "[JIurisdiction was not obtained by the method
of service employed. Lack of notice denied the defendant the opportu-
nity to appear and to defend."' 8
Res ludicata
A most significant case in the field of res judicata is Thompson
v. Lassiter.9 A minor son was driving his father's car with his father's
permission when he became involved in a three-car accident. A pas-
senger in one of the other cars sued the driver of the third and that
driver brought in as defendants the son and the driver of the other
car under the contribution statute, G.S. § 1-240. The father appeared
in the litigation as guardian ad litem for his son. A jury verdict found
all three drivers negligent and a-,yarded damages to the plaintiff.
Subsequently the father sued the original defendant and sought to
recover for the damages occasioned to his own car and for the medical
expenses and loss of earnings of his son. The Court held that the
judgment rendered in the action by the passenger was res judicata as
to the right of the father to sue the driver of one of the other cars. The
theory of the Court was that although the father was not individually a
party to the original action, he appeared in the case as guardian ad litem,
had control of the litigation, and could cross examine the various parties;
therefore, he should be held bound by the result of the first suit.
In reaching this conclusion the Court was called upon to distinguish
Rabil v. Farris,20 in which the Court held that when a father acts as
next friend in bringing an action for his child he is not estopped by an
adverse judgment in the child's suit from suing individually for expenses
incurred and loss of services of the child. The fact that a next friend
is appointed to prosecute an action for the infant while a guardian ad
litem is appointed to defend is a distinction which the Court finds sub-
stantial. But chief emphasis is placed ° on the fact that the father, as
guardian ad litem, was in control of the defense of the cross action and
"took every action he could have taken if he had been a defendant
himself."
21
Of course, the father when prosecuting his son's action as next
friend would also take every action he might take in attempting to
establish liability later on in his own action for expenses incurred in
treating his son, etc. It is significant that in the Rabil case three of the
justices dissented and one of them, Justice Barnhill, asked, "Why then
:
17 Id. at 199, 95 S.E.2d at 588. 28 Id. at 200, 95 S.E.2d at 588-89.
10 246 N.C. 34, 97 S.E.2d 492 (1957).
20 213 N.C. 414, 196 S.E. 321 (1938).
21 246 N.C. at 39, 97 S.E.2d at 497.
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permit two actions contested on their merits, with respect to the same
facts, merely because the damages are to be divided between the father
and the infant? Under the doctrine of res judicata the father should be
bound as to the determination of facts in the prior case in which he
participated."22
It seems that greater consistency would be achieved if the Court
in the Thompson case, instead of attempting to distinguish the Rabil
case, had adopted the philosophy of the dissenting opinion in Rabil and
applied the res judicata principle to both next friend and guardian at
litem cases.
CONTEMPT-EFFECT OF APPEAL
In Lawson v. Lawson23 the plaintiff wife obtained an order from the
superior court that the defendant husband pay fees to her counsel and
alimony to her pendente lite. The husband promptly'appealed that order.
Thereafter, while the appeal was pending, the superior court adjudged
the husband in contempt for failure to comply with the order and
sentenced him to imprisonment until he complied. The husband there-
upon petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of supersedeas which that
Court granted. Held: the appeal divested the superior court of juris-
diction; its contempt adjudication and order of imprisonment were void
and accordingly were vacated. To similar effect is Holden v. Holden.2 4
APPEALS-PARTY AGGRIEVED
"Any party aggrieved may appeal . . . ." This provision which is
now G.S. § 1-271 has been in our statutes since 1868 and a multitude of
cases have interpreted and applied the section. In in re Application for
Reassignment25 the Court held that an order of the Greensboro City
Board of Education assigning certain negro children, on applications
made by their parents, to previously all white schools could not be made
the subject of appeal by parents of white children attending those
schools. Neither could these white parents obtain an injunction restrain-
ing the Board of Education from enrolling and permitting the Negro
children to attend the schools to which they had been assigned.
After reviewing the history of the Assignment and Enrollment of
Pupils Law,26 the Court concluded that the 'only party who can be
aggrieved by action of a board of education in making an assignment
under the statute is the child assigned or some one acting in his be-
22213 N.C. at 419, 196 S.E. at 324. 22244 N.C. 689, 94 S.E.2d 826 (1956).
2 245 N.C. 1, 95 S.E.2d 118 (1956), 35 N.C.L. REv. 405 (1957).
2 247 N.C. 413, 101 S.E.2d 359 (1957).
21 N.C. GEN. STAT. 115-176 to -179 (Supp. 1957). See Wettach, North Carolina
School Legislation, 35 N.C.L. REv. 1 (1956).
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half. Therefore, those parents of white children who have not them-
selves been denied a requested assignment are not "aggrieved parties"
and hence have no right of appeal. The-Court reiterated its position in
Joyner v. The McDowell County Bd. of EduC.2 7 to the effect that under
the assignment law class suits are not in order but that all applications
for assignment must be made individually and an appeal by an aggrieved
party must also be made on an individual basis.
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT
The case of Bailey v. McGill28 points up the necessity of having the
record show that the client has given express authority to his attorney
to withdraw a cause of action stated in the complaint. In the absence of
showing such authority, or actual consent on the part of the client, the
action of the attorney in announcing at the trial that the plaintiff does
not rely on a cause of action stated in the complaint will be nugatory.
While an attorney has certain implied authority, such authority is
usually limited to matters of procedure. The implied authority arising
out of the relationship does not confer upon the attorney the right to
surrender a substantial right of his client. To announce the withdrawal
or the nonreliance on a valid cause of action set up in the complaint is,
as was declared by the Court, a surrender of a substantial right of the
client 29
TRUSTS
While there were no decisions of major importance in the trusts area,
the Court did establish significant precedents on several minor points.
FAILURE TO FILE BOND
A successor trustee's failure to file the bond required by statute1 does
not make his appointment void, the Court held on a point of first im-
pression in State Trust Co. v. Toms.2 Applying *the rule generally
applicable to the original appointment of other fiduciaries from whom a
bond is required,3 the Court concluded that this was a mere irregularity
2-244 N.C. 164, 92 S.E.2d 795 (1956).
28247 N.C. 286, 100 S.E.2d 860 (1957).
2 See for other cases applying the rule declared in the Bailey case, State v.
Bailey, 240 N.C. 253, 81 S.E.2d 772 (1954); Bath v. Norman, 226 N.C. 502, 39
S.E.2d 363 (1946) ; Bank of Glade Spring v. McEwen, 160 N.C. 414, 76 S.E. 222
(1912).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36-17 (Supp. 1957).
244 N.C. 645, 94 S.E.2d 806 (1956).
'See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-35(1) (1950) (foreign executors), Batchelor
v. Overton, 158 N.C. 395, 74 S.E. 20 (1912) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-34 (1950) (ad-
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relating to the qualification of the trustee. Hence the original trustee's
resignation and settlement with its successor,4 made in conformity with
an order of the court having -jurisdiction, were valid and liability could
not be imposed on the original trustee for the successor's embezzlements.
TRUSTS FOR MA1RI WOMEN
A trust for a married woman, created to protect her property from
her husband, will terminate upon the death or divorce of the husband.
This is because the trust is extinguished by the accomplishment of its
object.5 North Carolina precedent to this effect was established by
Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Taliaferro.6 Here a testamentary trust
was to continue "for that period after the death of my wife ... during
which my daughter ... shall be married." When the will was executed
the daughter had separated from her husband and was awaiting a final
divorce under the five-year separation statute then in force. The Court
concluded that the testator had intended to insure by this provision that
the trust would not terminate before the daughter's marriage was dis-
solved. The final divorce was obtained prior to the death of the testator's
wife; and in an action brought some years later, the Court reinforced
the language of the will with the rule above stated and held that the
trust should have terminated upon the wife's death.7
PURCHASE MONEY RESULTING TRUST
In an action brought to establish a purchase money resulting trust
where the husband paid the purchase price and the deed named his wife
as sole grantee, the Court held that evidence of his having paid taxes on
the property from the time of its purchase was competent as "tending to
rebut the presumption of a gift" to the wife.8  This appears to have
been a point of first impression in North Carolina. Where one pays the
purchase price of property and title is put in another, nothing else ap-
pearing, equity presumes an intention to create a trust with the payor
as its beneficiary.9 However, when title is put in a close relative or the
ministrators and collectors), It re Estate of Pitchi, 231 N.C. 485, 57 S.E.2d
649 (1950) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 33-12 (1950) (guardian for minor or incompetent),
Howerton v. Sexton, 104 N.C. 75, 10 S.E. 148 (1889).
' See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36-9 to -18 (1950).
" See 4 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRusmzs § 997 (1948) ; 3 Scorr, TRUSTS § 337.5
(2d ed. 1956).
0 246 N.C. 121, 97 S.E.2d 776 (1957).
'Married women's trusts were also involved in Pilkington v. West, 246 N.C.
575, 99 S.E.2d 798 (1957), where the Court, overruling earlier decisions, held that
a passive trust for the sole and separate use of a married woman will be executed
by the Statute of Uses. See Note, 36 N.C.L. REv. 255 (1958).
'Waddell v. Carson, 245 N.C. 669, 97 S.E.2d 222 (1957).
' See Van Hecke and Edwards, Purchase Money Resulting Trusts in North
Carolina, 9 N.C.L. Rav. 177 (1930).
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purchaser's wife, this presumption ordinarily changes from one of
trust to gift.10 To rebut this in the instant case the husband also showed
that title had been placed in the wife by mistake, that the error was not
discovered for some eighteen years, and that the wife at this time at-
tempted to deed the property to him but her conveyance was void
because of a defect in its execution. 1 Evidence of a husband's conduct
after the purchase of the property would not seem to be conclusive in
rebutting the presumption of gift.12 His payment of taxes might be
considered consistent with a gift. Yet, such evidence would seem to be
relevant when considered with the other circumstances of the case.' 3
In the instant case the husband's evidence that he paid the taxes, along
with the other circumstances, was held sufficiently clear, cogent, and
convincing to rebut the presumption of gift and to establish the trust.
INTENT TO CREATE TRUST
A thirty word holographic will leaving all of the testator's property
"to my wife . . . to provide for my son . . . and herself" was deemed
sufficient to show an intention to create a trust in Morris v. Morris.4
The Court stated that in construing a will of such brevity, every ex-
pression used by the testator should be given effect, if possible. Here,
testator's dominant purpose was found to be, as he stated, to provide for
his wife and twelve-year-old son. From this the Court concluded that
the testator had intended for his wife to be under an enforceable duty,
as trustee, to deal with the property both for the benefit of the son and
for herself. Accordingly, the lower court's decision that the language
was merely precatory15 and that the wife took an estate in fee simple
was reversed. The Court has said that "no particular language is re-
quired to create a trust relationship if the intent to do so is evident."16
Although the Morris case finds the trust intent to have been expressed
in fewer words than had been used in previous holdings' T in this area,
the decision would seem to be correct.
10 See 2A BoGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 459 (1948).
It did not comply with the provisions of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-12 (1950),
governing conveyances from a wife to her husband.
12 See Parks v. Parks, 207 Ark. 720, 182 S.W.2d 470 (1944); 2A BoGmr,
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES 487 (1948).
" As to the types of evidence which may tend to rebut the presumption of gift,
see 2A BOaERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES 481-88 (1948).14246 N.C. 314, 98 S.E.2d 298 (1957).
See 1 Sconr, TRUSTS 189-202 (2d ed. 1956) ; 1 BoaER, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES
§ 48 (1948),
1 Stephens v. Clark, 211 N.C. 84, 88, 189 S.E. 191, 194 (1937).
17 See e.g, Jarrell v. Dyer, 170 N.C. 177, 86 S.E. 1031 (1915) (where testatrix
devised all of her property "to my mother . . . that she may administer it to the
use of my children," the mother was held to be trustee for the children) ; Crudup
v. Holding, 118 N.C. 222, 24. S.E. 7 (1896) (devise of testator's property to his
wife "to keep and to hold together for her use and the use of my children" made
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RULE AGAINST EXCESSIVE DURATION OF PRIVATE TRUSTS
Language used by the Court in Finch v. Honeycutt"8 may reopen
the possibility that a private trust, even though all interests are presently
vested, might be held invalid because full enjoyment of the trust prop-
erty in fee is postponed for an excessive period of time. This would
be accomplished, if at all, through the application of the disputed "rule
against excessive duration of private trusts,"'19 a doctrine of American
origin closely related to the Rule Against Perpetuities. Stated generally,
the rule against excessive duration provides that a private trust may not
be limited to continue beyond a period which might exceed a life or lives
in being and twenty-one years thereafter.2 0 In the Finch case the Court
held valid a trust for testator's three children (ages seven, three, and one-
and-one-half at the time of his death) in which he had provided for dis-
tribution of specified portions of his estate to them free from the trust in
1980 and 1992 and the balance in 2005. The Court held that such a
trust did not violate the Rule Against Perpetuities as the interests of
the children were presently vested, only the full enjoyment was post-
poned. The Rule is concerned wholly with the vesting of estates, not
with their enjoyment or possession. But, the Court then added:
Even though the postponements here, ultimately invade the
Twenty-first Century, reference to the ages of the children indi-
cates that the postponements are within the life or lives of the
beneficiaries in being and twenty-one years and tein lunar months
thereafter, the limitation of the Rule' against Perpetuities. 21
The significance of this language is not clear. However, it would
seem to imply that under a different factual' situation the Court might
strike down an otherwise valid trust because full enjoyment of the
fee is postponed for a period which might exceed that of the Rule
Against Perpetuities. The Court seems to be saying that because of
the youth of the children it has concluded that the distributions will
probably be made within their normal life. spans, and twenty-one years
thereafter. Unanswered is the question of ihat, the Court would have
wife trustee for herself and the children) ; Young v. Young, 68 N.C. 309 (1873)
(devise of estate to wife "to be managed by her (and that she may be enabled the
better to control and manage our children), to be disposed of by her to them, in the
manner she may think best for their good and for their own happiness" made wife
trustee for herself and children). -
18 246 N.C. 91, 97 S.E.2d 478 (1957).
"o See 1 ScoTr, TRUSTS § 62.10 (2d. ed. 1956); 1A BOGERT, TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES § 218 (1948); 3 SIMFS AND SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS § 1391 (1956);
Note, 27 N.C.L. REv. 158 (1948).
" 3 SIMES AND SMiTH, FUTURE INTERESTS 240 (1956) (the authors describe
the rule as a "doctrine toward which the courts are tending"). In 1A BOGERT,
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES 409 (1948), it is said, "If there is such a rule, it is a rule
that a grantor may not postpone direct enjoyment of property for too long a time."2 246 N.C. at 100, 97 S.E.2d at 485.
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said and done had the beneficiaries been so much older that it appeared
unlikely ihat the distributions would be made within their lives and
twenty-one years.
The Court has in two earlier cases22 indicated that the Rule Against
Perpetuities limits the duration of private trusts. However, these as-
sertions were repudiated in McQueen v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 23
where the Court stated that the Rule was only concerned with the
vesting of estates and not with the duration of the vested private trust.
The distribution in fee in that case was to be made to the income bene-




G.S. § 28-6(b) provides that upon renouncement of the right to
qualify as administrator the renouncing party may nominate in writing
some other qualified person to be named administrator without losing
his priority under G.S. § 28-6(a). Since G.S. § 28-6(b) leaves the
qualification of the nominee within the discretion of the clerk, upon
rejection the nominee ordinarily lacks sufficient interest in the estate to
challenge the issuance of letters of administration to another. It was
so held in In re Cogdill.2 Unless the nominee can show as a matter
of law that the clerk abused his discretion, only those persons who are
allowed the privilege of nominating under G.S. § 28-6(a) have sufficient
interest to challenge the appointment of another by proceeding under
G.S. § 28-32.
Upon death, title to personal property vests in the decedent's exec-
utor, or administrator for purposes of administration. It is generally
true that upon proper distribution personal property ceases to belong
to the decedent's estate. Absent any trust proviso imposing duties upon
the executor, he loses all control over the property and becomes functus
officio in regard thereto.2
In Darden v. Boyette3 T devised all his personal property to his
wife "for and during her natural life ... with full power to dispose of
the same by deed or will in fee simple" and upon her death "if there
2 Mercer v. Mercer, 230 N.C. 101, 52 S.E.2d 229 (1949), 48 MicII. L. REv.
235 (1949); American Trust Co. v. Williamson, 228 N.C. 458, 46 S.E.2d 104(1948), 27 N.C.L. REv. 158 (1948).
28234 N.C. 737, 68 S.E.2d 831 (1952).
246 N.C. 602, 99 S.E.2d 785 (1957).
'McKay v. Guirkin, 102 N.C. 21, 8 S.E. 776 (1889).
'247 N.C. 26, 100 S.E.2d 359 (1957).
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shall be any of said property ... left undisposed of by my said wife
during her lifetime, the same shall .. be divided among my then heirs
at law, per stirpes and not per capita." T's wife, having been appointed
executrix, distributed all such property to herself as life tenant pursuant
to T's will and after payment of all debts and funeral expenses terminated
the administration by filing her final account with the proper authorities.
Thereafter she died without having disposed of the property. The
plaintiff, subsequently appointed administrator c.t.a. of T's estate, sought
to recover possession of it.
The Court held that, since T's will had not imposed any trust proviso
on his estate, upon distribution of the property to the life tenant the
property inured to the benefit of the remaindermen. Therefore, since
the property was not subject to further administration, the plaintiff could
not qualify under G.S. § 1-57 as the real party in interest. This leaves
the remaindermen responsible for their own interests. This seems to
be in accord with prior North Carolina law.4
CONSTRUCTION
In Wchovia Bank and Trust Co. v. Wolf5 T's will, after providing
for certain bequests to specified charities, stated: "To my sister Mrs.
Camille H. Wolfe, I leave my furniture, household effects and personal
property. The balance of my estate I leave to the National Red Cross
society of America." The will failed to mention some $21,827.20 in cash
and securities to which both T's sister and the Red Cross asserted claims.
The Court in view of the particular circumstances involved concluded
that T intended "personal property" to include only such property as
"tangible articles of household and personal use." Therefore the cash
and securities passed under the terms of the will to the National Red
Cross.
In Finch v. Honeycutt6 the Court after stating there was a presump-
tion against intestacy applied the doctrine of devise by implication in
construing testator's will.
In Matheson v. American Trust Co." T established a testamentary
trust with income to be paid to a brother and wife (not specifically
naming the brother's wife) in equal shares and "should either of them
die before the termination of this trust, said trustees shall pay the whole
of said income to the survivor of them during the lifetime of such
'See McKay v. Guirkin, 102 N.C. 21, 8 S.E. 776 (1889).
245 N.C. 535, 96 S.E.2d 690 (1957). This case was previously reported in
243 N.C. 469, 91 S.E.2d 246 (1956), and discussed in 35 N.C.L. REv. 167, and
Fourth Annual Survey of North Carolina Case Law, 35 N.C.L. Rv. 177, 268
(1957).
6246 N.C. 91, 97 S.E.2d 498 (1957), 36 N.C.L. Rav. 365 (1958).7246 N.C. 710, 100 S.E.2d 77 (1957).
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survivor." The brother remarried after T's death and was survived by
his second wife, his first wife having previously died. The Court held
that the brother's second wife was not entitled to receive any part of
the trust income under the class gift theory since wives do not generally
constitute a class.
WIDOW'S DISSENT
G.S. § 30-1 allows a widow six months after probate in which to
dissent from her husband's will. In Whitted v. Wade8 the wife was
adjudged mentally incompetent before her husband's death, the condi-
tion later proving to be permanent. A guardian ad litem was not
appointed for the widow until after the expiration of the six month
period. After his appointment the guardian promptly filed the widow's
dissent. G.S. § 30-1 was again held to be a statute of limitations and
not an enabling act.9 Consequently G.S. § 1-17 which tolls the statutes
of limitations until the disability is removed and for three years there-
after, was deemed to be applicable. 'Therefore, the widow's dissent
was filed within due time.
DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION
G.S. § 33-32 states in part:
"[I]n all sales by guardians whereby real is substituted by per-
sonal, or personal by real property, the beneficial interest in the
property acquired shall be enjoyed, alienated, devised or be-
queathed, and shall descend and be distributed, as by law the
property sold might and would have been had it not been sold,
until it be reconverted from the character thus impressed upon it
by some act of the owner and restored to its character proper."
(Emphasis added.)
Brown v. Cowper ° is a case of first impression in North Carolina.
The Court-was twice presented with the issue of "breaking the descent"
in ancestral property.- G.S. § 33-32 does not explicitly cover situa-
tions where realty is exchanged for realty. However, the Court held
8 247 N.C. 81, 100 S.E.2d 263 (1957). See Note, 35 N.C.L. Rav. 520 (1957).
'Hinton v. Hinton, 61 N.C. 410 (1868).
10247 N.C. 1, 100 S.E.2d 305 (1957).
"' North Carolina distinguishes ancestral and nonancestral property. If an
intestate- owns land which has been obtained from his ancestor by gift, devise,
descent, or settlement and he dies without leaving lineal descendants, the land
descends to his collateral heirs who are of the ancestor's blood; N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 29-1(4) (1950) ; McCall and Langston, A New Iatestate Succession Statute for
North Carolina, 11 N.C.L. REv. 266, 279 (1933); Comment, 42 YALE L.J. 101
(1933). But if the intestate purchased the land for a valuable consideration from
his ancestor, the land will descend as nonancestral property to his collateral heirs
in general. This is called breaking the descent. See Jones v. Jones, 227 N.C.
424, 42 S.E.2d 620 (1947) ; Ex parte Barefoot, 201 N.C. 393, 160 S.E. 365 (1931).
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that where real property of an incompetent was exchanged for other
realty, the land received by the incompetent was subject to the ancestral
characteristics of the land exchanged therefor, since such was within the
"purpose and intent" of G.S. § 33-32. The case also presented the
issue of whether or not a sale and repurchase by the incompetent would
break the line of descent. The incompetent's land was sold under court
order. The purchaser executed notes secured by a deed of trust. Upon
default the land was re-purchased for the incompetent. Once again the
Court held that there was no "breaking of the descent" since this situa-
tion also fell within the purport of the statute.
PROBATE
G.S. § 31-19 provides that a "record and probate is conclusive in
evidence of the validity of the will, until it is vacated on appeal or
declared void by a competent tribunal." -In Morris v. Morris12 the
Court construed this statute to the effect that an order of probate is to be
considered conclusive only when it is regular on its face. Therefore, in
a proceeding under the Declaratory Judgment. AMc for, the ,coonstruction
of a holographic will where the order, of probate indicated 'that only
two persons proved tfie execution thereof in stead ,of the',three -required
by G.S. § 31-18.2, thei order was held to be fatally ,dfective: -
"245 N.C. 30, 95 S.E2d 110 (1956).
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